Gajraj and Others vs State of U.P. and Others

Amitava Lala, J.—This Bench is burdened with several writ petitions regarding various acquisition of lands in the State inclusive of various villages, which fall within the area of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority and Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, particularly by the side of Yamuna Expressway. Prima facie, we are of the view that the State used the urgency clause in the routine manner. The act of the State appears to be unexplainable in nature.

It seems to be departure from solemn duty of the State towards people. A lot of hue and cry is there in respect of the ways and means of the acquisitions of lands by the State ignoring the necessity of hearing of the land owners u/s 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter in short called as the "Act") applying the urgency clause under Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act. Inspiration of filing so many writ petitions is outcome of the latest Supreme Court and High Court judgements in this regard. Therefore, in addition to consideration of the cause, the Court has additional duty to find out who is genuine and who is unscrupulous litigants, trying to take advantage of the situation.

However, with the consensus of the parties, the matters with regard to Village Patwari, Pargana and Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Buddh Nagar have been taken up at first. There is a reason for taking up those matters at first. Recently, on 19th July, 2011 another Division Bench of this Court delivered a judgement in Writ-C No. 17068 of 2009 (Har Karan Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors.), by which the notification dated 20th March, 2007 u/s 4(1) read with Section 17(1) of the Act and notification dated 09th July, 2008 u/s 6 read with Section 17(4) of the Act have been set aside. In the supplied copy of such judgement, the date of first notification is shown as 12th March, 2008 when that of the second notification is shown as 30th June, 2008. Most likely these two dates are the dates of publication of such notifications, particularly when No. objection has been raised by the Petitioners about dates of notifications. It appears to us that the judgement was delivered in the light of the judgement delivered by the Supreme Court on 06th July, 2011 reported in Greater Noida Indusl. Devt. Auth. Vs. Devendra Kumar and Others,

Main attack of the Petitioners is that the lands were acquired for the purpose of industrial development but instead of developing the same, it has been given to several private builders to construct the residential accommodations for the respective purchasers. No. change of land use is made. No. opportunity of hearing has been given. Payment of compensation is grossly inadequate. Mr. Pankaj Dubey, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in the first writ petition, has virtually reiterated the judgement delivered by the Division Bench of this Court on 19th July, 2011 to establish his case. On the other hand, Mr. L. Nageshwara Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State, has contended before us that the judgement, which has been delivered by the Division Bench of this Court on 19th July, 2011, is not based on the correct appreciation of facts. He has submitted that before delivery of the judgement dated 19th July, 2011, another Division Bench of this Court by its order dated 25th November, 2008 in Civil Misc.

Writ Petition No. 45777 of 2008 (Harish Chand and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors.) upheld the application of urgency clause of the selfsame notifications upon going through the records, whereas in Har Karan Singh (supra) the Division Bench failed to appreciate final pronouncement of Harish Chand (supra) based on the records and delivered a separate judgement only on exchange of affidavits. There was No. scope for the subsequent Division Bench to pass such judgement ignoring the earlier judgement passed on the verification of records and No. appeal was preferred from such order to the Supreme Court. Since both the Benches of this Court are of similar strength, these matters are required to be heard by a larger Bench. Moreover, the question of laches in filing the writ petitions have not been considered by the Division Bench in Har Karan Singh (supra) at the time of passing such order. To the last part of the submission of Mr. Rao as aforesaid, Mr. Dubey has contended that in such type of cases laches can not be held to be a good ground for refusal.

Against this background, prima facie we are of the view that a larger Bench is required to be formed for the purpose of hearing these matters not only in respect of the village in question but also for all the acquisition matters in respect of the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority and Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority for the ends of justice, to reduce the fume and to avoid the multiplicity of the proceedings.

At this juncture, Mr. Dubey has contended before this Court that he has No. objection regarding hearing of such type of matters upon formation of a larger Bench, but the Petitioners are entitled for an interim order of status quo, which has been opposed by the Respondents by saying that since the writ petitions have been filed after 3-4 years of requisition and acquisition, at this stage there is No. necessity of passing any interim order, otherwise litigations will multiply.

According to us, balance of convenience does not prescribe to pass any interim order at this stage but prescribes for early disposal. Even in the earlier occasion on 11th July, 2011 No. interim order was passed.

However, Petitioners will be protected with their rights in the following manner:

(a) Principle of lis pendens will be applicable in these cases. Therefore, whatever steps will be taken by the Respondents in the meantime, the same will abide by the result of the writ petitions.

(b) Willing Petitioners may make applications to the State or the appropriate authority to consider their grievances and if it is made, the same will be considered carefully upon giving fullest opportunity of hearing to them, if necessary with the assistance of the pleader, by 12th August, 2011 and a report to that extent will be placed before the Court along with the records of all the acquisition cases on the next date of hearing i.e. on 17th August, 2011. Applications, if any, for such settlement out of the Court are totally optional on the part of the Petitioners. Rights, if any, of the unwilling Petitioners u/s 11-A of the Act will not be infringed.

(c) If the Petitioners make such applications for settlement out of the Court with the State or the State authority, the same will be considered by them in the line of the Uttar Pradesh Land Acquisition (Determination of Compensation and Declaration of Award by Agreement) Rules, 1997, which is commonly known as ''''Karar Niymawali, 1997".

It is pertinent to note that several applications have been made either by the respective builders and/or purchasers of flats and/or the banks for impleadment, which have been strongly opposed by the Petitioners by saying that they can not be made parties to these writ petitions as in the cases of land acquisition the land owners and the requiring bodies, sometime acquiring bodies, are the necessary parties and not others. On the part of one of the applicants it is submitted before this Court that as per the Rules of this High Court any aggrieved or affected party can be treated to be intervenor in any of the proceedings, therefore, No. one can be restrained from getting opportunity of hearing. In these special circumstances, they are required to be heard. However, at this stage we do not propose to entertain such applications.

The matters will appear on 17th August, 2011.

Let it be placed before the Hon''ble the Chief Justice/ Hon''ble Senior Judge, as per the Rules and practice of this Court, to take an administrative decision about formation of the larger Bench as early as possible, so that the matters can be placed before such larger Bench on the next date itself.

(Justice Amitava Lala):

I agree.

(Justice Ashok Srivastava)