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Judgment
Anoop Chitkara, J
Petitioner, who was arraigned as accusedin the FIR mentioned above, has come up before this Court under Section 482, Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, for quashing the proceedings because he solemnized marriage with the girl, and after marriage they have compromised the matter.
Now, petitioner, Gaurav, aged 21 years, alongwith his mother petitioner No.2 and maternal uncles petitioners No.3 and 4, have filed this petition for
quashing of FIR, wherein they have arraigned as accused. The victim, aged 19 years, is the second respondent. The reasons for filing the petition are
that petitioner No.1 has solemnised marriage with second respondent. To support this contention, they have annexed affidavits of the marriage as
Annexure P-2 and marriage certificate dated 23 November, 2020. Learned Deputy Advocate General does not want to file response as she has
nothing to dispute the marriage.
On 27.1.2021, this Court examined victim, respondent No.2, in Camera and stated that she had voluntarily married to the accused. After that, this
Court recorded a joint statement of the petitioner Gaurav and second respondent, the wife. The couple stated that they have solemnized marriage and
are living happily and there is no pressure upon them. After that, statement of victim was also recorded on oath, in which, she stated that she is happily
married. She has clarified that at the time of recording FIR, she was minor and it was due to the factors which were more emotional than the other.
She further stated that now she has compromised the matter and in case the compromise is not effected, it may spoil her marriage.
The facts relevant to decide the present petition are that on 7.6.2018, second respondent (victim) gave a written complaint to the Superintendent of
Police Baddi about sexual exploitation. She stated that while going to school, a boy of her village, petitioner No.1, Gaurav, used to tease her. He also
used to wait for her. When he used to come from school, he continuously proposed her for marriage and threatened her that in case she did not marry
him, he would kill her parents. She further stated that on last Tuesday, Gaurav alongwith his parents forcibly came to her house and fought with her
parents. During the night at 11:30 p.m. he came outside her house and started flashing lights of his bike. Based on this complaint, aforesaid FIR came
to be registered against the accused-petitioner No.1.
On 27.01.2021 the victim (Petitioner No. 2) was present in the Court along with petitioner No.1. Her identity is not in dispute. This Court noticed
her orientation to place and time; she appeared in a perfect mental and physical state, wearing decent costumes; was looking happy, there was no sign
of fear, and she was quietly sitting in the Courtroom. Her statement was also recorded, on oath, in which she says that she has compromised the
entire matter and solemnized the marriage with the accused-petitioner No.1 and further states that she made the statement in her conscious state of
mind and admitted that she is aware that this stand would result in the quashing of F.I.R. against the petitioner. Admittedly after attainment of
majority, the girl married the accused. They are living a happy married life.
Although, the withdrawal of FIR would be through District Magistrate as a routine procedure. However, the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the CRPC, to intervene in such kind of matter, and it is not the requirement of law that the cancellation has to be approved only through
the District Magistrate.
Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482 CrPC can always be exercised, depending upon the facts and circumstances. The parties
are likely to live together for a lifetime, and intervention would create a cordial environment for peaceful relations between them.
Yuvan Noah Harari, in “Sapiens - A Brief History of Humankindâ€, (London: Vintage, 2011), p-427-428, wrote about the impact of happy
married life, as follows:
“Family and community seem to have more impact on our happiness than money and health. People with strong families who live in tight-knit and
supportive communities are significantly happier than people whose families are dysfunctional and who have never found (or never sought) a
community to be part of. Marriage is particularly important. Repeated studies have found that there is a very close correction between good marriages
and high subjective well-being, and between bad marriages and misery. This holds true irrespective of economic or even physical conditions. An
impecunious invalid surrounded by a loving spouse, a devoted family and a warm community may well feel better than an alienated billionaire, provided
that the invalid’s poverty is not too severe and that his illness is not degenerative or painful.â€
ANALYSIS:
The following aspects would be relevant to conclude this petition: -
a) On 27.1.2021 this Court had recorded the joint statement of Ruchika and Gaurav and also separate statement of Ruchika, wherein they testified
about compromise and prayed for quashing of FIR.
b) The complainant has resolved all disputes with the accused.
c) The victim and the accused have amicably settled the matter between them and are living happily after getting married with each other.
d) Accused was the first offender.
e) In the given facts, the occurrence was limited and confined between relatives and does not affect public peace or tranquillity.
f) The accused is facing prosecution for the last more than two years.
g) The rejection of compromise may also lead to ill will, and the purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to work for bringing
peace and happiness in society.
h) Even if this case is put to trial, the parties are likely to maintain the stand they have taken in this compromise, which is expected to result in the
accused's acquittal.
i) The accused and the victim are living happily as husband and wife. The denial of relief may bring bitterness in the euphoria of the new wedding.
9 In Bharti v State of Haryana, 2014(4) SCC 14, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds as under:
[6]. We are mindful of the fact that Section 354 of the IPC is, as of today, non-compoundable. But, as noticed by us, it was compoundable when the
instant offence was committed with the permission of the court. Even then, we would have hesitated to permit compounding of the offence. But, facts
of this case are very peculiar. Respondent No.2 and her husband have, even today, maintained their stand taken in the trial court that they have
entered into a compromise with the appellant. As we have already noted, respondent No.2 has filed an affidavit to that effect in this Court.
Compromise is, therefore, not an afterthought. Pertinently, the incident in question took-place way back in the year 2000. About 13 long years have
gone-by. In her affidavit respondent No. 2 has stated that the appellant is her neighbour and they are staying peacefully since 2000 till date. We are of
the opinion that since the appellant and respondent No. 2 are neighbours it would be in the interest of justice to permit the parties to compound the
offences. If the conviction is confirmed, the relations may get strained and the peace, which is now prevailing between the two families, may be
disturbed. In the peculiar facts of this case, therefore, in order to accord quietus to the disputes between the appellant and respondent No. 2 and in the
larger interest of peace, we permit the appellant and respondent No. 2 to compound the offences. Accordingly, offences under Sections 451 and 354
of the IPC are permitted to be compounded. The impugned judgment is set aside. The appellant is acquitted. The appellant-Bharti is in jail. The
appellant-Bharti should be released forthwith, unless he is required in any other case.â€
In SaloniRupam Bhartiya v RupamPrahlad Bhartiya, 2015(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 172, a three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
dealing with Section 498-A of IPC, which was non-compoundable offence, holds as follows:
It was submitted by learned counsel for the parties that in the light of the above subsequent developments especially the fact that the marriage
between the parties itself stands dissolved by a decree passed by a competent court, nothing really remained between the parties to be addressed and
that the conviction of the respondent-husband under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code could be set aside. We see no reason to decline that
prayer. In the circumstances, therefore, and in the light of the fact that the parties have successfully negotiated an amicable settlement sinking and
resolving all their differences and disputes and finding a lasting solution on all the outstanding issues between themselves, we see no reason why the
conviction recorded by the courts below and the sentence of imprisonment till the rising of the Court, which the respondent has already undergone
should continue to blemish the respondent-husband. We accordingly set aside the judgment and order of conviction of the respondent under Section
498A of the Indian Penal Code.
STAGE OF QUASHING FIR:
In Ashok Chaturvedi v Shitul H. Chanchani, 1998(7) SCC 698, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds that the determination of the question as regards
the propriety of the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance and issuing process need not necessarily wait till the stage of framing the charge. The
Court holds,
…. This argument, however, does not appeal to us inasmuch as merely because an accused has a right to plead at the time of framing of charges that
there is no sufficient material for such framing of charges as provided in Section 245 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he is debarred from
approaching the court even at an earliest (sic earlier) point of time when the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and summons the accused to
appear to contend that the very issuance of the order of taking cognizance is invalid on the ground that no offence can be said to have been made out
on the allegations made in the complaint petition. It has been held in a number of cases that power under Section 482 has to be exercised sparingly and
in the interest of justice. But allowing the criminal proceeding to continue even where the allegations in the complaint petition do not make out any
offence would be tantamount to an abuse of the process of court, and therefore, there cannot be any dispute that in such case power under section
482 of the Code can be exercised.
In Girish Sarwate v. State of A.P., 2005(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 758, the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court observed that the High Court
need not wait for completion of investigation and taking cognizance by the Magistrate.
NON-COMPOUNDABLE OFFENCES CAN BE QUASHED:
In the present case, the offence under Section _____, are not compoundable under Section 320 CrPC. However, the following precedents are
relevant:
a) In State of Madhya Pradesh v Laxmi Narayan, Cr.A No. 349 of 2019, decided on 5th of March, 2019, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[13]. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:
i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of
the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or
arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;
ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder,
rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed
by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;
iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated
as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or
the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground
that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a
mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether
incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing
the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is
inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only
after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible
when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of
Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;
v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are
private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the
offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was
absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.
[14]. In so far as the present case is concerned, the High Court has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 307 and 34 IPC
mechanically and even when the investigation was under progress. Somehow, the accused managed to enter into a compromise with the complainant
and sought quashing of the FIR on the basis of a settlement. The allegations are serious in nature. He used the fire arm also in commission of the
offence. Therefore, the gravity of the offence and the conduct of the accused is not at all considered by the High Court and solely on the basis of a
settlement between the accused and the complainant, the High Court has mechanically quashed the FIR, in exercise of power under Section 482 of
the Code, which is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The High Court has also failed to note the antecedents of the accused.â€
b) In Kailash Chand v State of Rajasthan, 2018(4) R.C.R (Criminal) 292, Supreme Court holds,
Though the offences under sections 307 and 326 of the IPC are non-compoundable, having regard to the fact that the incident in the present case
did not have an impact on the society in general, and having regard to the fact that the dispute between the parties has been settled amicably and there
is no likelihood of the repetition of such incident, we allow the application for compromise/compounding of offence and set aside the orders of
conviction and sentence passed by the courts below against the appellant by exercising our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
The appellant is ordered to be acquitted of the charges levelled against him. Since the appellant is confined in jail, he is ordered to be released from
custody forthwith if not required in any other case.
c) In Narinder Singh v State of Punjab, 2014 (2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 482, Supreme Court holds,
In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate
treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing
the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:
(I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under
Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those
cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly
and with caution.
(II) When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such
cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two
objectives.
(III) Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder,
rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been
committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are
not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
(IV) On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial
transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among
themselves.
(V) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of
criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal
cases.
(VI) Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime
against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of
Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of
Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under
Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the
vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding
factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of
conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later
case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this
stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may
improve their future relationship.
(VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where
the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be
liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still
on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is
still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the
circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the
evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in
such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section
307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate
stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender
who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime
and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.
JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS ON JURISPRUDENCE OF QUASHING:
The law is almost settled by larger benches judgements of Supreme Court that the offences, those are not listed as compoundable, under Section
320 CrPC, can also be compounded, and the procedure to follow would be by quashing the FIR, and consequent proceedings.
a) In R.P. Kapur v State of Punjab , AIR 1960 SC 866, a three-member Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
…. … ...It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to
prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily, criminal proceedings instituted against an accused
person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory
stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However,
we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be
cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused
person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the
criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is
a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding, the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings on that ground.
Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First
Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in
such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide
whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such case, it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to
allow the process of the criminal Court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the
High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do
constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to
prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or
where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its
appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under S. 561-A, the High Court would not embark upon
an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to
any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against
the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 561-A in the
matter of quashing criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point (Vide : In Re: Shripad G. Chandavarkar, AIR 1928
Bom 184, Jagat Chandra Mozumdar v. Queen Empress, ILR 26 Cal 786, Dr. Shankar Singh v. State of Punjab, 56 Pun LR 54 : (AIR 1954 Punj 193),
NripendraBhusan Roy v. GobinaBandhu Majumdar, AIR 1924 Cal 1018 and Ramanathan Chettiyar v. SivaramaSubramania, ILR 47 Mad 722 : (AIR
1925 Mad 39).
b) In MadhavraoJiwaji Rao Scindia v SambhajiraoChandrojiraoAngre, 1988 (1) SCC 692, a three judges’ bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court holds: -
The legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to
whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features
which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the
basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and,
therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the
special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.
c) A three Judges bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, 2012(10) SCC 303, has settled the law on quashing on
account of compromise/compounding, in the following terms:
[53]. Section 482 of the Code, as its very language suggests, saves the inherent power of the High Court which it has by virtue of it being a superior
court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It begins with the words, 'nothing in this Code' which
means that the provision is an overriding provision. These words leave no manner of doubt that none of the provisions of the Code limits or restricts
the inherent power. The guideline for exercise of such power is provided in Section 482 itself i.e., to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As has been repeatedly stated that Section 482 confers no new powers on High Court; it merely safeguards
existing inherent powers possessed by High Court necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. It is equally
well settled that the power is not to be resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of an aggrieved party. It
should be exercised very sparingly and it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.
[57]. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding
of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is
materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences,
power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the
other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the
material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or
dismissal of indictment.
[58]. Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has been settled
although offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the
case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor.
No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers and threatens well-being of
society and it is not safe to leave the crime- doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid
compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without permission of the Court. In respect of serious offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc; or other offences of mental depravity under Indian Penal Code or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between offender and victim
can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil,
mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or
the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of
the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal
proceeding or criminal complaint or F.I.R if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted
and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not
exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard and fast category can be prescribed.â€
d) In ParbatbhaiAahir v State of Gujarat,(2017) 9 SCC 641, a three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court, laid down the broad principles for
quashing of FIR, which are reproduced as follows:
The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:
16 (i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice.
The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
16 (ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement
has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence.
While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The
power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
16 (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High
Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
16 (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to
prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
16 (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled
the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
16 (vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity
cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in
nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public
interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
16 (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute.
They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
16 (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially
civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
16 (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a
conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
16 (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic
well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified
in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act
complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.
In the present case, the offences are not compoundable under section 320 CrPC. Be that as it may, in the peculiar facts and circumstances, this
Court is inclined to invoke the inherent jurisdiction under section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR and all subsequent proceedings.
This Court has inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to interfere in this kind of matter. Given the entirety of the
case and judicial precedents, I am of the considered opinion that the continuation of these proceedings will not suffice any fruitful purpose whatsoever.
In Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018 (4) Crimes 324, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds as under: -
[47]. As far as Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 135 of 2017 is concerned, the appellants came to this Court challenging the order of cognizance only
because of the reason that matter was already pending as the appellants had filed the Special Leave Petitions against the order of the High Court
rejecting their petition for quashing of the FIR/Chargesheet. Having regard to these peculiar facts, writ petition has also been entertained. In any case,
once we hold that FIR needs to be quashed, order of cognizance would automatically stands vitiated.â€
In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at p 642, Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the finest hour of Justice
arises propitiously when parties, despite falling apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion.
Given above, because of the compromise, this is a fit case where the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure is invoked to quash the proceedings mentioned above.The FIR mentioned above is quashed and all the consequential proceedings,
are also quashed and set aside. The bail bonds are accordingly discharged. All pending application(s), if any, stand closed.
Petition allowed.