Ganganarasaiah vs State of Karnataka and Others

K.A. Swami, Ag. C.J.-At the stage of admission, Sri S.R. Nayak, learned Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for the respondents. As the appeal involves a short question and as it is also covered by decisions of the Supreme Court, it is admitted and heard for final disposal.

This appeal is preferred against the order dated 2nd July, 1992, passed in Writ Petition No. 11284 of 1992 [Ganganarasaiah v State of Karnataka and Others, 1992(3) Kar. L.J. 519] by the learned Single Judge who has taken a view that the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution is excluded having regard to the provisions contained in Sections 15 and 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 which is passed by the Parliament pursuant to Article 323-A of the Constitution of India.

It is not necessary to consider the contentions urged in the appeal, afresh because the Supreme Court in Union of India and Others v Deep Chand Pandey and Another, reported in 1992 AIR SCW 3429, has held that even in respect of a person who is appointed on daily-wage basis provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act are attracted and he has to invoke the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal in the event his service on daily-wages is affected in any manner. Relevant portion of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the above case is as follows:

"4. The respondents, on the one hand, are relying upon their service under the Union of India, of course casual in nature, for a claim that they were entitled to continue as the servants of the Central Government and on the other hand for the purpose of their argument that the High Court and not the Central Administrative Tribunal is vested with the jurisdiction to entertain their claim, they are disassociating themselves from the relationship of master and servant under the Union of India. It is a strange stand taken on their behalf, involving self-contradiction and is not permissible.

The scope of Article 323-A permitting the Parliament to legislate on the subject covered therein is, having regard to the language, very wide, and by enacting 1985 Act this power has been exercised in almost full measure. An examination of Section 14 and Section 3(q) clearly indicates that the Act covers a very wide field, and there is nothing to suggest that the provisions dealing with the jurisdiction of the Tribunal should receive a narrow interpretation. This is also supported by the clarification offered by the then Minister for Law, who was piloting the Bill, while replying to the demand for the further enumeration of the conditions of service in Sections 14 and 15. He stated that (as recorded in the proceedings for 9th to 11th November, 1976, of the Rajya Sabha Debate) he believed the ''conditions of service'' to be of such a wide expression that an attempt of enumeration would be "really so dangerous from the point of view of the employees themselves that by exclusion you say that the others are not."

The present respondents are claiming the right to continue in the employment of the Union of India as before, with additional claim of temporary status and it is, therefore, idle to suggest that such a claim is not covered by the Act. The necessary conclusion, therefore, is that the remedy of the respondents was before the tribunal and not the High Court. We, accordingly, hold that the High Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the respondents. Consequently the impugned judgment is set aside, the writ petition before the High Court is dismissed and these appeals are allowed, but without costs."

Similar view is also taken by the Supreme Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 404 of 1990-Commercial Tax Department Daily Wages Employees'' Association of Karnataka and Others v State of Karnataka and Others; and by its order dated 9th September, 1992, it has been held as follows:

"There is no jurisdiction for the petitioners to approach this court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Mr. R.K. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioners, however states that the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal has taken the view that the Casual Daily Rated Employees cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the tribunal because they do not hold any post. He further states that the Karnataka High Court on the other hand has taken the view that a person appointed on purely temporary post to a Government service on a daily wage is appointed to a civil post and as such a petition by such a person lies before the Administrative Tribunal and the High Court has no jurisdiction. This is a matter which can only be determined on the facts of each case.

The petitioners before us are working as Second Division Clerks, Assistants and Stenographers in the Commercial Tax Department of the State of Karnataka. Their appointment orders show that they were provisionally selected and appointed purely on temporary basis on daily wages. It is thus obvious that the petitioners were appointed to the designated posts in Government service. They are performing duties of their respective jobs in the Government department. They are performing public duties and the wages are being paid to them directly from the State exchequer. They are under the administrative control of the Government authorities. On the facts of this case, there is no escape from the conclusion that the petitioners are in the civil service of the State of Karnataka and are holders of civil posts. In this view of the matter the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal has the jurisdiction to entertain and deal with this matter.

The petitioners may, if so advised, approach the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal for the adjudication of their grievances. The writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn with the above observations."

Therefore, it is clear that the learned single Judge is justified in rejecting the writ petition.

We see no ground to interfere with the order under appeal. Appeal is accordingly dismissed.

Sri S.R. Nayak, learned Government Advocate, is permitted to file his memo of appearance on behalf of the respondents in six weeks.