Ganesan and Another vs K.V. Pandurangan and Others

S. Swamikkannu, J.—The important point that arises for consideration in this case is, whether there are sufficient and adequate reasons to

excuse the delay of one year and six days in filing the claim petition u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (IV of 1937) before the Tribunal. The

main argument that is advanced on behalf of the appellants herein is that due to the mental shock that had actually influenced the mind of the

parents of the deceased who was their eldest son, they were unable to prepare for instituting a claim in the Tribunal concerned, and as such, the

strict rules of limitation contemplated by Section 5 of the Limitation Act, should not be applied to this case, especially when that plea has been put

forward as a ground for excusing the delay of one year and six days. In support of this contention raised on behalf of the appellants, the decision in

Samuthalamina v. State (1937) 2 M. L.J. 537 : 1974 A.C.J. 24 : AIR 1974 Karn. 22, is relied on by the learned Counsel, Mr. K. Surendranath.

In a most persuasive way he submits that Section 110-A, Clause (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act and the concept underlying the same tends

towards approaching the question relating to excusing the delay in a more liberal and humane way than in the way contemplated u/s 5 of the

Limitation Act, which is more rigorous in its nature. I have gone through the ratio deddendi in Sannahakimmd''s case (1937) 2 M. L.J. 537 : 1974

A.C.J. 24 : AIR 1974 Karn. 22 and Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar Vs. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi and Others, . The decision of the Supreme Court is

purely u/s 5 of the Limitation Act (XXXVI of 1963) and this decision does not touch the concept underlying Section 110-A, Clause (3), which

reads as followes:

No application for compensation under this section shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident:

Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant

was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time.

A reading of Section 110-A, Clause (3) of the said Act shows that no petition by the aggrieved person for compensation relating to an accident

and its impact on the person of himself or the dependant or the person for whom he is entitled to compensation under this Section 110-A, shall be

entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident, provided the Tribunal was satisfied that the claimant was

prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. Thus, a reading of the section as mentioned above shows that there must be

certain materials available so as to satisfy the judicial conscience of the Tribunal or the Court dealing with the application for excusing the delay so

as to hold that there were certain circumstances actually present and which prevented the petitioner or the claimant from making the application

and that the cause shown by the applicant or claimant is sufficient and adequate. Each case has to be approached with facts that are available in it

by way of evidence or by way of matters which are forming part of the affidavit accompanying the petitions relating to excusing delay which will

show the reasons, so as to excuse the delay occurred in the case or not. In the instant case, the only, reason that is offered for excusing the clelay is

that the parents of the deceased were so much overwhelmed with grave mental distress that they were unable to even think any way in terms of

judicial proceedings in a Tribunal or Court so as to get some benefit on the basis of the death of their only son. In this view, while taking into

consideration the contents of the affidavit sworn to and accompanying this petition and the contents of the counter and the contentions raised

therein, this Court has got no other alternative than to allow this appeal and excuse the delay of one year and six days, i.e., 371 days though it is

very much stressed on the other side that each day ought to have been explained as per the concept of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It has to be

made clear that this concept is entirely different when read together with the Motor Vehicles Act. Of course, on merits any number of contentions

may be raised by the respondent to the claim petition and they have to be gone into by the Court while recording the evidence. But this aspect has

to be deal with by the judicial forum intended for dealing with the claim for compensation, and decided whether the claimant is entitled or not, from

the point of view of judicial discretion and in my view, this discretion has to be exercised properly. It should never come in the way of capricious or

arbitrary approach. It must be orie which must be judicial in every iota of it. That is how this Court lays down the law relating to appreciation of the

submissions relating to excusing the delay that arose under the provisions of Section 110-A, I Clause (3) together with the proviso to that section

while dealing with the application for excusing the delay. It is not the length of time that matters. But, it is the concept of mental feeling with which

an aggrieved party which had lost its one and only son that has to be actually entertained in the mind of a judicial forum, which, no doubt has to be

guided only by the legal principles. But legal principles are emanating only from moral principles. When that is the concept, this provision u/s 110-

A, Clause (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, has to be interpreted only in the above way and in that view, this appeal is allowed. The delay is

excused. The Tribunal is directed to take the petition on file and dispose of it on merits after giving opportunities to both sides to let in evidence,

both oral and documentary and come to a correct conclusion on the basis of the evidence placed before it. Under these circumstances, there is no

order as to costs.