Garib Chand and Others vs Uttami and Others

R.S. Pathak, C.J.—These two revision petitions are directed against an order dated July 26, 1972, of the learned District Judge, Kangra Division, refusing to implead the Petitioners in a reference u/s 30 of the Land Acquisition Act.

A parcel of land in village Tikka Barar, Mauja Sathana, Tehsil Dehra, District Kangra, was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and compensation was assessed by the Collector. Munshi Ram and certain other persons filed objections before the Collector claiming that they were proprietors in the village and were entitled to share the compensation. Acting u/s 30 of the Act the Collector referred the matter to the learned District Judge, Kangra Division. During the pendency of the reference before the learned District Judge, the Petitioners applied for being impleaded as parties in the proceeding. It was contended by them that they were also proprietors of the village, that the land acquired was Shamilat land and as proprietors they had rights in it, and therefore, they had personal interest in the land within the meaning of the Act, and consequently they should be paid their share of the compensation.

The applications were resisted by the Respondents Uttami Devi and others, who contended that they were proprietors of the land and the Petitioners enjoyed no right or interest in it. It was also urged that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to implead the Petitioners as parties, and that the applications filed by the Petitioners were barred by limitation.

The Petitioners urged before the learned District Judge that when the award was announced they had contended that as members of the proprietary-body of the village they were entitled to receive compensation in proportion to the land revenue paid by them and that the Land Acquisition Collector while making the reference had erroneously omitted to include their names in the list of proprietors of the village entitled to share the compensation. They prayed that they should be allowed an opportunity to participate in the reference before the learned District Judge. The learned District Judge has taken the view that as the reference submitted by the Collector did not mention their names as "persons interested" it must be inferred that they did not file any objection to the award, and assuming that they did it must be presumed that the objections had been rejected. Proceeding on the view that the Petitioners had not filed any objection before the Collector the learned District Judge held that they could not be allowed to object to the award for the first time before him in the reference. In the result, he held that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the applications made by the Petitioners. On the other issue, the learned District Judge held that the objections were within limitation.

Because of his finding that the petitions were not maintainable, he made the impugned order dated July 26, 1972, dismissing them. And now these revision petitions.

The question is: If a reference has been made by the Collector u/s 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, and it does not mention the name of a person as a "person interested" the land, has the learned District Judge any jurisdiction to entertain a claim in the reference by such person to share the compensation, and therefore, has he any jurisdiction to implead him as party to the reference?

A reference u/s 30 of the Land Acquisition Act is made by the Collector to the court for the decision of a dispute as to the apportionment of compensation or as to the persons to whom compensation or any part thereof is payable. Presumably, the proceeding is analogous to a reference made u/s 18 of the Act, and we may assume that it must take the form prescribed by Section 19 of the Act. Section 19 of the Act mentions the kind of information which the Collector will set out in the statement when making a reference to the court. Clause (b) of Section 19(1) provides that the Collector shall state "the names of the persons whom he has reason to think interested in such land". The expression "person interested" is defined by Section 3(6) of the Act as including "all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land" under the Act. There is nothing in Section 19 to suggest that the names of only those persons are to be mentioned who have applied for the reference u/s 18. The proper disposal of the reference requires and adjudication of the question as to the persons to whom compensation is payable and as to the apportionment of that compensation between them. It is for the court hearing a reference on those questions to take all necessary steps to ensure that an effective and complete adjudication is rendered on those questions. The court is not bound to make its adjudication depend on the particulars supplied by the Collector in the statement u/s 19. The requirement of such a statement is merely for the purpose of assisting the court in disposing of the reference. It is significant that Section 19(1A) refers to the names of persons whom the Collector "has reason to think" are persons interested in the land. His belief is not conclusive. He may have reason to believe that only three persons are interested in the land, while in fact five persons are so interested. The reference has to be decided by the court, and it is for the court to determine whether in fact only the persons indicated by the Collector are interested. To my mind, the list of names set-out by the Collector in the statement drawn up u/s 19 does not preclude the court from determining who are the several persons who in fact can be held to be interested in the land.

In Sunder Lal v. Paramsukhdas and Ors. AIR 1968 S.C. 386 the Supreme Court held that the expression "person interested" includes a person who claims an interest in the compensation to be awarded even though he did not claim an interest in the land. A comparative analysis of the features of a reference made u/s 18 and that submitted u/s 30 was made by the Supreme Court in Dr. G.H. Grant Vs. State of Bihar, and it was laid down that a person could raise a dispute relating to apportionment of compensation and apply for a reference u/s 30 even though he may not have appeared in the acquisition proceeding before the Collector. As regards the jurisdiction of the Collector, the court observed that he was not authorised to decide finally the conflicting rights of the persons interested in the compensation and that the apportionment made by him did not determine finally the rights of such persons; the dispute had to be decided by the court either in a reference u/s 18 or u/s 30 or in a separate suit. I am, therefore, fortified in the conclusion that the list of names drawn up by the Collector of "persons interested" does not Preclude the court from determining (who in fact are all the persons who can be said to be interested. That is a duty plainly cast by the statute upon the court, having regard to the nature of the function entrusted to it by the Act, and the court cannot, in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction, decline to address itself to it. The reference in the present case has been made to the court for the purpose of deciding who are the persons entitled to compensation. The scope of the enquiry before the court is not enlarged by impleading a party and determining whether he is entitled to a share of the compensation. In doing so, the court is only doing that which the law envisages it should.

As regards the procedure, Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act applies the provisions of the CPC to all proceedings before the court under the Act. Order 1, Rule 10 (2) of the Code is attracted. The court is empowered to order, on such terms as may appear to it to be just, that the name of any person who ought to have been joined or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the case, be added. In Mt. Sakalbaso Kuer Vs. Brijendra Singh and Others, . the Patna High Court had before it a case where the Petitioner had applied in a reference u/s 30 of the Land Acquisition Act to be added as a party. The Petitioner had not appeared before the Collector either at the time when the award was made or thereafter when the claim for compensation was made by persons other than the parties in whose favour the award was made. The Additional District Judge, before whom the reference was pending, rejected the application on the ground that the Petitioner was not covered by the dispute referred to him by the Collector u/s 30 of the Act. The Petitioner applied in revision to the High Court, claiming that he was entitled to the benefit of Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil procedure. The Patna High Court held that the Petitioner was entitled to that benefit. The Patna High Court relied on Kishan Chand v. Jagannath Prasad (1902) ILR 25 All. 133 , where the Allahabad High Court has laid down that the provisions of Section 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (as it then was), corresponding to Order 1, Rule 10 of the present Code, were applicable to a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act before the District Judge in accordance with Section 53 of that Act. the view taken by the Patna High Court in Mt. Sakalbaso (supra) was followed by the same Court in Bhadar Munda and Another Vs. Dhuchua Oraon, In Kalarikkal Lakshmikutty Amma Vs. Kankath Vettolil Kanhirapally Velappa Nair and Another, the Kerala High Court laid down that a court hearing a reference u/s 32 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, (corresponding to Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894) for apportionment of compensation awarded has wide powers to implead as an additional party and person interested in the dispute referred for adjudication even though he has not been made a party to the award. Learned Counsel for the Respondents relies on Rana Dahal Jung v. Rani Smt. Hem Kumari Devy and Another AIR 1960 Tri 18 . In that case it was found by the Judicial Commissioner that by permitting the question regarding the applicability of the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act to be raised the District Judge was travelling outside his jurisdiction, his jurisdiction being strictly confined to the decision of the dispute referred to him. In the present case, the very question which the Petitioners desire to raise by getting themselves impleaded as parties to the reference is involved in the reference made by the Collector, and it cannot be said that the scope of the reference will be extended if the Petitioners are impleaded and are allowed to raise the question that they are entitled to a share of the compensation. Reliance has also been placed by the Respondents on Municipality, Nalgonda Vs. Hakeem Mohiuddin and Others, where a reference was made by the Collector to the court u/s 25 of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act (9 of 1309A) which substantially corresponds to Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Proceeding on the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Mafiananda Roy v. Srish Chandra 7 IC 10 (Cal), it was held that the addition of parties by the Civil Court, who have not been made parties to the reference by the Collector, was inconsistent with the Land Acquisition Act. It was observed, however, that additional parties should be made when a person who desires to be added as a party does not raise a new dispute. So also in Basalingappa Gowda v. Nagamma AIR 1969 Mys. 313 the Mysore High Court laid down that claimant who did not appear before the Land Acquisition Officer and did not figure as a claimant before him, could not appear for the first time before the court. It was observed that in a reference u/s 30 the Civil Court has to decide the title only between those claimants as are mentioned in the reference. In Indumati Debi Vs. Tulsi Thahurani and Others, it was held that a person claiming a share in compensation money who was not a pirty to the proceeding before the Collector could not be made a party to a reference made to the court u/s 30 of the Act dealing with the apportionment of compensation. The Calcutta High Court observed that a person can be added as party in a reference u/s 30 when he does not raise any new dispute but wishes to place other material before the court in connection with the dispute that is referred to it by the Collector. The learned Judges did not agree with the view taken in Kishan Chand (supra) by the Allahabad High Court. The same view was taken in Manjur Ahmed and on his death his heirs and legal representatives, Akhtari Bibi and Others Vs. Rajlakshmi Dassi and Others, where they dissented from the view taken by the Patna High Court in Tikait Nagendra Nath Sahi and Another Vs. Bhagwati Prasad Narayan Sahi and Others,

In my opinion, on the considerations to which I have adverted, the Petitioners are entitled to be impleaded as parties in the reference in order to enable the court to fully and effectively decide the reference made to it.

It has been urged that the addition of parties will delay the disposal of the reference and, therefore, they should not be impleaded. It seems to me that what is more important is that the adjudication effected by the court should be a full and complete adjudication of the dispute referred, and therefore, it is necessary to have on the record all the "persons interested".

Accordingly, I find myself in disagreement with the view taken by the learned District Judge and hold that the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

In the result, these revision petitions are allowed. The order of the learned District Judge in each case is set aside and the cases are remanded to him for fresh consideration in the light of the observations made above. In the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs.

Chet Ram Thakur, J.

I agree.