G. Ramachandiran vs S. Arumugam

M. Vijayaraghavan, J.—This appeal is arising out of a Judgment and Decree passed by the First Appellate Court, in A.S. No. 26/2006,

dated 27.10.2006, in dismissing the appeal and thereby confirming the judgment and decree passed in O.S. No. 225/1999, dated 11.04.2002.

For the better appreciation of this appeal, the brief averments of the plaint as well as the written statement are reproduced hereunder:

The brief averments of the plaint are as follows:

The suit property described in this schedule originally belong to Subraya Gounder and the plaintiff''s father Chakrapani inherited the same as a sole

legal adoptive son of Subraya Gounder as Subraya Gounder was issueless, to an extent of seven ares and 50 centiars. Out of the above extent, the

plaintiff Arumugam purchased from his father Chakrapani by a Sale Deed, dated 13.08.1998 to a valid consideration of Rs. 54,000/-, the suit

property among other properties. The suit property is 3 ares and 50 centiars equivalent to 6 kuzhies 9 visam equivalent to 3780 square feet

comprising in R.S. No. 163/3 Patta No. 78 and cadestre No. 532/3. The remaining portion of the property was purchased by the plaintiff''s

brother Gnanasekaran from his father Chakrapani by Sale Deed, dated 6.11.97 for a valid consideration of Rs. 30,500/- to an extent of 4 acres

equivalent to 7 Kuzhies 8 visam. The plaintiff''s father who is the vendor of the suit property was in possession and enjoyment of the same for more

than 40 years continuously and uninterruptedly. The plaintiff also in possession and enjoyment of the same as per virtue of sale Deed dated

13.08.1998. While so, the defendant who is the owner of a vacant site to the east of the suit property is interfering with the peaceful possession

and enjoyment of the suit property on and from 28.11.1998 and the fact was reported to the Kalapet police station on 28.11.98 for which no

action was taken. The defendant is attempting to trespass into the suit without any manner of right or possession taking law into his own hands in

order to give trouble, annoyance and unnecessary expenses to the plaintiff and hence the plaintiff prays to pass decree and judgment in favour of

the plaintiff by granting permanent injunction restraining the defendant, his men or agent from any way interfering with the peaceful possession and

enjoyment of the suit property with costs.

The brief averments of the written statement are as follows:

The suit filed by the plaintiff is unsustainable in law and is liable to be dismissed in liminie. It is denied that the plaintiff''s father Chakrapani inherited

the property as a sole legal adoptive son of Subbraya Gounder to an extent of 7 ares and 50 centiares. It is also denied that the plaintiff''s father

who is the vendor of the suit property was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property for more than 40 years and continuously in possession

and enjoyment. It is also denied that the plaintiff is in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property from the date of purchase. It is further

denied that the defendant is interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property and attempted to trespass the same on

28.11.1998. The suit property and other properties are originally belonged to Subraya Gounder and Pachiyappa gounder and their heirs. The

defendant''s aunt has purchased the suit property and other property from Tmt. Ettiyammal, Ramu, Devarasu on 09.05.1974 through the valid sale

deed in which the plaintiff''s father Chakrapani signed as witness from the date of purchase, the defendant is in peaceful possession and enjoyment

of the suit property is absolute owner. After such purchase, the defendant has also made several sale deeds to several parties i.e. to G. Srinivasan

@ Arumugam son of Govidasamy Gounder and to Karunanidhi, Kamalanathan both Sons of Surveswaran, wherein the plaintiff''s father

Chakrapani Gounder signed as a witness to the proceedings. Further, Veerappan son of Vazhumani, Murugavel son of Thangarasu and Selvi

Dhalakshmi, Daughter of Jeyaraman has also purchased the part of the property from the defendant. Hence, neither the plaintiff nor his father is in

possession and enjoyment of the suit property at any date. Hence, the plaintiff cannot file mere suit for injunction since due to dispute in the title of

the suit property. The only way to get remedy by the plaintiff is to file a suit for the declaration of title for the suit property paying proper Court fee.

There is no cause of action for the suit and the date as mentioned is imaginary one and hence prays to dismiss the suit with costs.

The second appeal is admitted on the following substantial questions of law:

Whether the Courts below are justified in investigating the question of title in a suit for permanent injunction?

Whether the document under Ex. B1 would not operate as estoppel precluding the plaintiff from stating claim based on adoption?

When the plaintiff''s father had attested the sale deed in favour of the defendant whether it would not operate as estoppel precluding the plaintiff,

searching title to the property?

The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant submitted that originally the suit in O.S. No. 255/1999 was filed by the respondent/plaintiff for a

relief of bare injunction with regard to the schedule of property resurvey No. 163/3 Cadestre No. 532/3, measuring 3 ares 50 centiars equivalent

to 6 kuzhies 9 visam i.e. 3780 square feet. It is very consistent case that the schedule property was inherited by the respondent''s father

Chakrapani as a sole legal adoptive son of Subraya Gounder and it is also the strong case of the respondent that while the schedule property was

in possession and enjoyment of the him through purchase effected by the plaintiff under a registered sale deed dated 13.08.1998 from the father of

the plaintiff, Chakrapani, the defendant on and from 28.11.1998 interfered with the possession and enjoyment and hence the suit. The above

consistent case of the plaintiff was seriously rebutted by the appellant/defendant in his written statement by stating that the defendant purchased the

suit property and other properties from Ettiyammal, Ramu, Devarasu, under a registered Sale Deed, dated 09.05.1974 and the same was attested

by the plaintiff''s father Chakrapani and from the date of sale, the suit property as well as other properties are in peaceful possession and

enjoyment of him as absolute owner and after the purchase effected dealt with the property in selling out the same through different sale deed and

furthermore denied that the schedule property was inherited by the plaintiff''s father Chakrapani as a sole legal adoptive son of Subraya Gounder

and since there is a dispute in title over the suit property, the plaintiff has to file a suit for declaration of title over the suit property by paying proper

Court fees. Furthermore, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that inspite of a specific averment made, as well as evidence adduced

both oral and documentary before the trial Court more specifically with regard to the property acquired by the plaintiff''s father Chakrapani as

adoptive son of Subraya Gounder was denied as well as the Sale Deed effected in the year 1974 by the defendant was duly attested by the

plaintiff''s father Chakrapani and thereby directing the respondent/plaintiff to file a suit for declaration of title, the Court below both trial as well as

the First Appellate Court granted decree for permanent injunction without adverted to the documents filed and the evidences adduced and hence

the finding of the Court below is perverse and liable to be dismissed. No doubt, a careful perusal of Ex. B1 original Sale Deed, dated 09.05.1974

executed by Tmt. Vettiammal and others in favour of the defendant shows that the schedule of property as item no. 4 along with other four

properties were purchased for a consideration of Rs. 1000/- and wherein it is more particularly in item No. 4, the Cadestre No. 532/3 as well as

the area 6 kuzhies 12 visam are clearly and categorically mentioned with boundaries and the same is tallied with the schedule property. Above all,

as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that this Ex. B1-Original Sale Deed was attested by Chakrapani, son of Gopal and

though the signature found in this document is denied by the respondent counsel as deposed by P.W. 1, the plaintiff himself, it is not disputed that

the plaintiff''s father Chakrapani is still alive and hence the most probable and valid evidence can be adduced on the side of the plaintiff is by

examining the father of the plaintiff-Chakrapani as plaintiff witness to deny the signature found in the Ex. B1 document. Though the signature found

in the Ex. B1 is denied through P.W. 1, it is more pertinent to note herein about the specific suggestion made to D.W. 1 defendant viz., that the

signature found in Ex. B1 was signed by the said Chakrapani, on a strong belief over the defendant without reading the contents of the documents,

but the said suggestion was rightly denied by the defendant Ramachandran as D.W. 1. From the above, the very categorical suggestion put in to

D.W. 1 disprove the case of the respondent/plaintiff that the said Charapani has not attested Ex. B1- the sale deed obtained by the

appellant/defendant herein.

The learned counsel for the appellant made a special reference to the contention of the document under Ex. B1 which was attested by the

plaintiff''s father Chakrapani is said to have the existing interest in the property which was dealt in this document, shall bind him and the plaintiff''s

father Chakrapani is estopped from contending the title and other rights conveyed in this document and cited a Judgment of this Court reported in a

case in Ramaswamy Gounder, Chinnasami Gounder alias Chinna Gounder Vs. Anantapadmanabha Iyer, wherein this Court has held as hereunder:

It is not always that a witness to a document knows what the contents of the document are, or how the parties have been described, but it

frequently occurs in native documents that a man signs as a witness to show that he is acknowledging the instrument to be correct.

In Kandasami Pillai Vs. Rangasami Nainar (died) and Others, , Sadasiva Ayyar, J., observed:

I am also of opinion that having regard to the ordinary course of conduct of Indians in this presidency, attestation by a person who has, or claims,

any interest in the property covered by the document must be treated prima facie as a representation by him that the title and other facts relating to

title recited in the document are true and will not be disputed by him as against the oblige under the document.

In a subsequent decision, namely, Narayana Aiyar and Others Vs. Rama Aiyar and Others, , the same learned Judge, after referring to the

observation of the Privy Council already quoted, stated:

I may respectfully add that, in my pretty long experience as a Judicial Officer, if the attestor of the document has an existing interest in the property

dealt with in the document, it has been always the case that this ''attestation'' has been taken in order to bind him as to the correctness of the

recitals therein.

Consequently, I hold that in addition to the attestation by Arunachala and Ramakrishna all the circumstances of this case clearly point to the

''conclusion that Arunachala and Ramakrishna attested the document with the full knowledge of the contents of the document. Such a conclusion is

also supported by the ratio in the decision in Janikiram Sital Ram Firm v. The Chota Nagpur Banking Association Ltd. (1936) ILR 15 Pat. 721.

Therefore, I hold that Arunachala and Ramakrishna were estopped from contending that Muruga Pillai had only a life interest and did not have an

absolute interest in Survey Nos. 24 and 25 and the well in S. No. 30, and therefore, the plaintiff herein, as the successor-in-interest of Arunachala

and Ramakrishna, is also estopped from putting forward that contention.

Moreover, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted the decision made by the Division Bench of this Court in a case namely Jegannatham

Pillai Vs. Kunjithapatham Pillai and Others, . In the above Judgment, the Division Bench has held as hereunder:

The main question for consideration in this appeal is whether Valambal became entitled to the properties covered by Ex. A.7 absolutely by

virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. Thiru A. Sundaram Iyer urged that as the second defendant had only a life interest in the

properties covered by Ex. A.5 by virtue of his having executed the release deed Ex. A.26 in favour of the first defendant and obtained the

settlement deed Ex. A.27 from him even in November 1948. Valambal could not have obtained a limited woman''s estate as known to Hindu Law

by taking the document Ex. A.7 from the second defendant in 1959 and she cannot therefore invoke Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act to

enlarge her estate as absolute. It is true the appellant has not put forward any such case in the plaint as he was not aware of the existence of the

documents Exs. A.26 and A. 27 at that time. In fact, he has pleaded in para 9 of his plaint that by the settlement deed dated 19-3-1959, the

original of Ex. A.7, Valambal can, if at all, get from the second defendant only a limited estate which she herself conveyed.

It is true the recitals in Ex. A.7 do not take note of the existence of the documents Exs. A.26 and A.27 and proceed on the footing that the second

defendant was in possession of the properties covered by it by virtue of the settlement deed of 1919, the original of Ex. A.5. and that he conveyed

the properties to his sister Valambal and delivered possession of the said properties back to her. It is true that by virtue of Exs. A-26 and A-27 the

first defendant Kunjithapatham Pillai had a vested remainder in the properties of Valambal in Sithakadu dealt with under those documents and if the

said vested remainder continued to remain with the first defendant even after the execution of Ex. A.7. Valambal could not claim to have acquired

a woman''s estate in her Sithakadu properties by virtue of the document Ex. A.7. But the first defendant Kunjithapatham Pillai has attested the

document Ex. A.7 after making a recital that he has acquainted himself with the contents of the document. It is true that mere attestation proves no

more than that the signature of an executing party has been attached to a document in the presence of the attesting witnesses. The following

observations in Raj Lukhee Debea v. Gokool Chander Chowdry. (1869-70) 13 Moo Ind App 209 229 are relevant for the present discussion:

Their Lordships cannot affirm the proposition, that the mere attestation of such an instrument by a relative necessarily imports concurrence. It might

no doubt, be shown by other evidence that when he became an attesting witness, he fully understood what the transaction was, and that he was a

concurring party to it, but from the mere subscription of his name that inference does not necessarily arise.

The principles governing estoppel by attestation and consent are clearly stated in page 1064 of Sarkar''s Law of Evidence. 11th Edn. Volume 2.

The entire case law on the subject has been reviewed by Ismail, J. in Ramaswami Gounder v. Ananthapadmanabha Iyer, 84 Mad LW 176. As

pointed out by Kumaraswami Sastri, J. in Nayakammal Vs. S. Munusami Mudaliar, it is commonest thing in this country for attestations to be

obtained from persons having a possible interest in the property with the object of binding them later on. He has observed that he has rarely come

across a case where a person having an interest or contingent in the property has attested the deed, without enquiring into its contents. In the

present case, the first defendant has attested Ex. A.7 with knowledge of its contents. In fact he has given evidence of as D.W. 6 that by virtue of

Ex. A.7 he had settled the properties in favour of Valambal. He has also asserted that Sithakadu properties belong to Valambal. Nothing was

elicited to discredit the said statements of the first defendant. In (Vemulapalli) Ramakotayya Vs. (Gutha) Viraraghavayya, ) a Full Bench of this

court has held that if the next presumptive male reversioner consents, though for no consideration, to an alienation without necessity by a Hindu

widow (e.g. a gift as in that case) the transaction will be binding on him when he actually succeeds to the estate. The consent was given in that case

by the presumptive reversioner by attesting the gift deed. In AIR 1927 227 (Privy Council) ) the attestation of a deed of alienation made by a

widow by the presumptive reversioner was held to bind the actual reversioners. The widow in that case alienated nearly the whole property of her

husband by three deeds executed and registered on the same day. By the first deed she gave a property to her brother, by the second she sold half

of another property to A and by the third she sold the other half of that property to her son-in-law. The signature on each of the deeds was

attested by the two other alienees. On the death of the widow. A was the heir to her husband''s estate and he did not seek to set aside the

alienations. But after his death, his son and grandsons brought a suit to recover the whole property.

It was held by the Privy Council that the three deeds were to be regarded as forming one transaction entered into by all the persons interested in

the property and that A and consequently the plaintiffs in that case were precluded from disputing the alienations; the alienations being by the

widow were voidable, not void and A being precluded from questioning them, it was no necessary to consider whether he could validly, have

agreed to sell his reversionary interest. But in the present case the first defendant by attesting the original of Ex. A.7 with knowledge of its contents

really consented to whatever interest he had in the properties passing title to Valambal and it was no longer open to him to question the title of

Valambal to the properties covered by it

The above Judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is squarely apply to the facts and circumstances and with due respect after

following the same, this Court holds that the plaintiff''s father Chakrapani who has attested under Ex. B1-Sale Deed with full knowledge of the

contention of the document i.e. Ex. B1 under which title was transferred in favour of the defendant and hence he is estopped from denying the said

title conveyed under Ex. P1.

As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant with regard to the adoption made by Subraya Gounder in adopting Chakrapani as

his adopted son, accepting the oral evidences of P.W.''s, no valuable acceptable evidence is produced that too in the light of the very living of the

Chakrapani is admitted by the plaintiff. No doubt, to prove the adoption was made by Subraya Gounder and Plaintiff''s father Chakrapani was the

adopted son of Subraya Gounder, the earlier proceeding before the Court of law i.e. the evidence produced by the witness in O.S. No. 1077/87,

as well as judgment and decree passed in A.S. No. 25/98 are marked as Ex. A1, A4, A5 and A12 respectively. A careful perusal of Ex. A12-

Appellate Court Judgment shows that the plaintiff''s father Chakrapani as a son of Gopala Gounder filed a suit in O.S. No. 1077/87 for bare

injunction and the same was dismissed but under this appeal, the judgment of the trial Court was reversed and thereby injunction was granted,

wherein there is also finding that the said Chakrapani was the adoptive son of Subraya Gounder. No doubt, based on the evidence on record, the

earlier proceeding i.e. oral evidence which are marked as Exs. A3, A4, and A5, as pointed out above and the above judgment rendered in the suit

filed by the Chakrapani wherein the respondent/defendant are one and the same i.e. the appellant/defendant herein before this appeal.

Moreover, the learned counsel for the respondent herein cited a unreported Judgment of this Court in S.A. 1346/2003, dated 19.12.2006

wherein the appeal preferred is against the concurrent findings of the Courts below in a suit filed for bare injunction by the respondent/plaintiff viz.,

Arumugam along with one another was dismissed at the admission stage wherein the relief sought for is only injunction. Furthermore, the learned

counsel for the respondent/plaintiff submitted that this Court after holding that the respondent has proved his title and possession and there was

also concurrent findings and since no question of law involved dismissed the same. No doubt, as rightly pointed out above, with regard to Exs. A3,

A4, A5 as well as A12 document in the Second Appeal, i.e. unreported Judgment the appellant/defendant is not a party to that proceedings.

Pointing out the above factual position, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that as per the provisions contained in Section 43 of the

Indian Evidence Act 1972 the above depositions marked as Exs. A3, A4 and A5 as well as the judgment Ex. A12 besides the above unreported

judgment decision cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiff are irrelevant since the facts in issue as well as party to the proceedings are not

similar to the case on hand and the learned counsel for the appellant also cited a judgment of the Supreme Court in a case in State of Bihar Vs.

Radha Krishna Singh and Others, In this cited Judgment the Supreme Court has held hereunder:

Taking the first head, it is well settled that judgments of courts are admissible in evidence under the provisions of sections 40, 41 and 42 of

the Evidence Act. Section 43 which is extracted below, clearly provides that those judgments which do not fall within the 861 four corners of

sections 40 to 42 are inadmissible unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree is itself a fact in issue or a relevant fact under some other

provisions of the Evidence Act:-

Judgments, etc., other than those mentioned in sections 40 to 42, when relevant-Judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in

sections 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other

provision of this Act.

Some Courts have used section 13 to prove the admissibility of a judgment as coming under the provisions of Section 43, referred to above.

We are, however, of the opinion that where there is a specific provision covering the admissibility of a document, it is not open to the court to call

into aid other general provisions in order to make a particular document admissible. In order words, if a judgment is not admissible as not falling

within the ambit of sections 40 to 42, it must fulfil the conditions of section 43 otherwise it cannot be relevant u/s 13 of the Evidence Act. The

words ""other provisions of this Act"" cannot cover Section 13 because this section does not deal with judgments at all.

It is also well settled that a judgment in rem like judgments passed in probate, insolvency, matrimonial or guardianship or other similar

proceedings, is admissible in all cases whether such judgments are inter parties or not. In the instant case, however, all the documents consisting of

judgments filed are not judgments in rem and therefore, the question of their admissibility on that basis does not arise, As mentioned earlier, the

judgments filed as Exhibits in the instant case, are judgments in personam and therefore, they do not fulfil the conditions mentioned in s.41 of the

Evidence Act.

The cumulative effect of the decisions cited above on this point clearly is that under the Evidence Act a judgment which is not inter parties is

inadmissible in evidence except for the limited purpose of proving as to who the parties were and what was the decree passed and the properties

which were the subject matter of the suit.

The judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is squarely apply to the facts and circumstances of the case and in due respect,

after following the judgment, this Court helds that the above evidence in the earlier proceedings, which are marked as Exs. A3, A4, A5 as well as

Judgment Ex. A12 besides the unreported Judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff are inadmissible and the decisions

made thereunder are in personam and shall not bind on the appellant/defendant and hence the decision arrived at by the Courts below based on

these documents marked as Exs. A3, A4, A5 and A12 with regard to the adoption of the plaintiff''s father Chakrapani to the Subraya Gounder as

well as consequential findings are not sustainable in law and the same are liable to the set aside.

The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the respondent/plaintiff has not whispered anything even the year of adoption of the

plaintiff''s father as well as their customary function held and moreover absolutely there is no documentary evidence produced to show that the

father''s name of Chakrapani was subsequently changed as Subraya Gounder contra to the documents produced on the side of the plaintiff i.e. the

Sale Deed Exs. A1 & A2 as well as the earlier suit proceeding Ex. A12 simply show the name of Chakrapani as son of Gopal Gounder not

Subraya Gounder. Furthermore, the Learned counsel for the Appellant, cited Judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in a case viz., reported in

Rahasa Pandiani (dead) by Lrs. and Others Vs. Gokulananda Panda and Others, In the Judgment, cited the Hon''ble Apex Court has held as

hereunder:

When the plaintiff relies on oral evidence in support of the claim that he was adopted by the adoptive father in accordance with the Hindu rites, and

it is not supported by any registered document to establish that such an adoption had really and as a matter of fact taken place, the Court has to

act with a great deal of caution and circumspection. Be it realized that setting up a spurious adoption is not less frequent than concocting a spurious

will, and equally, if not more difficult to unmask. And the Court has to be extremely alert and vigilant to guard against being ensnared by schemers

who indulge in unscrupulous practices out of their lust for property. If there are any suspicious circumstances, just as the propounder of the will is

obliged to dispel the cloud of suspicion, the burden is on one who claims to have been adopted to dispel the same beyond reasonable doubt. In the

case of an adoption which is not supported by a registered document or any other evidence of a clinching nature if there exist suspicious

circumstances, the same must be explained to the satisfaction of the conscience of the Court by the Party contending that there was such an

adoption. Such is the position as an adoption would divert the normal and natural course of succession. Experience of life shows that just as there

have been spurious claims about execution of a will, there have been spurious claims about adoption having taken place. And the Court has

therefore to be aware of the risk involved in upholding the claim of adoption if there are circumstances which arouse the suspicion of the Court and

the conscience of the Court is not satisfied that the evidence preferred to support such adoption is beyond reproach.

The above judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is squarely apply to the facts and circumstances and with due respect after

following the judgments, this Court holds that the respondent/plaintiff has failed to produce the clinching evidence to the satisfaction of this Court in

proving the adoption and the mere recital contained under Exs. A1 and A2 shall not prove the consistent case of the plaintiff that too in the light of

strong case put forth by the appellant/respondent through valid evidences both oral and documentary.

The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that inspite of the consistent pleading in the written statement by rebutting the title derived by

the plaintiff and claiming the title over the suit property as per the sale deed which is marked as Ex. B1, the plaintiff without properly amend the

case for declaration of title, simply allowed the suit to go on trial and the Court below also without considering the evidence both oral and

documentary, on record erroneously gave a finding i.e. perverse and also cited a Judgment of this Court after relying upon the Judgment of the

Supreme Court in refusing the injunction and directing the parties to file the suit for declaration i.e. in a case in R.C. Church Vallipuram Vs. K.

Seeranga Gounder In the judgment cited this Court has held as hereunder:

Under such circumstances, the respondent/plaintiff ought to have filed a suit for declaration and the suit for bare injunction will not lie, especially

when a dispute in respect of title is involved. The Honourable Supreme Court Anathula Sudhakar Vs. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs. and Others,

has laid down the guidelines for granting injunction and in clause ''C'' it is stated as follows:-

(c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings and appropriate issue regarding title (either

specific, or implied as noticed in Annaimuthu Thevar). Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating

to title, the court will not investigate or examine or render a finding on a question of title, in a suit for injunction. Even where there are necessary

pleadings and issue, if the matter involves implicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will relegate the parties to the remedy by

way of comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction;

As per clause ''c'' when question regarding title is raised and that cannot be resolved without proper pleadings, the Court should not grant

injunction and direct the parties to file a suit for declaration.

In the result, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court is set aside. The second appeals are allowed and liberty is granted to the

respondent to file appropriate suit for declaration to establish their rights over the suit property. There will be no order as to costs. Consequently,

connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.

In agreeing with the Judgment rendered by this Court as cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, the suit itself is filed for a relief of bare

injunction without declaration of title is not sustainable under law and moreover the concurrent findings of course given by the Courts below are

perverse, in the light of ample evidence both oral and documentary available, in denying the case of the respondent/plaintiff. Hence, the

respondent/plaintiff is at liberty to file comprehensive suit for declaration to establish their rights over the suit property.

It is the consistent case of the respondent/plaintiff that the plaintiff''s father Chakrapani sold the schedule property under Ex. A2 original sale

deed dated 13.08.1998 to plaintiff and to prove the case of possession and enjoyment of the schedule property only one tax receipt dated

08.04.1984 A10 was filed and marked and no other document except this solitary documentary evidence is filed on the side of the plaintiff. No

doubt, on the side of the defendant also, there is one piece of document i.e. Ex. B4-Tax Receipt in the name of the defendant dated 14.10.1997 is

produced. A careful perusal of Ex. A10-Tax receipt issued by the statutory authority shows the same was issued in the name of Chakrapani son of

Gopal Gounder, but the survey number mentioned thereunder i.e. written as 163/2, 3. But, apparently, to the naked eye it is seen that number ""3

was written in different alignment and it is nothing but the interpolation and also creates strong doubts. Hence, this document shall not prove

possession and enjoyment of the schedule property after paying necessary tax to the statutory authority and hence the reliance can be made and

the finding based on this document and other documents as pointed out above is not valid in law and the same is perverse. No doubt, according to

the defendant the properties scheduled under Ex. B1 including the suit property were purchased under registered sale deed dated 09.05.1974.

But, on their side also only one document Ex. B4 is produced and except this document no other tax receipt also produced even then after taking

into consideration that the suit itself is filed by the plaintiff for bare injunction, the burden is heavily on the plaintiff to prove the case to sustain the

relief sought for and thereby Ex. B4 shall not falsify the Defendant''s case. Hence, this piece of evidence Ex. A10 produced on the side of the

appellant/defendant shall not prove the case of the respondent/plaintiff.

For the foregoing reasons, the question of law raised in this appeal are decided in favour of the appellant/defendant and as against the

respondent/plaintiff. In the result the appeal is allowed and the decree and the judgment passed by the Court below i.e. in A.S. No. 26/2005 dated

27.10.2006 as well as O.S. No. 225/1999 dated 11.04.2002 are set aside and as a whole the suit is dismissed. The respondent/plaintiff is at

liberty to file a fresh comprehensive suit for declaration and injunction, if he so desires and advised. Considering the nature of claim involved as well

as the relationship between the parties, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.