AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
P.L.N. Sarma, J.—The point that has to be decided in this batch of writ petitions is:
"When persons holding the posts of Examiner, Copyist, Reader in the A.P. Judicial Ministerial Service are promoted to the post of Junior Assistant (L.D.C.) carrying the same time-scale of pay, they are entitled to have their pay fixed in the promotion post at the stage next above the pay notionally arrived at by increasing their pay in the lower post by one increment as per F.R.22-B."
The relevant facts leading to the reference to the Full Bench are as follows:
Petitioners in these writ petitions were holding the posts of Examiner, Copyist and Reader in the A.P. judicial Ministerial Service governed by "A.P. Judicial Ministerial Service Rules, 1964", (herein after referred to as "the Service Rules"), and promoted some of them as Junior Assistants (L.D.Cs.) and some as Typists and others as Steno-typists between the years from 1981 to 1989 i.e., after 1-4-1978.
Posts of Junior Assistants (L.D.Cs.), Steno-typists and Typists are in Category 5 of Division IV of ''the Service Rules''. Posts of Examiners are included in Category 6 of Division IV of ''the Service Rules''. Posts of Readers, among others, in the Muffasal Courts are included in Division V, while the posts of Copyists are included in Division VI. Categories 5 and 6 in Division IV and Divisions V and VI are as under:
"Category 5:-Junior Assistants, including III Grade Clerks in the Offices of Public Prosecutors and Government Pleaders in Telangana area, Assistant Nazir, Junior Superintendents of Copyists, III Grade Clerks in Courts in Telangana area, Typists, including III Grade Typists in Courts in Telangana area and Steno-typists.
Category 6:- Assistant Superintendents of Copyists; Examiners.
Division V:
Muffasal Courts.
Category : 1. Amins. 2. Readers.
Division VI:
(Muffasal Courts)
Copyists."
(Underlining is ours)
Earlier, time-scale of pay for the posts of Junior Assistants and others in Category 5 is Rs. 250-10-430 higher than the time-scale of pay attached to the posts of Examiner, Copyist and Reader i.e., Rs. 240-10-420 as per G.O.Ms.No. 180 Finance dated 15-7-1975. Later on, Revised Pay scales were introduced as a consequence of the recommendations of the Pay Revision Commissioner in G.O.Ms.No. 235 Finance, (PRC-I) dated 17-9-1979 fixing identical scale of pay of Rs. 425-10-455-15-650 for the posts of not only Junior Assistant, Typist and Steno-typist but also for the posts of Examiner, Copyist and Reader. Revised scales of pay came to be applied with effect from 1-4-1978. The result is that with effect from 1-4-1978, time-scales of pay attached to the posts of Junior Assistant (L.D.C.), Typist, Steno-typist, Examiner, Copyist and Reader were equalised and made identical. However, in the hierarchy of the posts, the same position is maintained, viz., that the posts of Junior Assistant, Typist and Steno-typist remained in Category 5 of Division IV and continued to be promotion posts for persons holding the posts of Examiner, Copyist and Reader. In the year 1986, the identical scales of pay were revised to Rs. 910-30-1240-35-1625.
In this batch of writ petitions, petitioners who are all holding the posts of Examiner, Copyist and Reader were promoted to the posts of Junior Assistant etc., which are in Category 5 (Promotion posts) between the years 1981 to 1989. They claim that since they are promoted from a lower post to a higher post they are entitled to have their pay fixed in terms of F.R.22-B of the "Service Rules". For this purpose, they relied upon the language of the said rule to the effect that if Government servants holding posts in a substantive, officiating or temporary capacity are promoted or appointed in a substantive, officiating or temporary capacity to another post carrying duties and responsibilities of greater importance, they are entitled to have their pay fixed in the higher post after arriving notionally at their pay in the lower post by stepping up the same by one increment.
Originally, persons similarly situated approached this Court by way of a Writ Petition No. 7811 of 1984. The said writ petition was disposed of on 20-6-1988 by K. Ramaswamy, J. (as he then was). The learned Judge thought that at the relevant time the scales of pay attached to the post of Junior Assistant (L.D.C.) etc., and the post of Examiner, Reader and Copyist were distinct and separate. We will deal with this judgment at a later stage. Suffice to say that factually the assumption is not correct. The said judgment was followed by the same learned Judge while disposing of Writ Petition No. 11469 of 1984 dated 24-6-1988. However, the same point arose in Writ Petition No. 10733 of 1983 which came up before A. Raghuvir, J. The learned Judge by his order dated 27-11 -1987 dismissed the same without going into merits of the case. In the said writ petition, a communication of the Registrar of the High Court to the District Judges to verify as to the fixation of pay to the LD.Cs. who were promoted from the category of Examiners after April 1,1978 and refix their pay and if any excess amount was paid, the same may be recovered, was questioned. The learned Judge while dismissing the writ petition stated as follows:
"All that is directed in the impugned order is to verify what amount the petitioners were paid and only in the event of excess payments'', the excess be recovered. The order is unexceptionable. The writ petition is dismissed. No costs."
Obviously, this judgment was not brought to the notice of K. Ramaswamy, J., when the learned judge was disposing of the writ petitions referred to above. The judgment of A. Raghuvir, J., in Writ Petition No. 10633 of 1983 dt.27-11-1987 was carried in Writ Appeal No. 1321 of 1988 by the petitioners in the writ petition to a Division Bench of this Court. The said writ appeal was dismissed by the then Hon''ble Chief justice and M. Jagannadha Rao, J., on 12-12-1988 in the following words:
"In view of Rule 30(2) of the Fundamental Rules, the writ petitioners are not entitled to any increments on being posted as Lower Division Clerks (Junior Assistants) because the pay scales of both the LD.Cs. (J.As.) and the Examiners are the same.
The Writ Appeal is consequently dismissed."
While so, another Writ Petition No. 9093 of 1989 raising the same question came up before Sardar Ali Khan, J. The learned Judge, on 19-9-1989, following the Judgments of K. Ramaswamy, J., in Writ petition Nos. 7811 of and 11469 of 1984, held that the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of F.R.22-B. However, it is significant to notice that the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 1321 of 1988 was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge. While things stood thus, this batch of writ petitions came up before V. Sivaraman Nair, J. All the conflicting decisions of this Court referred to above have been brought to the notice of the learned Judge. The learned Judge felt that the essential aspect to be satisfied for the application of F.R.22-B of Fundamental Rules is that the post to which the Government servant is promoted shall carry duties and responsibilities of greater importance than those attached to the post held by him. The learned judge felt that the promotion of a Government servant to a superior post, does not by itself justify the application of Rule 22-B of the Fundamental Rules unless the promoted post carries with it the duties and responsibilities of greater importance. The learned Judge seems to be of the opinion that irrespective of the fact whether the scales of pay are the same for the lower post as well as promoted post and whether the promotion is to a superior post, to enable the applicant to claim the benefit of F.R.22-B, the superior post to which he is promoted should carry duties and responsibilities of greater importance. The learned Judge was also of the view that F.R.30(2) only applies to the promotions made for officiating appointments and may not apply to the promotions made otherwise. The learned Judge being of the view that it is necessary to reconcile the conflicting views contained in the judgments referred to above, directed the papers to be placed before the Hon''ble The Chief Justice for taking orders to have the matter heard by a Division Bench, by his order dated 19-10-1990.
Accordingly, the matters were placed before a Division Bench consisting of Sardar Ali Khan and Y. Bhaskar Rao, JJ. The learned Judges of the Division Bench were not inclined to agree with the view expressed by the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 1321 of 1988 dated 12-12-1988 and felt that this batch of writ petitions deserves to be referred to a Full Bench for a final and authoritative pronouncement on the subject Accordingly, the matters are referred to the Full Bench and that is how they have come up before us.
Sri M. Panduranga Rao and Sri J. Venugopala Rao, learned counsel addressed arguments on behalf of the petitioners in these writ petitions. The main contention raised by the lea; led counsel is that the posts of Examiner, Reader and Copyist are in Category 6 of Division IV, and Divisions V and VI respectively, while the posts of Junior Assistant (L.D.C.), Typist and Stenotypist are in Category 5 of Division IV. The posts of Junior Assistant, Typist and Steno-typist are in the higher category and they are promotion posts for the persons holding the posts of Examiner, Reader and Copyist. Promotion Posts i.e., Junior Assistants etc., carry duties and responsibilities of greater importance than those attached to the post of Examiner, Reader and Copyist and therefore, on a plain reading of F.R.22-B, all the petitioners are entitled to have their pay fixed in the higher post, viz., Junior Assistant etc., at the stage next above the pay notionally arrived at by increasing their pay in the lower post by one increment. In this connection, the learned counsel drew our attention to the definition of "Promotion" contained in Clause (o) of Rule 2(1) of the "Service Rules", which is as under:
"(o) "promotion" means the appointment of a member of any division, category or grade of the service to a higher division, category or grade of the service;"
Learned counsel contended that the post of Junior Assistant is definitely a promotion post and it is a promotion insofar as the persons holding the posts of Examiner, Reader and Copyist are concerned and that having regard to the duties and responsibilities attached to the post of Junior Assistant, which are duties and responsibilities of greater importance man those attached to the post of Examiner, Reader and Copyist, they are entitled to the application of F.R.22-B and have their pay fixed accordingly in the post to which they are promoted, viz., Junior Assistant (L.D.C.) etc. They challenged in these writ petitions the clarifications issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, Home (Courts-C) Department dated 16-3-1983 and 20-3-1986 respectively. In the impugned letters, Government stated that in view of the fact that the posts of L.D.C. as well as Examiner, Reader and Copyist carry an identical time-scale of pay of Rs. 425-10-455-15-650 with effect from 1-4-1978, the petitioners who are all promoted subsequent to 1-4-1978 are not eligible to have their pay fixed at the next higher stage under F.R.22-B.
On the other hand, learned Govenrment Pleader contended that in view of the fact that with effect from 1-4-1978 the time-scale of pay of all the posts having been equalised and fixed at Rs. 425-10-455-15-650 irrespective of the fact that it is promotional post carrying duties and responsibilities of greater importance, the petitioners will not be entitled to the benefit of F.R.22-B.
Before discussing the main point to be decided in these writ petitions, we are of the opinion that the posts of Junior Assistant (L.D.C), Typist and Stenotypist which are in the category of 5 of Division IV of the "Service Rules" are promotion posts for the persons holding the posts of Examiner, Reader and Copyist in view of the definition of "Promotion" contained in Rule 2(l)(o) of the "Service Rules". It is also clear that all these posts including the post of Junior Assistant (L.D.C.) carry the same time-scale of pay with effect from 1-4-1978 by virtue of G.O.Ms.No. 235 Finance (PRC-I) department dated 17-9-1979. It is clear that the petitioners who are all members of the A.P. Judicial Ministerial Service are governed by the Fundamental Rules by virtue of Rule 3 of the "Service Rules".
To appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary to refer and extract the Fundamental Rules which are relevant for the purpose of resolving the present controversy and they are as under:
"F.R.22-B. Notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules, where a Government servant holding a post in a substantive, officiating or temporary capacity is promoted or appointed in a substantive, officiating or temporary capacity to another post carrying duties and responsibilities of greater importance than those attaching to the post held by him, his initial pay in the time-scale of the higher post shall be fixed at the stage next above the pay notionally arrived at, by increasing his pay in respect of the lower post by one increment at the stage at which such pay has accured:
Provided that the provisions of this rule shall be applicable to all the Government servants who are promoted or appointed to the following categories of posts:-
(a) xxxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx or
(b) all posts carrying the scale of 1800-75-2400-100-2500 or below shown in column (3) of schedule I, to the Andhra Pradesh Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1979 introduced through G.O.(P) No. 235, Finance & Plg. (F.W. PRC-I) Department, dated the 17th September, 1979.
or
(c) xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx Provided that if a Government Servant either-
has previously held substantively, officiated in
(i) the same post, or
(ii) a permanent or temporary post on the same time-scale, or
(iii) a permanent post other than a tenure post, or a temporary post on an identical time-scale, or
(iv) is appointed substantively to a tenure post on a time-scale identical with that of another tenure post which he has previously held substantively or in which he has previously officiated,
then proviso to Fundamental Rule 22 shall apply in the matter of initial fixation of pay and counting of previous service for increment.
F.R.22. The initial substantive pay of a government servant who is appointed substantively to a post on a time-scale of pay is regulated as follows:
(a) If he holds a lien on a permanent post, other than a tenure post or would hold a lien on such a post had his lien not been suspended;
(i) When appointment to the new post involves the assumption of duties or responsibilities of greater importance (as interpreted for the purpose of Rule 30) than those attaching to such permanent post, he will draw as initial pay the stage of the time-scale next above his substantive pay in respect of the old post;
(ii) xxxxxx
(iii) xxxxxx
(iv) xxxxxx
(b)xxxxxxxxxxxx
Provided, both in cases covered by clause (a) and in cases other than cases of re-emplpyment after resignation, removal or dismissal from the public service covered by clause (b), that if he either
(1) has previously held substantively or officiated in-
(i) the same post, or
(ii) a permanent or temporary post on the same time-scale, or
(iii) a permanent post, other than a tenure post, on an identical time-scale, or a temporary post on an identical time scale such post on the same time-scale as a permanent post; or
(2) is appointed substantively to a tenure post on a time-scale identical with that of another tenure post which he has previously held substantively or in which he has previously officiated, then the initial pay shall not be less than the pay other than special pay, personal pay or emoluments classed as pay by the President of India under Rule 9(21)(a)(iii), which he drew on the last such occasion, and he shall count the period duirng which he drew that pay on such last and any previous occasion for increment in the stage of the time-scale equivalent to that pay."
On a plain reading of the language of F.R.22-B, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that, the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of F.R.22-B. However, learned Government Pleader drew our attention to the last proviso of F.R.22-B as extracted above, and contended that where both the posts, viz., promoted post as well as lower post from which the person is promoted, carry the same time-scale of pay, then the proviso to F.R.22 will apply in such a situation. On a reading of the proviso, it is clear that if a Government servant previously held a permanent or temporary post on the same time-scale of pay, then proviso to F.R.22 will apply. Thus, it is necessary to refer to F.R.22 along with proviso insofar as they are relevant for the purpose of present discussion. Proviso to F.R.22 refers to identical situations as are referred to by the last proviso to F.R.22-B as extracted above.
Sub-clause (2) of the proviso to F.R.22 is to the effect that a Government servant who is appointed substantively to a tenure post on a time scale identical with that of another tenure post which he has previously held substantively or he has previously officiated, then his initial pay shall not be less than the pay other than special pay, personal pay or emoluments classed as pay under Rule 9(21)(a)(iii), which he drew on the last occasion.
On a reading of the relevant proviso, it is clear that where a person is promoted from one post to another post, both of which carry the same time-scale of pay, he will not be governed by F.R.22-B, but he will be governed by Clause (2) of Proviso to F.R.22 which is made applicable by the last proviso to F.R.22-B. Where the time-scale of pay is not the same for both the posts, F.R.22-B applies. But if the post he held previously and the post to which he is promoted, carry the same time-scale of pay, the person will not be entitled to the benefit of F.R.22-B. Having regard to the fact that the posts of Examiner, Copyist and Reader as well as the promotion post of Junior Assistant (L.D.C.) etc., carry the same time-scale of pay with effect from 1-4-1978, the last pay drawn in the posts of Examiner, Reader and Copyist alone is protected in view of the proviso to F.R.22, which is made applicable by the last proviso to F.R.22-B. Having regard to the above, we are of the opinion that the impugned letters of the first respondent stating that the petitioners are not entitled to the benefits of F.R.22-B of the Fundamental Rules in view of the fact that the time-scale of pay attached to the posts are identical, are inaccordance with the last proviso to F.R.22-B read with the proviso to F.R.22.
One more hurdle is in the way of petitioners for invoking the benefit of F.R.22-B. Assuming for the sake of argument that F.R.22-B applies in the case where the previous post held by an individual and the post to which he is promoted carry identical scales of pay, he will have to establish that the promoted post carries duties and responsibilities of greater importance for invoking the benefit of F.R.22-B. Therefore, we have to see as to what is meant by the words "another post carrying duties and responsibilities of greater importance than those attacking to the post held by him" occurring in F.R.22-B. A reference may use'' ''ally be made to the similar language contained in F.R.22(a)(i), which is as follows:
"22(a)(i). When appointment to the new post involves the assumption of duties or responsibilities of greater importance (as interpreted for the purpose of Rule 30) than those attaching to such permanent post, he will draw as initial pay the stage of the time-scale next above his substantive pay in respect of the old post."
This clause refers to F.R.30 for the interpretation of "post involves the assumption of duties or responsibilities of greater importance". The provision in sofar it is relevant for the present discussion is as under:
"F.R.30(2). For the purpose of this rule the officiating appointment shall not be deemed to involve the assumption of duties or responsibilities of greater importance if the post to which it is made is on the same scale of pay as the permanent post, other than a tenure post, on which he holds a lien or would hold a lien had his lien not been suspended or on a scale of pay identical therewith."
This sub-rule (2) of F.R.30 lays down in unmistakable terms that if the post to which the person is appointed to officiate carries the same time-scale of pay of the post on which he has a lien, then it shall not be deemed to involve the assumption of duties or responsibilities of greater importance. In other words, if the time-scale of pay attached to the post of Examiner, Reader and Copyist which the petitioners previously held, and on which the petitioners are holding lien, is the same in respect of the post to which they are promoted, viz., Junior Assistant (L.D.C.) etc., then it is deemed that the promotion post of Junior Assistant etc., will not involve duties or responsibilities of greater importance. Therefore, having regard to the fact that the time-scale of pay attached to these posts are identical, the promotion to the posts of Junior Assistant (L.D.C.) etc., will not involve the assumption of duties or responsibilities of greater importance. A combined reading of F.R.22-B and F.R.22(a)(i) and sub-rule (2) of F.R.30 makes it clear that the petitioners'' officiating promotion as Junior Assistants (L.D.Cs.) etc., which posts carry the same time-scale of pay as that of the lower post from which they are pomoted, will not involve the assumption of duties or responsibilities of greater importance. On this point also, we are of the view that the ingredients of F.R.22-B are not established.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of K. Ramaswamy, J. (as he then was) in Writ Petition No. 7811 of 1984 dated 20-6-1988. We have sent for the original record in the said writ petition. The affidavit filed in support of the said writ petition disclosed that the petitioners therein were working as Examiners and were promoted to the posts of Junior Assistant (L.D.C.) and they have been working in Judicial Department, West Godavari District. It was specifically stated therein that they were promoted between 1969 to 1983. It was mentioned in the affidavit that the posts of Examiner and Junior Assistant (L.D.C.) carry the same time-scale of pay with effect from 1978 i.e., Rs. 425-10-355-15-650 by virtue of G.O.Ms.No. 235 dated 17-9-1988. Inspite of the reference made in the affidavit to the identical scales of pay attached to the posts of Examiner as well as Junior Assistant, the learned Judge referred to different scales of pay which were applicable prior to 1-4-1978 in the judgment and also did not refer to the fact that some of the petitioners therein were promoted between 1-4-1978 to 1983. Having regard to the decision arrived at by us in the foregoing paragraphs, the view taken by the learned Judge is not correct and it is accordingly over-ruled. K. Ramaswamy, J. (as he then was) allowed another Writ Petition No. 11469 of 1984 on 24-6-1988 by following the earlier judgment rendered by him in Writ Petition No. 7811 of 1984 dated 20-6-1988. We have perused the original record in this writ petition also. We find that the petitioners therein were promoted between the years 1978 and 1984. A reference was also made to the equalised pay scales in para (4) of the affidavit. Even so, the learned judge allowed the writ petition following the earlier judgment. Having regard to the decision arrived at by us, we are constrained to hold that the judgment of the learned Judge is not correct in law and it is accordingly overruled. Similarly, Sardar Ali Khan, J., allowed Writ Petition No. 9093 of 1989 on 19-9-1989, without giving any reasons whatsoever, simply following the above judgments rendered by K. Ramaswamy, J. (as he then was). The learned Judge has also not taken into consideration the equalised scales of pay attached to the respective posts with which we are concerned. As a consequence of the over-ruling of the judgment in Writ Petition No. 7811 of 1984 dated 20-6-1988, this judgment also stands over-ruled. Writ Appeal No. 321 of 1988 decided by a Division Bench of this Court on 12-12-1988 on the basis of F.R.30(2) is concerned, there is no detailed discussion of the relevant provisions of Fundamental Rules and other aspects. We are of the opinion that in all probability, the learned Judges proceeded on the footing that in view of the fact that the time-scales of pay are identical, it will not involve the assumption of duties or responsibilities of greater importance. However, reference to Rule 30(2) in the order is not correct. V. Sivaraman Nair, J., while referring the matters seems to be of the opinion that F.R.30(2) may not apply to the situation for the reason that the rule itself is applicable to officiating appointments and that the learned Judge felt that what is essential according to rule was that the post to which the Government servant was promoted shall carry the duties or responsibilities of greater importance than those attached to the post held by him. In our opinion, Sivaraman Nair, J., did not notice that by virtue of F.R.22(a)(i), the meaning given by F.R.30(2) for the words "involve the assumption of duties or responsibilities of greater importance", is made applicable by reference, to an appointment whether substantive, officiating or temporary. F.R.30(2) clearly says that if both the posts, i.e., post previously held and the post to which the person was promoted carry the same scale of pay, then it will not "involve the assumption of duties or responsibilities of greater importance". The above meaning contained in F.R.30(2) was made applicable to F.R.22 by reference and the same meaning will have to be given while construing F.R.22-B. It is true that F.R.30(2) may refer to officiating appointment. But the interpretation put by F.R.30(2) on the words "involve the assumption of duties or responsibilities of greater importance" will apply even in the case of a Government servant who is promoted or appointed in a substantive, officiating or temporary capacity. It is unfortunate that the relevant rules and provisions, which are considered by us, have not been brought to the notice of any one of the learned Judges who decided the earlier matters and the result was conflicting decisions as referred to above. The order of reference of the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Sardar Ali Khan and Y. Bhaskar Rao, JJ. dated 14-8-1991, except saying that they are not in agreement with the judgment of the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 1321 of 1988 dated 12-12-1988, did not give any reasons.
Sri Panduranga Rao, learned counsel relied upon a judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of M.P. 1979 (3) SLR 233 We find that the facts of the said case are not similar to the facts of the present case. In the said case, the petitioner was appointed as a Lecturer in Education Department of the State of Madhya Pradesh in the scale of pay of Rs. 250-10-290-15-350-20-45CI. Subsequently, he joined in a new post of Deputy Collector as Probationer in the scale of pay of Rs. 300-25-550-30-850 which was later on revised. In view of the fact that the two posts carry two different scales of pay, the learned Judge granted the relief. The said decision is not of any assistance to the petitioners herein.
Sri J. Venugopala Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 3130 of 1991 relied upon the judgments in K.S. Srinivasan Vs. Union of India (UOI), and E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 55. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court held that if the action is arbitrary, it is liable to be struck-down under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. We fail to see as to how they are relevant for the purpose of this case.
Having regard to the above discussion, we hold that in view of the identical scales of pay of Rs. 425-10-455-15-650 attached to the posts of Junior Assistant (LDC), etc., and Examiner, Reader and Copyist by virtue of the revised pay scales introduced with effect from 1-4-1978, the petitioners who were promoted subsequent to 1-4-1978 are not entitled for the benefits under F.R.22-B.
For the reasons mentioned above, all the writ petitions are dismissed and there will be no order as to costs.
However, the petitioners are all salaried persons and in view of the uncertainty in law created to some extent by the conflicting decisions, they were allowed to draw the salary giving the benefit of F.R.22-B. It will be too harsh and onerous if they are asked to refund the amount paid already to them at this stage. In similar circumstances, the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh and Others Vs. G. Sreenivasa Rao and Others, directed that the additional monetary benefit given to the respondents therein shall not be recovered from them. We are of the opinion, that a similar direction meets the ends of justice in the present cases as well. We, therefore, in the interests of justice, direct the respondents not to recover from the petitioners the excess amount drawn by them already on the basis of F.R.22-B.