GARG STORES vs DURGA ICE And COLD STORAGE

THE present complaint, has been filed by M/s. Garg Stores, a partnership concern, through its partner, Shri Hari Ram Gupta, averring therein that the complainant firm has been working as a wholesale dealer inter alia dealing in tamarind with seed (Imli), tamarind without seed (Mukassar) and dry grapes (Kishmish), at 11-B, Church Road, Bhogal, New Delhi, for the last several years. It is stated that the opposite party has been running a cold storage, situated at C-34/3, Lawrence Road Industrial Area, New Delhi, for the last several years, wherein facility of storage of goods is given to the desirous persons for consideration, i.e., the opposite party rendering services to desirous persons for ''consideration''.

IT is stated that the complainant firm had stored ''Imli'', ''Mukassar'' and ''Kishmish'' in the opposite party''s cold storage on different dates in various lot numbers allotted by the opposite party to the complainant, as detailed in paragraph (iv) of the complaint on payment of usual storage charges. IT is stated that the opposite party was required to keep the cold storage fit and to take all safety and precautionary measures required for any possible mishap. But the opposite party was negligent and deficient in service, as a result of which in the cold storage, on the night falling between 30th and 31st December, 2000 there was an outbreak of fire, due to which ''Imli'' of the value of Rs. 1,98,443/-, ''Mukassar'' of the value of Rs. 1,60,180/-, and ''Kishmish'' of the value of Rs. 1,67,497/-, belonging to the complainant and stored in the cold storage of the opposite party, were completely destroyed. The details of the goods, belonging to the complainant, and alleged to have been destroyed in the abovesaid fire, have been given in paragraph (iv) of the complaint. IT is stated that due to negligence and deficiency in service on the part of the opposite party, the complainant has suffered a loss of Rs. 5,26,120/-. IT is stated that the complainant made several representations to the opposite party, asking for compensation, but no relief was given to the complainant. A legal notice dated 29th March, 2001 was also got served on the opposite party to pay a sum of Rs. 5,26,120/-, together with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. But the opposite party has failed to redress the grievance of the complainant. In the complaint filed by the complainant, it has been prayed that the opposite party be directed to pay to the complainant a sum of Rs. 5,26,120/- together with interest at the rate of 18% per annum with effect from 31st December, 2000 till payment. The complainant has also claimed compensation/damages and cost of litigation. A notice of the complaint was issued to the opposite party. The opposite party has filed a reply/written version, resisting the claim of the complainant. In the reply/written version, filed on behalf of the opposite party, the opposite party has taken certain preliminary objections, stating that the complainant is not a ''consumer'' that the complainant has failed to make out a case of ''deficiency in service'', that in view of clauses (1) and (2) of the terms and conditions mentioned at the back of the receipt, the complaint is liable to be dismissed; and that the matter is sub-judiceas the Crime Branch is still investigating the same.

On merits, while admitting that the opposite party is a partnership firm with Mr. S.K. Jain as one of the partners, the cold storage of the opposite party is in existence for the last 15 years and the opposite party has been storing perishable items of its customers in the cold storage, in the reply/written version the occurrence of the outbreak of fire on the intervening night of 30th and 31st December, 2000 in the cold storage has been admitted. It is stated that the matter regarding the outbreak of fire was reported to the police authorities and an F.I.R. (F.I.R. No. 490 of 2000) has been registered at Police Station Keshavpuram, Delhi, under Section 436 of the I.P.C. The opposite party in the reply/written version has also admitted the fact that the complainant firm had been storing perishable items in the cold storage of the opposite party. Insofar as the contents of paragraphs (iii) and (iv) of the complaint is concerned, in the reply/written version it is stated that the same are denied as no records are available with the opposite party because all the documents/papers were destroyed in the devastating fire which took place on the intervening night of 30th and 31st December, 2000. The allegations of negligence and deficiency in service have been denied. It is stated that as the stocks/stores were received and stored in the cold storage of the opposite party at owners'' risk, the opposite party is not responsbible for any loss or damage caused to the goods while in the cold storage due to fire or any other cause. It is stated that the complainant is not entitled to any relief and the complaint filed by the complainant be dismissed with exemplary costs.

A rejoinder to the reply/written version, filed on behalf of the opposite party, has been filed on behlaf of the complainant, controverting the pleas taken in the reply/written version and reiterating the averments made in the complaint. The parties have adduced evidence in support of their respective cases by means of affidavits. On behalf of the complainant, an affidavit of one Shri Vinod Kumar Gupta, a partner of the complainant firm, has been filed, whereas on behalf of the opposite party an affidavit of Shri S.K. Jain, one of the partners of the opposite party, has been filed. Both the parties have filed written submissions/arguments.

WE have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and have also carefully gone through the documents/material on record, including the written submissions filed on behalf of both the parties. On the basis of material on record, contentions advanced at the Bar and the pleas taken by both the parties, the following questions arise for our consideration in the present complaint : (1) Whether the complainant is a ''consumer'' within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act ? (2) Whether in the given facts the opposite party was providing any ''service'' within the meaning of Section 2(1)(o) of the Act? (3) Whether, in the given facts, was there any ''deficiency'' in service on the part of the opposite party within the meaning of Section 2(1)(g) of the Act ? and (4) To what relief the complainant is entitled to in the facts and circumstances of the present case ?

Question Nos. 1 and 2 : Since both the above questions are inter-connected, therefore, we would be dealing with the same together. The term ''consumer'' has been defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the Act and, therefore, it would be appropriate for us to refer to the definition of the word ''consumer'' at this stage, which reads as under : " ''conumer'' means any person who- (i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and inculudes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose; or (ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires or avails of the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person but does not include a person who avails of such services for any commercial purpose. Explanation.-For the purposes of this clause, ''commercial purpose'' does not include use by a person of goods bought and used by him and services availed by him exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment."

The term ''service'' has been defined in Section 2(1)(o) of the Act which reads as under : " ''service'' means service, of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service :"

On a bare perusal of the above provisions of the Act, it is apparent that definition of the word ''consumer'' as defined in Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 2 and that of the word ''service'' as defined in Clause (o) of Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act, is of a wide sweep. The above provisions of the Act, as contained in Section 2(1)(d) and (o), came up for consideration before the Hon''ble Supreme Court in case Lucknow Development Authority v. Shri M.K. Gupta, III (1993) CPJ 7 (SC) = (1994) 1 SCC 243, and their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the above said case have held : "The word ''consumer'' is a comprehensive expression. It extends from a person who buys any commodity to consume either as eatable or otherwise from a shop, business house, corporation, store, fair price shop to use of private or public services. In Oxford Dictionary a consumer is defined as a ''purchaser of goods or services''. In Black''s Law Dictionary it is explained to mean, ''one who consumes''. Individuals who purchase, use, maintain, and dispose of products and services. A member of that broad class of people who are affected by pricing policies, financing practices, quality of goods and services, credit reporting, debt collection, and other trade practices for which State and federal consumer protection laws are enacted."

WHILE interpreting the scope and sweep of the term ''service'' as defined in Section 2(1)(o) of the Act, their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the above decision of Lucknow Development Authority, have further held : "The term has variety of meanings. It may mean any benefit or any act resulting in promoting interest or happiness. It may be contractual, professional, publish, domestic, legal statutory, etc. The concept of service thus is very wide xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx The main clause itself is very wide. It applies to any service made available to potential users. The words ''any'' and ''potential'' are significant. Both are of wide amplitude. The word ''any'' dictionarily means ''one or some or all''. In Black''s Law Dictionary it is explained thus, word ''any'' has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate ''all'' or ''every'' as well as ''same'' or ''one'' and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and subject matter of the statute. The use of the word ''any'' in the context it has been used in Clause (o) indicates, that it has been used in wider sense extending from one to all. The other word ''potential'' is again very wide. In Oxford Dictionary it is defined as ''capable of coming into being, possiblity''. In Black''s Laws Dictionary it is defined as ''extending in possibility but not in act. Naturally and probably expected to come into existence at some future time, though not now existing; for example, the future product of grain or trees already planted, or the successive future instalments or payments on a contract or engagement, already made''. In other words service which is not only extended to actual users but those who are capable of using it are covered in the definition. The clause is thus very wide and extends to any or all actual or potential users. But the Legislature did not stop there. It expanded the meaning of the word further in modern sense by extending it to even such facilities as are available to a consumer in connection with banking, financing, etc. Each of these are wide ranging activities in day to day life. They are discharged both by statutory and private bodies."

IF the criterion laid down by their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the above decision is applied to the present complaint, it is noticed by us that it is not in dispute that the opposite party at the relevant time was running a cold storage at C-34/3, Lawrence Road Industrial Area, Delhi, where perishable articles belonging to their clients were being stored on payment of charges (consideration). In the complaint, a specific averment has been made by the complainant that the complainant had stored ''Imli'', ''Mukassar'' and ''Kishmish'' in the cold storage of the opposite party as detailed in paragraph (iv) of the complaint on payment of usual charges. The above averment in the reply/written version has not been specifically denied and a plea has been taken by the opposite party that no records with the regard to the storage of goods in the cold storage at the relevant time are available as the same were destroyed in the devastating fire on the night intervening 30th and 31st December, 2000. Moreover, the complainant, in the complaint filed by him, has also averred that when no relief was given by the opposite party, the complainant got served a legal notice dated 29th March, 2001 on the opposite party. In the above said notice also the details of goods stored in the cold storage of the opposite party and destroyed in the devastating fire have been given. The opposite party gave a reply dated 7th April, 2001 to the above said legal notice of the complainant (a copy of which has been annexed by the opposite party along with the reply/written version). In the reply to the legal notice it is stated that the opposite party is not in a position to admit or deny the claim of the complainant having stored the specified goods and the quantity of goods specified in the notice. Shri Vinod Kumar Gupta, one of the partners of the complainant firm, in his affidavit dated 2nd May, 2002, filed by way evidence, has also specifically stated about the storage of the goods in question in the cold storage of the opposite party. There is no cross-examination of said Shri Vinod Kumar Gupta insofar as the above aspect is concerned and, therefore, we conclude that the above averment has gone on record unchallenged. In the affidavit of Shri S.K. Jain, a partner of the opposite party firm, filed by way of evidence, the above averment has not been denied and it is simply stated that due to a fire on the intervening night of 30th and 31st December, 2000 all records pertaining to the case stored in the cold storage have been totally destroyed and the opposite party, therefore, is not having any papers to ascertain the extent of loss of items stored by different individuals and that the opposite party also does not have the break-up of items stored in the cold storage by their different clients. On the basis of the above facts, the only irresistible conclusion is that the complainant had stored the goods, as detailed in paragraph (iv) of the complaint, in the cold storage of the opposite party for consideration. In the presence of the above facts and in view of the law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the above decision of Lucknow Development Authority, we have no hesitation in holding, that, in the given facts, the complainant was a ''consumer'' within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act and that the opposite party was a ''provider of service'' within the meaning of Section 2(1)(o) of the Act. Question No. 3 :

It has been pleaded on behalf of the complainant that there was ''deficiency in service'' on the part of the opposite party. According to the complainant''s case, the fire in the cold storage of the opposite party took place on the night falling between 30th and 31st December, 2000, where the goods of the complainant were lying stored, due to the negligence and deficiency in service on the part of the opposite party. As per the case of the complainant, the electricity wiring in the opposite party''s cold storage was not upto the standard quality and the opposite party was negligent in not keeping the same in good condition. In nut-shell, the case of the complainant is that the fire occurred because of short-circuit of electricity. The opposite party, as already stated, has denied the above allegation and during the course of arguments it was vehementally contended by the learned Counsel for the opposite party that information about the outbreak of fire was given to the police authorities and information about the same was also received by the concerned functionaries of Delhi Fire Service, who reached the spot, made all efforts to extinguish the fire and conducted a thorough investigation of the burnt electrical items and after conducting full investigation, have given their reports, stating that the fire in the cold storage was not due to short-circuit of electricity nor due to poor quality of maintenance nor due to the negligence on the part of the opposite party. The above contention, advanced in support of the case of the opposite party, is not supported by the above said report of Delhi Fire Service , dated 13th February, 2001. (A copy of the report of the Delhi Fire Service has been annexed with the reply/written version as Annexure III). The operative portion of the above said document, which is significant for deciding the above controversy, reads as under : "Please refer to your letter No. Nil, dated 6.2.2001 on the subject cited above. The required information given as under : (1) Date of occurrence : 31.12.2000 (2) Time of receipt of call : 0145 hours (3) Property involved : Fire was in the cold storage comprising of basement and six upper lebels invloving dry fruits, etc. The furniture, fixture, machinery, official records were also burnt. The building was also damaged in the fire."

ON a bare perusal of the contents of the abovesaid report, it is apparent that not a word has been stated in the abovesaid report of Delhi Fire Service that the fire in the cold storage was not due to short-circuit of electricity nor due to poor quality of maintenance nor due to negligence on the part of the opposite party. The above said report of Delhi Fire Service even does not speak a word about the cause of the fire. Moreover, it was incumbent upon the opposite party, with whom the goods were entrusted for safe custody in the cold storage, to explain as to what steps/arrangements had been made by the opposite party to safeguard the interests of the persons who used to entrust their goods for safe custody in the cold storage of the opposite party. The opposite party, with whom the goods were entrusted for safe custody, was also under an obligation, in the given facts, to explain as to how the fire had occurred. Even otherwise, non-delivery of the stocks per se would amount to deficiency in rendering service. Similar view has been taken by the Punjab State Commission in case M/s. Perma Nand Joginder Pal & Co. v. M/s. C.M.P. Finishing Mills Cold Storage & Anr., reported as I (1999) CPJ 483. For discharging its obligation, it was incumbent on the part of the opposite party to have brought on record the arrangements made and precautions taken by the opposite party to safeguard the interests of the clients who were availing the services for considertion (storing their goods in the cold storage for safe custody). The opposite party has not brought any material on record to show that the opposite party, with a view to safeguard the interests of its clients, including the complainant, had made arrangements for insurance of goods kept and had taken proper precautions to avoid any incident of fire and in the event of fire taking place, to minimize the loss due to fire by installing fire fighting equipments, etc. In the absence of any such material on record, the presumption is that no such arrangement for safeguarding the interest of the consumers had been made by the opposite party, which also amounts to ''deficiency in sevice''. Thus, on the basis of material on record, it is established that there was ''deficiency in service/negligence'' on the part of the opposite party within the meaning of Section 2(1)(g) of the Act, as a result of which the goods of the complainant, stored in the cold storage of the opposite party, were destroyed, thereby causing loss to the complainant. Question No. 4 : During the course of arguments and also in the written submissions filed on behalf of the opposite party, it is contended that even if there was any deficiency in service on the part of the opposite party, the complainant is not entitled to any relief in view of condition Nos. (1) and (2) of the terms and conditions as mentioned at the back of the receipt issued at the time of accepting the stock. The above said two conditions, printed at the back of the receipt, relied upon by the opposite party, read as under : "1. All stocks are received and stored at owner''s risk." "2. that the company shall not be responsible for any loss or damage caused to the goods while in cold storage due to breakdown of plant, machinery, cold - storage building, failure of electricity and fire or through any other cause, such as war, riots, civil commotion, any act of God within/beyond the control of the company. The company shall not be responsible for delay in delivery or non-delivery due to any of the said causes."

The above plea, advanced in the defence of the opposite party, in our opinion, is of no consequence because in the first place there is nothing on record to indicate that the complainant was specifically told of any terms and conditions printed on the back of the receipt. Moreover, on the basis of material on record, it is apparent that the complainant or any of its employees seldom approached the said cold storage at the time of entrusting the goods. The endorsement of having received the goods was generally made by the employee of the said cold storage on the back of the bilty of the transporter after unloading goods, and thereafter the transporter used to produce the papers/bilty for getting the freight from the shop of the complainant.

ABOVE all, as per settled law, an unfair or untenable or irrational clause in a contract is amenable to judicial review. In Gillespie Brothers & Co. Ltd. v. Roy Bowles Transport Ltd., (1973) 1 QB 400, Lord Denning for the first time construing the indemnity clause in a contract stated that the Court to permit party to enforce his unreasonable clause, even when it is so unreasonable, or applied so unreasonably, would be unconscionable. In Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy, (1974) 3 All ER 757, inequality of the bargaining power was enunciated by Lord Denning M.R. and held that one who enters into a contract on terms which are very unfair or transfers property for a consideration which is grossly inadequate when his bargaining power is grievously impaired by reason of his own needs or desires, or by his own ignorance or infirmity; the one who stipulates for an unfair advantage may be moved solely by his own self interest, unconscious of the distress he is bringing to the other. It has been held that one who is in extreme need may knowingly consent to a most improvident bargain solely to relieve the strains in which he finds himself. Decidedly, the above mentioned clauses, relied upon by the opposite party, cannot be treated or termed to be reasonable by any stretch of imagination and, therefore, no advantage can be allowed to be taken by the opposite party on the basis of the same.

OUR view, that the above clauses, printed on the back of the receipt, are of no consequence, further gains strength from the fact that despite the fact that the above clauses were printed on the receipts issued earlier by the opposite party to the complainant, Shri S.K. Jain, a partner of the opposite party, himself had paid compensation of Rs. 43,890/- for the damage of 665 bags of ''Imli'' of the complainant, vide cheque No. 828076 dated 3rd February, 1989, drawn on Canara Bank, Chandni Chowk, Delhi, which fact is evident on the basis of documents, annexed with the rejoinder filed on behalf of the complainant. One of the abovesaid documents reads as under : "In the meeting held at the office of Durga Cold storage, C-34/3, Lawrence Road, Delhi- 110035 at 11.00 a.m. on Tuesday the 31st January, 1989, the following persons took post and had detailed discussions : 1. Shri S.K. Jain For Durga Ice & Cold Storage 2 Shri Hari Ram Gupta For Garg Stores, Bhogal, New Delhi 3. Shri Rameshwar Das A Khari Baoli Trader In this meeting it was mutually agreed and settled that M/s. Durga Ice and Cold Storage, Lawrence Road, Delhi-10035, would pay a compensation of Rs. 43,890/- (Rupees Forty three thousand eight hundred and ninty) for 665 Bags of 55 kg. damaged in the said Cold Storage at the rate of Rs. 120/- per quintal. Sd/- S.K. Jain Sd/- Hari Ram Gupta C-34/3, Lawrence Road Industrial Area 15A/2, Temple Road, Bhogal Delhi - 110035 New Delhi-110014 Sd/- Rameshwar Dass E-20, Ranjit Singh Marg Adarsh Nagar, Delhi."

The correctness of the facts in the above document, has not been disputed by the opposite party. The above documents virtually takes the bottom out of the case of the opposite party in sofaras the above aspect is concerned.

IN view of the position explained above the complainant is entitled to grant of relief under the Act. Having decided that the complainant is entitled to relief, the next question requiring consideration is with regard to the quantum of relief which can be given to the complainant in the facts and circumstances of the case.

The law on the subject is fairly well settled. In the land mark decision in case Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held : "Each hierarchy in the Act is empowered to entertain a complaint by the consumer for value of the goods or services and compensation. The word ''compensation'' is again of very wide connotation. It has not been defined in the Act. According to dictionary, it means, ''compensating or being compensated; thing given as recompense;''. In legal sense it may constitute actual loss or expected loss and may extend to physical, mental or even emotional suffering, insult or injury or loss. Therefore, when the Commission has been vested with the jurisdiction to award value of goods or services and compensation it has to be construed widely enabling the Commission to determine compensation for any loss or damage suffered by a consumer which in law is otherwise included in wide meaning of compensation. The provision in our opinion enables a consumer to claim and empowers the Commission to redress any injustice done to him."

(Emphasis supplied)

IN case Vijay Sethi v. The District Manager, Telephones & Anr., 1986-89 Consumer 3891 (NS), the Hon''ble National Commission, while interpreting the scope and sweep of the provisions of Section 14(1)(d) of the Act, has held : "The only question that remains to be answered is the quantum of compensation. Section 14(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, lays down the reliefs that can be granted by the Consumer Fora, when there is a finding of deficiency in service. It empowers the Consumer Fora to direct to pay such amount as may be awarded by it as compensation to the consumer for any loss or injury suffered by the consumer due to the negligence of the opposite party. Compensation can be awarded to a consumer only in respect of any loss or injury found to have been suffered by him due to the negligence of the opposite parties. The compensation is just equivalent of the loss that is suffered by a party."

In case Smt. Kailash Kumari v. Narendra Electronics & Ors., II (1991) CPJ 279 (NC)=1986-94 Consumer 906 (NS), it has been laid down by the Hon''ble National Commission that the amount of compensation should not be fixed arbitrarily, but only on the basis of well settled legal principles. The Hon''ble National Commission, in the above said decision, has cautioned the Consumer Forums against taking a too narrow and technical view on the question of quantification of compensation and proceeded to lay down the law as follows : ".....where it is practically impossible to adduce tangible evidence regarding the actual monetary equivalent of the inconvenience, mental suffering, etc., caused to the petitioner, it is the duty of the concerned Redressal Forum, to assess and determine in the light of all the evidence available in the case what amount would reasonably go to compensate the petitioner for the inconvenience, mental agony, etc., caused to the complainant on account of the negligence of the opposite party."

(Emphasis supplied)

THE Hon''ble National Commission, in a recent decision, in case Standard Chartered Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. H.B. Impex Private Ltd. 2002 CTJ 106 (CP) (NCDRC), has held that relief to a consumer by a redressal agency established under the Act can be given for actual loss and not for remote loss or for abnormal loss. THE complainant had entrusted goods worth Rs. 4,58,106/-, as detailed in paragraph (iv) of the complaint to the cold storage of the opposite party. THE complainant has claimed a sum of Rs. 5,26,120/-, being the market value of the goods destroyed. However, no authentic proof/satisfactory evidence has been brought on record to satisfy us that the market value of the goods stored on the date of occurrence of the fire was to the extent of Rs. 5,26,120/-. On the basis of cash memos and other documents on record, it is established that for purchasing the said goods, the complainant had incurred an expenditure of Rs. 4,58,106/- and, therefore, the complainant is entitled to the above said amount, together with interest. THE complainant has claimed interest at the rate of 18% per annum from 31st December, 2000 till realization. In our opinion, the interest claimed is on the higher side. Interest at the rate of 12% per annum would be sufficient to meet the ends of justice. The complainant has also claimed compensation and damages. Both interest and compensation cannot be awarded to a consumer by a redressal agency established under the Act. In our above views, we stand fortified by a decision of the Hon''ble National Commission, in case Laxmi Vilas Bank Ltd. & Anr. v. P.R. Krishnan & Anr., reported as I (1995) CPJ 43 (NC)=1986-96 Consumer 3234 (NS). In the above said decision, the Hon''ble National Commission has held : "In our opinion all that the complainants were entitled to was to be compensated for the loss sustained by them by reason of the failure on the part of the Bank to pay the amount due under the fixed deposit on the date when it matured for payment. This could be done either by awarding them interest in lieu of damages or by awarding a lump-sum compensation based on the evidence, if any, adduced by the complainants regarding the actual loss sustained by them. The conferment of a double benefit by awarding both interest as well as lump-sum compenstion in our opinion is not justified in law."

(emphasis supplied) In view of the position explained above, it is directed that the opposite party to pay a sum of Rs. 4,58,106/- (Rupees Four lakhs fifty eight thousand one hundred and six only) to the complainant, together with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 31st December, 2000 till actual payment. The complainant is also awarded cost of litigation, amounting to Rs. 5,000/-, to be paid by the opposite party to the complainant. The above amount, as directed by us, be paid by the opposite party to the complainant within 45 days from the date of receipt of this order, failing which the complainant would be at liberty to file an application under Section 25/27 of the Act, as the complainant may be advised. The above mentioned complaint, filed by the complainant, stands disposed of in above terms. Complaint disposed of.