High CourtsDivision Bench(1974) 02 MAD CK 0012

Ganesamuthuriar and Another vs The Idols of Sri Sappani Karuppuswami and Others

Madras High Court · Decided on 27 February 1974 · Citation: AIR 1975 Mad 23 : (1978) 87 LW 704 : (1974) 87 LW 704

HON’BLE JUDGES
Maharajan, J · Kailasam, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Letters Patent Appeal No. 26 of 1970

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

47 paragraphs · 1,189 words

Maharajan, J.—This letters patent appeal is directed against the judgment of Palaniswamy, J. and arises under the following circumstances.

One Samiyadi Pichai claiming to be the trustee of a temple of five deities (Sri Sappanikarppuswami, Sri Naruveli Karuppuswami, Sri

Nagappaswami, Sri Marudaiveeraswami end Sri Sannasiswami) sued the appellants, who were the defendants 1 and 2 in the trial Court, for a

declaration that he is the trustee of the temple and for recovery of possession of the plaint mentioned land, measuring one acre two cents, from the

appellants and in the alternative, for rendition of accounts. This suit was resisted by the appellants on several grounds. The trial court held that

Pichai is the trustee of the temple, but that he was not entitled to possession by virtue of a decision in O. S. No. 119 of 1932. It, however, granted

a decree declaring the title of Pichai as trustee and directing the defendants to render accounts in respect of a specific temple Kattalai. of which the

defendants were the trustees. On appeal, the District Judge of Tiruchirapalli concurred with the trial court and confirmed the decree granted by the

trial court. Then the defendants preferred a second appeal. The learned second appellate Judge held that Pichai was trustee of the temple and that

even assuming he was only a de facto trustee, he was entitled to call for accounts from the appellants. In this view, the learned Judge confirmed the

concurrent judgments of the trial Court and the first appellate Court and dismissed the appeal with costs.

2.

The main attack of the appellants against the maintainability of the suit is that Pichai was not the de jure trustee of the suit temple and that he was

not therefore competent to sue for rendition of accounts. There is the concurrent finding of three Courts to the effect that whether Pichai was a

hereditary or de jure trustee or not, he was undoubtedly the de facto trustee of the temple. Learned counsel for the appellants says that a de facto

trustee is not competent to maintain an action of the kind that has been decreed. The learned Judge has referred to the Full Bench decision in

Sankaranarayanan Iyer v. Poovananathaswami Temple, Koilpatti, 62 MLW 508 : AIR 1949 Mad 721 where it has been laid down that a de facto

trustee of a temple in possession and management of its properties is entitled to maintain a suit, in the absence of the de jure trustee, for recovery of

possession of the property belonging to the institution from a person holding adversely to and in denial of the title of the trust. Learned counsel says

that though a de facto trustee may be competent to bring a suit for recovery of possession from a trespasser, he is not entitled to sue the kattalai

trustee for rendition of accounts. We are unable to agree. It has been pointed by Viswanatha Sastri, J. in the above Full Bench ruling at page 523,

In recognising the right of de facto trustee to sue for recovery of possession of trust property. Courts must be astute to safeguard the interests of

the institution, for it is only in such interest that the right of suit is at all conceded to him."" It therefore follows that the main consideration that has

influenced Courts to recognise the competence of de facto trustee to institute a suit is that he is brining the suit, not on his own behalf, but for the

benefit and on behalf of the deity, which is a juridical entity, and when any act is done to the prejudice of the deity, even a de facto trustee must be

allowed to sue in the interests of the deity. We see no reason why a de facto trustee, who is, in the eye of law, competent to sue for recovery of

possession of a property belonging to the deity, should not. in the interests of the deity, be allowed to sue for rendition of accounts in. respect of

the properties which are found endowed specifically in favour of the deities. Learned counsel''s next argument is that u/s 108 of the Hindu Religious

and Charitable Endowments Act, no suit or other legal proceeding in respect of the administration or management of a religious institution or any

other matter or dispute for determining or deciding which provision is made in this Act shall be instituted in any Court of Law, except under, and in

conformity with, the provisions of this Act, and consequently this suit for rendition of accounts is not cognizable by the civil Court. The learned

second appellate Judge rejected this contention on the ground that this is not a suit for any of the reliefs contemplated by Section 108 of Tamil

Nadu Act No. 22 of 1959. The learned Judge also relied, and in our view rightly, upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi

Narasimha Swami Temple Vs. Induru Pattabhirami Reddy, where a suit was filed by the then trustee of a temple against an ex-trustee for rendition

of accounts and it was resisted on the ground now urged before us by the appellants. The Supreme Court, while negativing it, construed Section

93 of Madras Act XIX of 1951 (which is identical with Section 108 of Tamil Nadu Act 22 of 1959) and observed as follows: ""It is a well settled

principle that a party seeking to oust the jurisdiction of an ordinary civil Court shall establish the right to do so. Section 93 of the Act does not

impose a total bar on the maintainability of a suit in a civil Court. It states that a suit of the nature mentioned therein can be instituted only in

conformity with the provisions of the Act; that is to say, a suit or other legal proceedings in respect of the matters not covered by the section can

be instituted in the ordinary way. It therefore imposes certain statutory restrictions on suits or other legal proceedings relating to matters mentioned

therein. Now what are those matters? They are: (1) administration or management of religious institutions; and (2) any other matter or dispute for

determining or deciding which provision is made in the Act. The clause ""determining or deciding which provision is made in this Act"", on a

reasonable construction, cannot be made to qualify ""the administration or management"", but must be confined only to any other matter or dispute.

Even so, the expression ""administration or management"" cannot be construed widely so as to take in any matter however remotely connected with

the ""administration or management."" Their Lordships also held that a suit for accounts by a trustee against an ex-trustee is not interdicted by any

provision of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951. We think that the learned second appellate Judge was perfectly

right in holding that the suit by the de facto trustee of the temple filed against the kattalai trustee for rendition of accounts is by the same token

maintainable in the eye of law. The result is the appeal fails and will stand dismissed with costs.