General Manager vs Rameshji Sonaji Thakore and Another

M.D. Shah, J.—Both these appeals are preferred by the appellant against the judgment and award dated 20-9-2005 passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Mehsana, in LAR Nos. 3554 and 3555 of 2003, whereby the original claimants were granted compensation of Rs. 3.33 per sq.mtr. from the date of taking over possession upto 31-12-1984; Rs. 4.00 per sq.mtr. from 1-1-1985 to 31-12-1987; Rs. 4.50 per sq. mtr. from 1-1-1988 to 31-12-1990; Rs. 5 per sq. mtr. from 1-1-1991 to 31-12-1993; Rs. 6.66 per sq. mtr. from 1-1-1994 to 31-12-1996; Rs. 8.33 per sq. mtr. from 1-1-1997 to 31-12-1999; Rs. 10.00 per sq. mtr. from 1-1-2000 to 31-12-2002; Rs. 12.00 per sq. mtr. from 1-1-2003 to 31-12-2004 and thereafter Rs. 15.00 per sq. mtr. from 1-1-2005 onwards, against an amount of Rs. 0.48 ps. per sq. mtr. originally awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer u/s 35 of the Land Acquisition Act (the Act for short). The appellant was further directed to pay arrears of compensation with interest at the rate of Rs. 12% p.a. from the date on which the amount has become due till 31-12-1999 and thereafter at the rte of 9% p.a. till the amount is realised or paid by the appellant. It was further directed that the amount of compensation fixed at Rs. 15.00 per sq. mtr should be increased at 15% at every interval of three years commencing from 1-1-2005 and the said increase will be calculated on the last presiding amount. It was further observed that in the event of land not being surrendered to the original land owner, the claimants should have right after expiration of period of 20 years to move the competent court for refixation of the amount of compensation in future.

Since these appeals arise out of common judgment and award passed by the learned Reference Court and raise common questions of fact and law, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order.

Heard learned Counsel for M/s Marshall and Associates for the appellant and learned AGP, Mr. N.J. Shah, for the respondent No. 2. However, no one appeared on behalf of the respondent No. 1.

It is submitted by learned advocate for M/s Marshall and Associates that under Sec.17 of the Land Acquisition Act, temporary acquisition was made by the Collector and possession was taken in the year 1984 after following due procedure of law by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. Thereupon, the Special Land Acquisition Officer fixed the amount of compensation by way of rent @ 48 paise per sq. mtr. As the respondent- original claimants were dissatisfied with the amount awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, they preferred references before the Competent Authority and the Competent Authority referred the said references to the District Court. Special Land Acquisition Officer and General Manager, ONGC, were the opponents in the said references. Both the parties led their oral as well as documentary evidence. Thereupon, after considering the evidence on record and submissions of the learned advocates of the respective parties, the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Mehsana, partly allowed the references of the claimants by judgment and award dated 20th September, 2005, which is challenged by the present appellant in these appeals.

Learned Counsel for the appellant has relied on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Sankarji Hemaji and Anr. reported in 2008(2) G.L.R. 226 more particularly paragraph No. 25 which reads as under:

Even otherwise as stated above, the Special Land Acquisition Officer declared the award u/s 35 of the Act as back as on 11/8/1980 determining the compensation/rent at the rate of 0.35 paise per sq. mtr. per annum which was never objected to by the original land owners / interested persons, but the same came to be accepted without raising any objection and still the respondents herein original claimants submitted the applications for making reference to the reference court under sub Section (3) of Section 35 i.e. after a period of 21 years raising the dispute as to sufficiency of the compensation which was determined while declaring award on 11/8/1980. It is the contention on behalf of the original claimants that as under Sub-section (3) of Section 58 of the Act on 11/8/2008, no time limit is prescribed and as it is the duty of the Collector to refer the dispute to the Reference Court and as the Collector has failed to perform the duty cast upon him, the application submitted by the claimants are within the period of limitation and/or not barred by delay and laches. It is the contention on behalf of the appellants and the Special Land Acquisition Officer that when there is no limitation prescribed, Article 137 of the Limitation Act would come in picture and within three years from the date of cause of action, the applications could have been made. It is true that under Sub-section (3) of Section 35 of the Act, no limitation is prescribed. However, that does not mean that the application for reference can be made at any time. Article 137 of the Limitation Act provides that when there is no limitation prescribed or provided, three years would be the limitation and from the date of cause of action within three years, an aggrieved person can initiate proceedings. The reference court has misinterpreted the provisions of Sec. 35 of the Act. While considering the submissions with regard to the limitation, the reference court has held that as the entire land acquisition proceedings and the award are null and void, Article 137 of the Limitation Act (reference court has considered Section 137 of the Limitation Act wrongly) would not be applicable, more particularly when the Collector has failed to perform the duty cast upon him, making the reference to the reference court as provided under Sub-section (3) of Section 35 of the Act. As stated above, such a findings and the observations of the Reference Court are perverse and illegal. As held by us, there was no dispute with regard to sufficiency of the possession raised by the claimants at the relevant time when the award was declared, therefore, there was no occasion for the Collector to refer the dispute to the reference court and we have also held that the reference applications are not maintainable. Even otherwise, assuming that it was the duty of the Collector to refer the dispute to the reference court and when the Collector failed to perform his duty, in that case also, the claimants are required to initiate appropriate proceedings within reasonable time, as there is no time limit prescribed under the Act. Certainly the claimants cannot submit the applications and/or raise the dispute after a period of 21 years. Thus, on the ground of delay and laches the reference applications were not maintainable. As such when the applications were submitted after a period of 21 years raising dispute with regard to adequacy of the compensation awarded in the year 1980, the Special Land Acquisition Officer, ought not to have referred the dispute to the reference court. As such the Special Land Acquisition Officer himself has committed an error and/or acted arbitrarily in referring the dispute to the reference Court after a period of 21 years.

Relying on the aforesaid reported judgment of this Court, it is submitted that since the issue involved in the present appeals is squarely covered by the aforesaid decision of a Division Bench of this Court, the appeals are required to be allowed and the references are required to be dismissed.

This Court has gone through the impugned judgment and award. It is not disputed that the possession of the land in question was taken in the year 1984. However, the references were made much after a period of three years of passing of the award by the Special Land Acquisition officer. Thus, there is an inordinate delay in preferring the reference applications. This issue has been decided by the Division Bench of this Court in the case reported in Sankarji Hemaji (supra) relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant. Facts involved in the said case and facts on hand are similar and hence, the law laid down therein squarely applies to the facts of the present case. Hence, in view of the judgment reported in Sankarji Hemaji (supra), the appeals are required to be allowed.

The appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment and award dated 20-9-2005 passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Mehsana, is quashed and set aside. The reference applications are dismissed.