Gamman vs State of U.P.

@DELETEUPPERDATA

Ranjana Pandya, J.—This revision has been preferred against the order dated 23.5.2014 passed by the learned Special Judge (D.A.A.)/Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 6, Budaun in Special Sessions Trial No. 200 of 2012, under Sections 395 and 397, I.P.C. against the order dated 10.4.2014 rejecting the discharge application.

Facts of the case are that the revisionists filed an application for discharge stating that they may be discharged under Sections 395 and 397, I.P.C. because no case under these sections is made out.

It has been stated that before this occurrence there is enmity between the parties. It has not been proved that dacoity was committed and the evidence has come that only after the occurrence, the opposite party No. 2 was paid money from the bank. Hence, it cannot be said that Rs. 8,000 were snatched from him. Hence, in case at hand since revisionists'' are already facing trial, they need to be discharged under Sections 395 and 397, I.P.C.

I have heard Mr. R.P.S. Chauhan, learned counsel for the revisionists: Mr. Imran Ullah, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2 and learned A.G.A. for the State.

Learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has placed reliance upon the judgment in State of Tamilnadu by Ins. of Police Vigilance and Anti Corruption Vs. N. Suresh Rajan and Others, , in which it has been laid down that at the stage of consideration of discharge application, the court has to proceed with the assumption that materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and the court has only to find out whether the facts brought on record by the prosecution are true.

In para 20 of the said judgment, the Hon''ble Apex Court has stated that: "True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post-office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage. Reference in this connection can be made to a recent decision of this Court in the case of Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, in which, after analyzing various decisions on the point, this Court endorsed the following view taken in Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (N.C.T. of Delhi):

"11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence."

The learned counsel for the revisionists has drawn my attention to the statements of bank guards Jagan Singh, Kushal Ram and Dharm Prakash, in which they have stated that the amount was withdrawn after the incident, hence no case under Sections 395 and 397, I.P.C. can be made out.

I think the statements recorded before the court carry more weight than the statements given to the Investigating Officer because in the F.I.R. and in the statement recorded by the court given by the complainant it has been stated that Rs. 8,000 were snatched by the accused persons.

Hence, I think there is prima facie a grave suspicion against the present revisionists.

There is no illegality, irregularity or impropriety in the order. Thus, the revision deserves to be dismissed at the admission stage.

The revision is dismissed at the admission stage. However, if the revisionists surrender before the lower court within twenty days from today and apply for bail, their bail application shall be considered and decided in accordance with law as laid down in Amarawati and Another (Smt.) Vs. State of U.P., .