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Judgment
K. Chandru, J.—The Petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking to challenge the provisional order of attachment, dated 05.10.2010 passed u/s 5(1) of the Prevention of money Laundering Act, 2002 (for short POMLA) by the second Respondent Deputy Director of Enforcement, POMLA as well as the consequential complaint No. 70/2010, dated 01.11.2010 pending on the file of the Adjudicating Authority under the POMLA, New Delhi.
The writ petition was admitted on 10.1.2011. Pending the writ petition, this Court had granted an interim stay for a period of four weeks in M.P. No. 2 of 2011. In the application in M.P. No. 3 of 2011 for suspension of provisional attachment of moveable assets of the Petitioner, only notice was ordered. Aggrieved by the interim order, the second Respondent has filed a vacate stay application in M.P. No. 4 of 2011. When that application came up for hearing, with the consent of both parties, the main writ petition itself was taken up for hearing.
Heard the arguments of Mr. R. Subramanian, learned Senior Counsel leading Mr. S.D. Venkateswaran, learned Counsel appearing for Petitioner, Mr. M. Dhandapani, learned Central Government Standing Counsel appearing for second Respondent and M/s. Ramalingam Associates on behalf of fourth Respondent Bank.
The facts leading to filing of the above writ petition are as follows:
In connection with the Petitioner''s activities in forging documents and forging records in the name of non existing companies for the purpose of getting loan from the Bank, criminal cases were registered against the Petitioner. The offence committed by the Petitioner is covered by POMLA and investigation was undertaken by the second Respondent Enforcement Directorate. It was thereafter, the provisional attachment order was made vide GSR 441(E), dated 1.7.2005. The complaint u/s 5(5) of POMLA in O.C. No. 70 of 2010 in Provisional Attachment Order No. 6 of 2010, dated 05.10.2010 was filed on 1.11.2010 by the second Respondent Deputy Director of Enforcement before the first Respondent Adjudicating Authority at New Delhi. The first Respondent on considering the complaint had issued a show cause notice u/s 8 of POMLA to the Petitioner for his appearance before the first Respondent calling him to show cause to his source of income, out of which or by means of which the provisionally attached movable properties were acquired. The Petitioner instead of appearing before the first Respondent has filed the present writ petition challenging the provisional attachment order as well as the case filed against him.
It was further stated that one Karthikeyan, the Managing Director ofM/s. Ari Fabrics Ltd. having office at Coimbatore had entered into a Memorandum ofUnderstanding dated 13.2.2008 with the Petitioner that he should settle the amountof Rs. 6.5 Crores which was obtained by the said Karthikeyan as loan for the purposeof running M/s. Ari Fabrics Ltd. For this purpose, the Petitioner was appointed asthe additional Director and that Board resolution was also passed. The Petitionerhad paid an amount of Rs. 2 Crores towards the said loan to the State Bank of India,Trichy Road Branch, Coimbatore. But, however, he did not pay the balance amount asundertaken by him pursuant to the Memorandum of Undertaking, dated 13.2.2008. Infact, it was the complaint of the Managing Director of M/s. Ari Fabrics Ltd. thatthe Petitioner without being authorised by any Board resolution had opened acurrent account in the name of M/s. Ari Fabrics with the fourth Respondent Bank ofBaroda, Udumalpet by forging the signature of the Managing Director and also madeit appear as if the Board had authorised him to open the current account in thename of the Mill. The said Karthikeyan, Managing Director had filed a complaintwith the District Crime Branch, Coimbatore. The criminal case was registered underSections 120-B, 468, 471 and 409 IPC against the Petitioner.
Similarly, though the Petitioner was authorised to run M/s.VMT Spinning mills India Pvt. Ltd., but no authorisation was given to open a current account in the name of the said mill. On the basis of the statement given by one Sudha, Director of the said mill on 9.9.2010 before the Assistant Director, POMLA, Directorate of Enforcement as well as the statement given by the Petitioner, dated 28.10.2010 that he had opened current account in the name of VMT Spinning Mills India Pvt. Ltd. by forging the signature of late Duraisamy, the then Managing Director of M/s.VMT Spinning Mills India Pvt. Ltd., as if the Board had authorised him to open the account and in the light of these facts, the provisional attachment order No. 6/2010, dated 5.10.2010 impugned in the writ petition came to be made.
The contention raised by the Petitioner in this writ petition was that the said Karthikeyan and his group having sold the company as early as 13.2.2008 had initiated various legal proceedings to take over the company. In respect of the dispute between the Petitioner and the said Karthikeyan and his group, a civil dispute is pending before the learned District Munsif Court, Coimbatore. The Petitioner had also filed an arbitration O.P., which is pending before the Principal District Judge, Coimbatore. A further arbitration petition is also pending before this Court. With reference to the company affairs, petitions are pending before the Company Law Board and certain company applications filed by him are also pending before this Court. The Petitioner had purchased the third Respondent M/s.VMT Spinning Mills India Pvt. Ltd., by an agreement, dated 12.11.2007 and 08.12.2008. He was permitted to run the mill. Therefore, he had opened a Bank account with the fourth Respondent.
It is further claimed that when a criminal case was filed by the Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Coimbatore, the accounts were verified in the Bank and the second Respondent was satisfied about the transaction. It is on these premise, the Petitioner had challenged the provisional attachment order issued u/s 5(1) of the POMLA. It is claimed that the authority should have "reason to believe" on the basis of materials that the attached subject property is the proceeds of a crime and the person charged had committed scheduled offences and that there are chances of concealment or transfer of proceeds. A mere repetition of the word "reasons to believe" cannot be a ground for passing the attachment order. The provisions of the second schedule to the Income Tax Act with reference to attachment proceedings are very clear inasmuch as there must be notice before attachment. The Petitioner was kept in dark about the investigation. The impugned attachment notice was contrary to Section 5 of POMLA. The attachment can be made only in relation to the scheduled offence and a report should have been forwarded to the Magistrate or the Court taking cognizance of the scheduled offence. Since the provisional attachment u/s 5(1) is illegal, the consequential proceedings u/s 8 is also illegal. The attached bank accounts are his earnings from legal sources.
Controverting these arguments, in the counter affidavit, it was contended that the provisional attachment order was passed on the basis of the materials, which include the Petitioner''s voluntary statement that he had availed loan amount by furnishing bogus bills raised in the name of non existing mills. The subjective satisfaction of the authority was arrived at on the basis of the materials. The materials are listed out in paragraph 8(iv) of the counter affidavit. In the present case, since the attachment is relating to moveable property,r the second schedule to the Income Tax Act need not be notified. A copy of the provisional attachment order was sent to the fourth Respondent and a report was forwarded to the Magistrate.
With reference to the contention that the procedure laid down under Second schedule to the Income Tax Act was not followed, the learned CGS Cl placed reliance upon the amendment made to Section 5 of the POMLA, wherein a proviso has been introduced to Section 5(1)(c), which reads as follows:
[Provided that no such order of attachment shall be made unless, in relation to the scheduled offence, a report has been forwarded to a Magistrate u/s 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or a complaint has been filed by a person, authorised to investigate the offence mentioned in the Schedule, before a Magistrate or Court for taking cognizance of the scheduled offence, as the case may be:
Provided further that, notwithstanding anything contained in Clause (b), any property of any person may be attached under this section if the Director or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by him for the purposes of this section has reason to believe (the reasons for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that if such property involved in money-laundering is not attached immediately under this Chapter, the non-attachment of the property is likely to frustrate any proceeding under this Act.]
It was further stated that because of second proviso to Section 5, the attachment can be made even without forwarding a report u/s 173 Cr.P.C.
Therefore, the short question that arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether the impugned notice of provisional attachment u/s 5(1) and the impugned notice for adjudication u/s 8 suffer from any want of jurisdiction and liable for interference by this Court?
Mr. M. Dhandapani, learned Central Government Standing Counsel in support of his contentions had relied upon a judgment of the division bench of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal Nos. 527 to 529 of 2010 in Radha Mohan Lakhotia v. The Deputy Director, PMLA, Directorate of Enforcement, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Mumbai, which arose under the provisions of POMLA. The Bombay High Court vide its judgment, dated 5.8.2010 had dealt with the scope of POMLA including Section 5(1). In analysing Section 5(1) being invoked against a person who is not named as an accused in the commission of scheduled offence, in paragraphs 11 to 13 of its judgment, it was observed as follows:
The question is whether Section 5 can be invoked against a person who is notnamed as an accused in the commission of a scheduled offence? Sub-section (1) ofSection 5 will have to be read as a whole conjointly with the other provisions ofthe Act already referred to hitherto, including Section 8 thereof. Section 5authorises the Director of any other office not below the rank of Deputy Directorauthorised by Director for the purposes of the said section to resort to action of"attachment of property" if he has reason to believe and the reason of such beliefhas been recorded in writing arrived at on the basis of material in his possession. That action is intended to freeze the proceeds of crime, which property, isderived or obtained directly or indirectly as a result of criminal activityrelating to a scheduled offence or value of any such property until the criminalaction for the scheduled offence is taken to its logical end against the accusednamed therein. The proceeds of crime means any property or assets of everydescription, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible orintangible and includes deeds and instruments evidencing title to, or interest in,such property or assets, wherever located # which has been derived or obtained,directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduledoffence or the value of such property. The proceeds of crime may be or can be inpossession of "any person". Be it a person charged of having committed a scheduledoffence "or otherwise". In the case of any other person in possession of proceedsof crime, if it is also found that he has directly or indirectly attempted toindulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is actually involved inany process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime and projecting it asuntainted property, he shall be liable to be prosecuted for offence u/s 3 read with Section 4 of the Act of 2002 # in addition to suffering the action ofattachment of the proceeds of crime in his possession. Attachment of proceeds ofcrime in possession of any person (other than the person charge of having committeda scheduled offence) will, therefore, be legitimate within the sweep of Section 5 of the Act of 2002. In our opinion, the thrust of Section 5 is to attach everyproperty involved in money-laundering irrespective of whether it is in possessionof the person charged of having committed a scheduled offence or any other person #provided however it must be shown to be proceeds of crime and further, that proceeds of crime are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner, which may result in frustrating any proceedings relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime under the Act.
Going by the definition of "person" occurring in Section 2(s) and on conjointreading of Section 2(u), which also refers to "any person", coupled with thepurpose and intent for which the enactment has been brought into force, acceptingthe argument of the Appellants would result in a pedantic approach and limitingthe plenitude of action of attachment and confiscation of proceeds of crimes onlyin the hands of the persons who have been charged of having committed a scheduledoffence and none else. Whereas, the Act has come into being to prevent moneylaundering and to provide for confiscation of property derived from or involved in,money laundering and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. It isthe outcome of the Political Declaration and Global programme of Action, as annexedto the resolution S-17/2 adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations atits seventeenth special session on the twenty-third day of February, 1990. It hascome into being also on account of the Political Declaration adopted by the SpecialSession of the United Nations General Assembly held on 8th to 10th June, 1998 whichcalled upon the Members States to adopt national money-laundering legislation andprogramme. The term "money-laundering" has the same meaning assigned to it inSection 3 of the Act of 2002. It essentially refers to the tainted property whichis derived from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. Such taintedproperty may travel at different levels or by way of circular transactions forbeing eventually projected as untainted property in the hands of or possession ofperson other than the person charged of having committed a scheduled offence. Thatinvolves direct or indirect involvement of person or persons other than theperson(s) accused of having committed a scheduled offence. Such other person(s) maydirectly or indirectly attempt to indulge or knowingly assist or knowingly is aparty or is actually involved in any process or activities connected with theproceeds of crime and projecting it as untainted property. If such is the natureof activity, the Act of 2002 is intended to deal with the same sternly. In a givencase a person can be in possession of any proceeds of crime without his knowledgethat the property held by him is tainted. That person may not face prosecutionunder Section 3 of the Act of 2002. But even in his case, an order of attachment ofthe proceeds of crime can be invoked and later end up with confiscation thereofdepending on the outcome of the criminal action against the person charged ofhaving committed a scheduled offence. The action of attachment is not in relationto a person as such but essentially to freeze the proceeds of crime. Theinterpretation given by the Appellants, if accepted would be destructive of thesaid legislative intent. Suffice it to observe that the term "person" appearing inclause (a) of the Section 5(1) of the Act cannot be limited to the person who hasbeen charge of having committed a scheduled offence. If that was the intent of thelegislature, there was no reason to insert Clause (a). In that case, theLegislature would have simply provided for any person who has been charged ofhaving committed a scheduled offence and in possession of any proceed of crime,such proceeds of crime can be attached and confiscated, subject to fulfillment ofthe specified conditions.
The Appellants however, have placed emphasis on the expression "such person"used in Clause (b) of Section 5(1) of the Act. According to them, the word "such"is prefix to the word "person" in Clause (b). That is not superfluous, but isascribable to the person referred to in Clause (a). Which means that even Clause (a) deals with person who has been charged of having committed a scheduled offence. It is not possible to countenance this submission. We are conscious of the factthat penal provisions should be strictly construed. At the same time, we cannotoverlook the language of Section 5 as applicable at the relevant time. In ouropinion, Clause (a) refers to "any person" # whether he has been charged of havingcommitted a scheduled offence "or otherwise". The only requirement is that thatperson should be in possession of any proceeds of crime. The governing factor ispossession of any proceeds of crime by a person. Taking any other view may defeat the legislative intent. In as much as, a person who has been charged of havingcommitted a scheduled offence can successfully defeat the object of the enactmentof attachment and confiscation of the proceeds of crime by transferring it to someother person who is not so involved with him in commission of stated scheduledoffence. In our opinion, on fair reading of Section 5(1) read with Section 8 ofthe Act, it postulates two categories of persons against whom action of attachmentof property can be proceeded with. The first category is any person who is inpossession of any proceeds of crime. A person falling in this category need not bea person, charged of having committed a scheduled offence. The second category isof a person who has been charged of having committed a scheduled offence. Besides,being charged of having committed a scheduled offence, that person is found to bein possession of any proceeds of crime. In either case, it is open to take recourseto Section 5 of the Act if the specified Authority has reason to believe and reasonfor such belief is recorded in writing that the proceeds of crime are likely to beconcealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustratingany proceedings relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime. Indeed, theproviso to Sub-section (1) as was applicable at the relevant time envisaged that noorder of attachment can be made unless, in relation to the offence under paragraph1 of Part A and Part B of the Schedule, a report has been forwarded to a Magistrateunder Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; or paragraph 2 of Part Aof the Schedule, a police report or a complaint has been filed for takingcognizance of an offence by the Special Court constituted u/s 36(1) ofNDPS Act, 1985. This proviso essentially is directed against the second categoryof person covered by Sub-section (1), namely, person who has been charged of havingcommitted a schedule offence. In other words, action of attachment of proceeds ofcrime in possession of the person charged of a scheduled offence can be proceededonly on forwarding of a report to Magistrate u/s 173 of the Code or acomplaint has been filed for taking cognizance of offence by the Special Courtconstituted under the NDPS Act. In so far as the person who is not named in thescheduled offence, there can be no question of filing of any report or complaintfor taking cognizance. That stipulation has no application to the person who is nota person having been charged of a scheduled offence. The view that we propose totake is reinforced from the purport of Section 3 and 4 of the Act of 2002. Thesame deal with the offence of money-laundering and punishment for money-launderingrespectively. Both these provisions, even on strict construction, plainly indicatethat the person to be proceeded for this offence need not necessarily be charged ofhaving committed a scheduled offence. For, the expression used in "whosoever". Theoffence of money-laundering u/s 3 of the Act of 2002 is an independentoffence. It is committed if "any person" directly or indirectly attempts to indulgeor knowingly assists of knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any processor activity connected with the proceeds of crime and projecting it as untaintedproperty. Further, it would create a piquant situation as a person who is notcharged of having committed a scheduled offence even if can be proceeded foroffence of money laundering and even if such person is in possession of anyproceeds of crime, no action of attachment and confiscation of the proceeds ofcrime can be resorted to qua him-albeit the proceeds of crime are in hispossession. If the argument of the Appellants were to be accepted, even theexpression "whosoever" appearing in Section 3 and 4 of the Act will have to belimited to person who has been charged of having committed a scheduled offence. The object of the enactment of 2002 would be completely defeated by such approach. Besides, the view that we propose to take is reinforced also from the purport ofSection 8 of the Act of 2002. It provides that the Adjudicating Authority if hasreason to believe that "any person" has committed an offence u/s 3, mayserve notice upon such person calling upon him to indicate his source of hisincome, earning or assets, out of which or by means of which he has acquired theproperty attached u/s 5(1) of the Act. Once again, the legislature hasunambiguously used the term "any person" and not person charged of having committeda scheduled offence. Indeed, any person referred to in this provision is a personwho has committed an offence u/s 3 of the Act of 2002. He may not necessarily be a person charged of having committed scheduled offence. The provisoto Sub-section (1) thereof stipulates that where a notice under the said Sub-section specified any property as being held by a person on behalf of any otherperson, a copy of such notice shall also be served upon such other person. Sufficeit to observe that even Section 8 contemplates adjudication to be done by theAdjudicating Authority after provisional attachment order is passed u/s 5 of the Act and upon receipt of complaint u/s 5(5) of the Act. We are notreferring to other provisions mentioned in the said Section 8(1), as we are dealingonly with the case arising u/s 5 of the Act. Considering the above, weare of the considered opinion that there is no merit in the argument of theAppellants that action u/s 5 of the Act could not have proceeded againstthem, as they were not charged of having committed a scheduled offence.
Further, a Full Bench of this Court (to which I am a party) vide its judgment in S. Bagavathy v. State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by its Secretary, Law Department, Chennai and Anr. reported in 2007 (2) MLJ 526 dealt with the attachment of properties under the Tamil Nadu Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1997. While dealing with the exparte attachment, in paragraphs 27 and 28.1 to 28.4, the Full Bench had observed as follows:
The opportunity given to the financial establishments, the persons aggrieved or person interested as mentioned above is not minimal, but, should be viewed pragmatically as the same satisfies the principles of natural justice with utmost promptitude. The Act therefore provides very flexible hearing giving opportunity to the financial establishments and persons whose properties were attached and procedure provided in this regard is malleable and adaptable to the concept of principles of natural justice. The dispensation of pre-decision opportunity while passing ad interim order of attachment u/s 3 of the Act is inevitable, as the very object of the enactment is to control, rgulate and curb the activities of malicious transfer of funds by the financial establishments and to realise the amount from the financial establishments and distribute the same to the depositors equitably and thus, protect the interest of the innocent depositOrs.
28.1. We, therefore, do not see any justification in the complaint for not affording a reasonable opportunity before attaching the property, as there cannot be any justified reason to fleece the funds that actually belongs to the depositOrs.
28.2. If that be so, can''t the State rush-in to bring out necessary enactment in order to provide a stabilised socio-economic justice and to provide infallibility by unique machinery of attaching the properties to safeguard the interest of the depositors?
28.3. Can''t the State under such circumstances save the moths from the fire except by putting out the fatal glow, by way of the impugned legislation?
28.4. Even on the point that properties of innocent third parties were also attached without giving any opportunity to them, we do not find any force as such innocent third parties are entitled to approach the Special Court for necessary remedy, after satisfying their bona fide. For their any hardship in the interregnal period, the answer is that when a general evil is sought to be suppressed some martyrs may have to suffer, for the legislature cannot easily make meticulous exceptions and it has to proceed on broad categorizations and not singular individualization.
The said judgment was taken on appeal to the Supreme Court. The SupremeCourt very recently by its judgment dated 4.3.2011 in K.K. Baskaran v. State rep. by its Secretary, Tamil Nadu and others in Civil Appeal No. 2341 of 2011 had dismissedthe appeal and confirmed the order of the Full Bench. In paragraphs 36 and 37, theSupreme Court had approved the law laid down by the Full Bench in relation toattachment of properties as means to achieve justice, which reads as follows:
In the case of the Tamil Nadu Act, the attachment ofproperties is intended to provide an effective and speedy remedyto the aggrieved depositors for the realization of their dues. The offencesdealt with in the impugned Act are unique and have been enacted to deal with theeconomic and social disorder in society, caused by the fraudulentactivities of such financial establishments.
u/s 3 & 4 of the Tamil Nadu Act, certain properties can be attached, and there is also provision for interim orders for attachment after which a post decisional hearing is provided for. In our opinion this is valid in view of the prevailing realities.
In the present case, by attachment of property made by the second Respondent, the Petitioner is not bound to lose anything and he cannot be said to be prejudiced. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 5(3), every order of attachment made u/s 5(1) of the POMLA will lose its efficacy either after 150 days or after an order passed u/s 8(2) of the POMLA. Therefore, it is only the Petitioner instead of approaching the first Respondent Adjudicating Authority who had initiated proceedings u/s 8(1), had rushed to this Court. Even if the attachment is made final, u/s 26, an appeal lies to the Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, the Petitioner must submit his explanation to the Adjudicating Authority and convince it that the amount sought to be attached was not obtained due to any money laundering and that it was the legally earned income. Even if he fails before the first Respondent, there is time enough for challenging the same before the judicial appellate Tribunal constituted u/s 26 of the POMA. When the Act itself provides for an inbuilt remedy, it is not open to the Petitioner to rush to this Court at the stage of provisional attachment, which is yet to be confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority.
In this context, it is necessary to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Shivhare Vs. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement and Another, wherein the Supreme Court while dealing with an alternative remedy available under the FEMA Act held that the Act cannot be bypassed and the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked. In the following passages found in paragraphs 31 and 32, the Supreme Court had observed as follows:
When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievance and that too in a fiscal statute, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. In this case the High Court is a statutory forum of appeal on a question of law. That should not be abdicated and given a go-by by a litigant for invoking the forum of judicial review of the High Court under writ jurisdiction. The High Court, with great respect, fell into a manifest error by not appreciating this aspect of the matter. It has however dismissed the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
No reason could be assigned by the Appellant#s counsel to demonstrate why the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court u/s 35 of FEMA does not provide an efficacious remedy. In fact there could hardly be any reason since the High Court itself is the appellate forum.
Very recently, the Supreme Court in United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon and Others, dealt with SARFAESI Act and DRT Act and in paragraphs 55 and 56, it had held as follows:
It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.
Insofar as this case is concerned, we are convinced that the High Court was not at all justified in injuncting the Appellant from taking action in furtherance of notice issued u/s 13(4) of the Act. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. Since the Respondent has not appeared to contest the appeal, the costs are made easy. Therefore, the writ petition filed by the Petitioner must necessarily fail.
Before parting with the case, it is necessary to refer to the observations made by the Supreme Court in K.K. Baskaran''s case (cited supra), where the Supreme Court emphasized the necessity to have laws to protect the people from money laundering and swindlers. In paragraph 41 of the said judgment, the Supreme Courthad observed as follows:
The State being the custodian of the welfare of the citizens as parens patriaecannot be a silent spectator without finding a solution forthis malady. The financial swindlers, who are nothing but cheats and charlatanshaving no social responsibility, but only a lust for easy money by making falsepromise of attractive returns for the gullible investors, had to be dealt withstrongly.
In view of the above factual matrix and legal precedents, the writ petition will stand dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions stand closed.