Ganga Narain vs Bal Krishan Dass and Another

P.C. Pandit, J.—Balkishan Dass and his brother Narain Dass brough to suit against Ganga Narain alias Kakko alias Papoo and Suraj Mai for possession of the shops in dispute one for the recovery of Rs. 171/4/- as mesne profits. Their allegations were that one Ram Saran Dass was the tenant of the shops in question. His tenancy was terminated by issuing him a notice dated 14-4-1956 to vacate the premises; Thereafter on 31-8-1956 a suit was brought for his eviction and for recovery of arrears of rent. Daring the pendency of this suit, he died on 14-9-1956 and Ganga Narain was impleaded as a Defendant as he was alleging himself to be the adopted son of the deceased, Ram Saran Bass. He paid the arrears of rent, which were accepted by the Plaintiffs and, as a result, their suit was dismissed on 10-12-1956. The present suit was brought on 10-6-1958, in which it was alleged that Ganga Narain was a trespasser and further that he sublet the shops to Suraj Mai, Defendant No. 2. The mesne profits were claimed for the period commencing from 7-8-1956 to 19-5-1958.

The suit was contested by Ganga Narain, Defendant No. 1, who inter alia, pleaded that he was the adopted son of Ram Sarup Dass and was in possession of these shops as a tenant in his own right. Defendant No. 2 was proceeded against ex parte

The pleas of the parties gave rise to the following issue:

Are the Plaintiffs the owners of the suit property?

Is the suit properly valued for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction?

Is the Defendant a tenant of the premises under the Plaintiffs?

Is the Defendant an adopted son of Ram Saran Dass deceased?

To what amount, if any, are the Plaintiffs entitled as mesne profits?

Has this Court jurisdiction to award a decree for arrears of rent?

Is the Defendant liable to eviction as per allegations in the plaint?

Relief.

The trial Judge found that the Plaintiffs were the owners of the suit property, that the Defendant No. 1 was the adopted son of Ram Saran Dass and was the tenant of the shops in dispute under the Plaintiffs and that a Defendant No. 1 (sic) or non-payment of rent. In view of these possession (sic) the suit of the Plaintiffs for ejectment and possession, of the premises in dispute was dismissed, but a decree for Rs. 171/14/- as arrears of rent, was however, passed in favour of the Plaintiffs against Defendant No. 1, because these arrears were tendered in Court but the Plaintiffs had refused to accept them as they were not recognising Defendant No. 1 as their tenant.

Against this decree, the Plaintiffs went in appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Delhi. He reversed the finding of the trial court on issue No. 3 and held that Ganga Narain, Defendant, was not the tenant of the shops in dispute. He, consequently, accepted the appeal and granted the Plaintiffs a decree for possession of the premises in question against Ganga Narain. As regards the amount of Rs. 171/14/- awarded by the Lower Court as rent, the decree was modified to this extent that this amount was termed as mesne profits and not arrears of rent. Against this decision, the present appeal has been filed by Defendant No. 1. The facts found by the Lower appellate, Court, and about which there is no controversy in appeal, are that the tenancy of Ram Saran Dass was determined by means of the notice dated 14-4-1956. He died on 14-9-1956 during the pendency of the suit filed against him for his eviction and for recovery of arrears of rent. After his death, Ganga Narain was impleaded as a Defendant. He paid up the arrears of rent and the suit was then dismissed on 10-12-1956. The present suit has been filed against Ganga Narain on the ground that he is a trespasser. It is undisputed that the tenancy of Ram Saran Dass was contractual. It came to an end when the notice to quit was given to him on 14-4-1956. The mere; fact that the arrears of rent tendered by Ganga Narain were accepted by the Plaintiffs, would not make him their tenant. It has been held that mere acceptance of the rent does not operate as waiver of notice to quit. As a matter of a fact, it has been frankly conceded by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that this proposition of law could not be challenged. His submission, however, is that since Ram Saran Dass remained in possession of the premises even after the termination of the tenancy in his favour he became a statutory tenant and after his death, his adopted son, Ganga Narain, would inherit his tenancy rights and would, consequently, be deemed to be the tenant of the Plaintiffs.

After hearing the counsel for the parties, I find that there is no merit in this contention. There is ample authority for the proposition that a statutory tenancy is a personal right enjoyed by the tenant, who has ceased to be a contractual tenant, and it does not create a right which is heritable. It was held by Mehar Singh J. in Chande Ram Bashaku Vs. State,

That if a contractual tenancy determines for any cause, and the tenant under the contractual tenancy remains in possession of the property not under the terms of the contract but pursuant to the provisions of statutes like the Rent Acts, his possession from the dale of the determination of the contractual tenancy is termed a statutory tenancy.

* * * * * * * * That a statutory tenancy under a Rant Act is a personal right to remain in possession of the property and no more, of which the legal consequence is that the right comets to an end upon the death of the person in whom it resides. This is because such a tenant cannot dispose of this type of tenancy by assignment, subletting or otherwise parting with possession of that premises.

This authority was followed by Grover J. in Niadre v. Nanneh 62 Pun LR 451. Reference in this connection may also be made to two decisions of the Bombay High Court in The State of Bombay Vs. Virendra Motabhoy and Others, , and Eruch J. Bapasola and Another Vs. B.D. Mirchandani, . Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the rulings of this Court, undoubedly, went against his contention, but they did not lay down correct law. As at present advised, I have not been persuaded to take a different view than the one taken by our own Court.

No other point was urged before mo.

The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, however, I will leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.