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9 paragraphs · 1,048 wordsK.T. Thomas, J.—A landlady is seeking for an order to evict her tenant from a century old building which was rent out for residential purpose. The ground put forward is that she wants to reconstruct the building for accommodating her son and his family for a separate residence Rent Control Court and Appellate Authority have upheld her claim and granted the order of eviction. So the tenant has filed this revision.
The main contention urged here is that despite its old age the building remains strong even now and it does not indicate any need for demolition and hence the ground envisaged in Section 11(4)(iv) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short ''the Act'') is not available to the landlady. Counsel pleaded for a reconsideration of the decision of this Court in Balagangadhara Menon v. Peter 1984 KLT 845 : 1984 K.L.J. 576. In that decision a Division Bench has overruled the decision in Thanka v. Narayani 1981 KLT 502, rendered by a Single Judge. The plea for reconsideration is advanced on the strength of the Supreme Court decision in P.ORR and Sons (P) Ltd. Vs. Associated Publishers (Madras) Limited[OVERRULED], .
We may point out that Anr. Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the implication of the ratio in the aforesaid Supreme Court decision and the Learned Judges (Varghese Kalliath and Manoharan, JJ.) have in Madhavan v. Leelamma 1991 (2) KLT 32, taken note that the decision in P.ORR and Sons (P) Ltd. Vs. Associated Publishers (Madras) Limited[OVERRULED], was based on a differently worded provision in the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (for short ''the T.N. Act''). u/s 14(1) of the T.N. Act, satisfaction of the Rent Controller that the building is bona fide required by the landlord "for the immediate purpose of demolishing it" was made sine qua non for passing an order of eviction under the Sub-section, if the purpose of such demolition is for erecting a new building on the said site. The Supreme Court in that decision has laid emphasis on the words "immediate purpose of demolishing" in the corresponding: provision in the T.N. Act and held that "the legislative intent is that the purpose should be immediate or direct and not mediate or remote or indirect or secondary; the conditions of the building need not be such as to warrant instant demolition, but it must be grave enough to need timely action and rule out undue or protracted delay". But Section 11(4)(iv) of the Kerala Act is worded differently. The relevant portion reads thus:
If the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction and if the landlord requires bona fide to reconstruct the same.
On account of the said different in the language between the two statutes, the Division Bench in Madhavan v. Leelamma 1991 (2) KLT 32 (cited supra) declined to deviate from the ratio laid down in Balagangadhara Menon v. Peter 1984 KLT 845.
The catch in Section 11(4) of the T.N. Act is apparently different in tone, tenor and temper from the corresponding provision in the Kerala Act. In Balagangadhara Menon v. Peter 1984 KLT 845, the Division Bench made a survey of the case law starting from Narayanan Nair v. First Additional District Judge ILR 1964 Ker 254, and made reference to the observations of K.K. Mathew. J. in Ahammad Kanna v. Muhammed Haneef 1967 KLT 841, as well as V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. in Kalliani v. Mudhavi 1970 KLT 257 and concluded that the condition of the building heed not be dangerous or even dilapidated, nor need be very old for granting an order u/s 11(4)(iv) of the Act. We may say with great respect to the Learned Judges that they have rightly refrained from disturbing the ratio in Balagangadhara Menon v. Peter 1984 KLT 845 on the footing of the Supreme Court decision in P.ORR and Sons (P) Ltd. Vs. Associated Publishers (Madras) Limited[OVERRULED], .
Be that as it may, should the rent control court or the Appellate Authority have considered the legal position relating to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act in the present case at all. Here what the landlady wants is eviction of the tenant for demolishing the building to put up a new building on the site for accommodating her son who is dependent on her. That precisely forms the ground covered by Section 11(3) of the Act i.e., the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. Merely because the landlady said that a new building has to be put up in the place of the existing structure does not transpose the ground to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act. In the context of Section 11(3) of the Act the landlady would have stated formally as to how she would make use of the building after eviction. In the same context she has also said about the proposal to put up a new building in the place of the old one. When a landlord applies for eviction on two grounds-one u/s 11(3) and the other u/s 11(4)(iv) of the Act-Rent Control Court can stop with the finding that the ground u/s 11(3) has been made out. In such a situation there is no need to proceed further to the consideration of the other ground. Of course, if the former ground is found against the landlord, there may arise the necessity to consider the latter ground, when that ground is pressed into service [vide Das Naik v. Narayanan 1980 KLT 951 : ILR 1981 Ker 617].
In this case both lower authorities have concurrently found that the landlady''s requirement to accommodate her son in a new building, at the same site, is bona fide. A contention that the landlady can choose some other vacant plot in her possession for the said purpose does not merit consideration, It is for the landlady to make the choice between the two and to decide in what fashion the new building shall be constructed. Tenant cannot dictate to the landlord as to the site or the type of the new building which the landlord has in mind.
We Therefore, dismiss the Civil Revision Petition.
