G.G. Suryakant and others vs M/s. Leema Resorts Pvt. Ltd. and another

K.A. Swami, C.J.—Both these appeals are preferred against the order dated 21-7-1993 passed by the learned single Judge in Contempt

Application No. 596 of 1992. The LPA is preferred by the applicants in Contempt Application No. 596 of 1992 whereas Contempt Appeal No.

5 of 1994 is preferred by the respondents 1 and 2 therein.

The learned single Judge has held that the respondents have, with every knowledge, wantonly, deliberately and wilfully, flouted the order of this

Court made in Application No. 4181 of 1991 and thereby they have committed civil contempt and consequently punished the Managing Director

of the Company-first respondent by imposing a penalty of Rs. 1,500/- and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of thirty days.

The applicants apart from praying for punishing the contemners have also prayed for stricking off the defence in CS No. 970/91 and further to

direct them to surrender vacant possession of the property to the applicants by way of punishment. Learned Single Judge has rejected the other

prayers made in the contempt application No. 596/92 by stating that the other reliefs claimed in the contempt application regarding striking off the

defence etc., are not accepted. Therefore, the applicants in the contempt application have filed the Letters patent Appeal under clause 15 of the

Letters Patent against that portion of the order of the learned single Judge by which he has refused to strike off the defence of the respondents in

the contempt application who are the defendants in the suit CS No. 970/91 pending on the file of this court; whereas the respondents in the

contempt application have preferred Contempt Appeal No. 5/94 against that portion of the order of the learned single Judge by which they are

found guilty of civil contempt and punished with imposition of fine. Therefore, we have heard both the appeals together.

The appellants in Contempt Appeal No. 5/94 who are the respondents in the LPA No. 172/93 have raised an objection as to the maintainability

of the LPA. under Clause 15 of the Letters patent. If necessary, we will deal with this objection at the appropriate stage.

1. The facts, which have given rise to the application for contempt and which are either established beyond doubt or not disputed, are as follows

: The appellants in the LPA are the owners of the schedule property, comprised in premises No. 15, Smith Road, Madras-2 together with two

rooms below the staircase and comprising three halls and one kitchen on the rear side measuring about 4400 sq. ft. excluding the 12'' width

common road on the Southern side and out house and open space on the western side. The abovesaid premises was leased out to the respondents

in the LPA. The ground floor was separately leased out on 1-11-1989; whereas the first and the second floors were leased out under separate

agreements of lease dated 9-11-1989 and 24-11-1989 respectively. The terms on which the ground floor was leased under a registered lease

deed dated 1-11-1989 were that the respondents in the LPA should pay the appellants in the LPA towards rent a sum of Rs. 25,000/- per month

for the period from 1-10-1989 to 30-9-1990 and a sum of Rs. 30,000/- per month for the period from 1-10-1990 to 30-9-1991. The terms on

which the first and second floors were leased under agreements dated 9-11-1989 and 24-11-1989 were that the respondents in the LPA should

pay a sum of Rs. 25,000/- per month as rent for the first and a sum of Rs. 25,000/- per month for the second floor of the premises till 30-9-1990

and if the respondents were to occupy the premises beyond 30-9-1990, the rent would be Rs. 27,500/- per month for each floor upto 30-9-1991

and thereafter if the respondents continued to occupy beyond 30-9-1991 on month to month basis there will be an increase in the rent at 10%

every year over the existing rent at the end of the previous year till such time the lease continues on month to month basis. It was also agreed that in

respect of each floor, certain amount to be deposited as security to be refunded at the end of the lease without interest. It appears from the plaint

averments that the respondents in the LPA paid the rent for sometime; but they had not deposited the entire security deposit amount. Thereafter,

they fell in arrears. Therefore, the leases were terminated and CS No. 970/91 was filed on the original side of this Court for the following reliefs

:

(a) directing the defendant to pay a sum of Rs. 4,85,000/- together with interest at 18% per annum on Rs. 4,85,000/- from the date of plaint till

the date of realisation and to pay at the rate of Rs. 1,70,000/- per month for the month of July, 1991 onwards till delivery of vacant possession of

the schedule mentioned property.

(b) directing the defendant to surrender the suit premises which is fully described in the schedule hereunder written together with fixtures, plant and

fittings forthwith;

(c) directing the defendant to pay the costs; and

(d) granting such further or other reliefs, as this Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.

In the suit the plaintiffs (appellants in the LPA) filed two applications being Application Nos. 4180 and 4181/91. In Application No. 4180/91,

the appellants prayed for a direction to the respondents to furnish security to the extent of suit claim and costs and in default attach all the fixures

and fittings lying in premises Nos. 14 and 15, Smith Road, Madras-2 as described in the schedule. In Application No. 4181/91, the appellants

prayed for a direction to the respondents to remit a sum of Rs. 1,70,000/- per month being damages for use and occupation of the demised

premises being Door Nos. 14 and 15. The learned single Judge heard both the applications and in Application No. 4180/91, he passed orders

allowing the same and in Application No. 4181/91 he passed the order in the following terms :

I deem it necessary to direct the respondent herein to deposit the accrued quantum of rental at the rate of Rs. 85,000/- per month from the date

of filing of the suit and the future rent only time for payment of the same is two months. Accordingly, this application No. 4181 of 1991 is allowed

with no order as to costs.

1. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the respondents preferred OSA Nos. 189 and 190/92. A Division Bench of this Court confirmed

both the orders and dismissed the appeals by the order dated 14-9-1993. The respondents approached the Supreme Court in Special Leave to

appeal (Civil) Nos. 12746 and 12747/92 against the aforesaid order passed by the Division Bench. By the order dated 21-10-1992 the Supreme

Court declined to interfere and dismissed the special leave petitions. Thereafter, the respondents made an application for extension of time by six

weeks to consider and comply with the order based on 30-4-1992 in the Application No. 4181/91.

The learned Single Judge considered all the circumstances and dismissed the application with the following observation :

I have no doubt in my mind that the defendant is not serious in seeking extension of time. Even the two letters filed by the defendant do not show

any anxiety to fulfil the orders of the court. Further the defendant has been given enough time to comply with the orders of the court. I have already

noticed several adjournments which were given right from the date when this Court directed to furnish security on 22-8-1991. The defendant has

successfully evaded the order of attachment for nearly one year. The defendant does not deserve any indulgence from this Court. I have no

hesitation in rejecting application Nos. 2795 and 2796 of 1992 and the said applications are dismissed with costs. Counsel''s fee Rs. 1,000/- in

each application"".

2. Even though the appellant in the LPA gave notice to deposit, the respondents did not deposit the amount and did not comply with the Court

order. Hence they filed contempt petition No. 596/92 for punishing the respondents and also for striking off the defence in CS No. 970/91 and

also for a further direction to surrender vacant possession and to direct payment of the amount in terms of the order dated 30-4-1992 which the

time stipulated by the Court. The respondents appeared in the contempt petition and filed their counter. Both sides did not choose the adduce oral

evidence. They argued the matter on the basis of the affidavit and the counter affidavit and the records produced by them. On considering the

averments made by the petitioners and the respondents the affidavit and the counter affidavit and also the other records produced by them, the

learned single Judge recorded the following findings :

(1) The respondents had not established that they had no means to pay;

(2) that they had not established that there was justifiable cause for not obeying the order of the court; and

(3) that they committed contempt in disobeying the order of the court wilfully.

Accordingly, the learned single Judge held that respondents committed civil contempt and punished them as aforesaid.

In the light of the contentions urged by both sides, the following points arise for consideration :

(1) Whether the finding recorded by the learned single Judge that the respondents in the LPA who are the appellants in the contempt appeal No.

5/94 have committed civil contempt is valid ?

(2) Whether there is justification or is it permissible to invoke the contempt jurisdiction of this Court ?

(3) Whether the LPA is maintainable and if the point is answered in the affirmative, what relief is to be granted ?

(4) If point Nos. 1 and 2 are answered in the affirmative, whether the punishment imposed is just and proper or it be altered ?

Point No. 1 : The order directing the respondents to deposit the amount was passed on 30-4-1992 in Application No. 4180 of 1991. As per

that direction the respondents are required to deposit the accrued quantum of rental at the rate of Rs. 85,000/- per month from the date of filing of

the suit. Two months'' time was granted for depositing the amount. The respondents challenged the correctness of the order in the appeal before

this Court which was also dismissed. They took up the matter before the Supreme Court and the SLP was also dismissed. In the meanwhile they

sought for extension of time which was also dismissed by Kanakaraj, j., by the order dated 31st July, 1992. Thus even after the expiry of the time

granted for depositing the amount and after issuance of the notice by the appellants in the LPA., the respondents did not comply with the Court''s

order. Therefore, they had filed this application for contempt.

The contention of the appellants in the contempt Appeal No. 5 of 1994 is that they have not wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the order of this

Court in not depositing the amount but it is because of the fact that they are not in a position to deposit the amount. Hence, it has not become

possible for them to comply with the direction and therefore, it is the case of the appellant that it is because of their inability to pay the amount, they

have not been able to comply with the order of the Court, as such they have not wilfully disobeyed the order of the Court. It is also contended that

the contempt jurisdiction cannot be invoked in a case where the order could be executed. We will first dispose of the second contention. It may be

pointed out that even before the learned single Judge, they went on submitting that they were prepared to deposit amount; but did not deposit the

same. The question of execution of the order dated 30-4-1992 does not arise because the order directs the appellants in Contempt Appeal No. 5

of 1994 to deposit the amount in the Court. Therefore, they should have complied with the order by depositing the amount. The request for

extension of time for depositing the amount, as already pointed out, was also rejected. Hence the contention that the execution ought to have been

levied instead of invoking the jurisdiction of contempt of court is not tenable and as such it cannot at all be accepted.

As to the inability of the appellants in Contempt Appeal No. 5/94, to deposit the amount except their assertion, no evidence is placed before the

court to establish or at least to show prima facie that they are in such a pitiable financial condition that under no circumstances, they can comply

with the direction of this Court to deposit the amount. No doubt, in the counter, they have tried to blame the appellants in the LPA and contend

that because of their non-co-operation, they were not able to get the licence. But from the counter affidavit, it is clear that there are 33 rooms in the

leased premises belonging to the plaintiffs in the suit which are being used by the appellants and a hotel is being run by them in the leased building.

The counter affidavit describes in detail the 33 rooms and the furnishings of those rooms and the use of the same as a hotel. Their grievance is that

if the plan had been mentioned they would have been able to earn well and register themselves with the Tourism Development Department,

Government Agencies, Air India and other Air Lines and they would have got concession from the Sales Tax and Income Tax and also concession

in the rate of interest from the nationalised banks. All these things would be possible if only the first respondent is able to register themselves as a

hotel industry with restaurant under the Tourism Development Department of State and Central Governments. In paras 8, 9 and 10 of the counter

affidavit they have given the particulars of the 33 rooms and the furnishings made therein. They have also stated that they have inaugurated the

restaurant in July, 1989 itself and the hotel was inaugurated in 1990. Thus, even according to their showing, in the demised premises, they have

been running the hotel as well as the restaurant. That being the position, the plea of the appellants in the contempt appeal No. 5 of 1994 that they

are not in a position to deposit the amount due to the lessor as directed by the court is only a ruse to avoid making deposit and to avoid

punishment in the contempt proceedings. Here itself, we may refer to a decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants in Contempt

Appeal No. 5 of 1994, namely, Abdul Razack Sahib Vs. Mrs. Azizunnissa Begum and Others, . In our view, the said decision cannot be applied

to the case where the contemner having means to pay or deposit nevertheless fails to pay or deposit. That was a case in which the contemner was

placed in a difficult position as found by the court and was not in a position to make payment, therefore it was held that his failure to comply with

the order was not wilful; but it was due to his inability to pay. Such a situation as already pointed out, does not obtain in the case on hand. Here is

a case where, as already pointed out, the appellants in the contempt Appeal No. 5 of 1994 in spite of the fact that they have means to deposit the

amount as ordered, have failed to deposit and their failure to deposit the amount is nothing but a wilful and deliberate act. Hence, we are of the

view that the learned single Judge is correct in coming to the conclusion that the appellants in Contempt Appeal No. 5 of 1994 have wilfully and

deliberately disobeyed and failed to comply with the direction of this Court to deposit the amount. It mat be pointed out here that it is also argued

at the Bar that the arrears of rent even from the date of suit would come to a sum of Rs. 30 lakhs as on today. The suit has been filed on

terminating the lease in the month of August, 1991. Thus, in spite of the order directing to deposit the rent accrued as on the date the order was

passed and also the future rent, the contemners are enjoying the demised premises without depositing any amount. This is nothing but a wilful and

deliberate act of disobedience of the order of the Court. If such an act on the part of the appellants in the Contempt Appeal No. 5 of 1994 does

not amount to wilful and deliberate disobedience of the order of the Court, then the order of the Court will have no efficacy and the party will be at

liberty to disobey the order of the Court without any consequence and the party in whose favour the order is passed, will be deprived of the

benefit. The net result would be that the justice becomes a casualty. Therefore, taking into consideration the case pleased by the contemners in the

counter affidavit, we are of the view that the findings recorded by the learned single Judge are correct and the same are not liable to be disturbed.

Accordingly, point No. 1 is answered in affirmative.

Point No. 2 : While dealing with point No. 1 we have already considered the question as to whether the order could have been executed. We

have held that as the order directs the contemners to deposit the amount, it becomes obligatory on the part of the contemners to deposit the

amount as ordered by the Court. At the same time, it is the responsibility of the Court to ensure that this order is obeyed. The plaintiffs in the suit

cannot execute that order and recover the amount if, as per the order the amount is to be deposited in court. That being so, in the facts and

circumstances of the case, the contempt jurisdiction of this Court is properly invoked. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is not possible

to hold that there is no justification to invoke the contempt jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, point No. 2 is also answered in the affirmative.

Point No. 3 :

In the application filed for taking action for contempt of Court, the plaintiffs have made the following prayer :

For the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit, the petitioners pray that this Hon''ble Court may be pleased to commit the respondents for

contempt of Court and direct the respondents to pay the amount in terms of the orders dated 30-4-1992 within the further time to be stipulated by

this Hon''ble Court, failig which this Hon''able Court, may be pleased to strike off the defence in C.S. No. 970 of 1991 and direct the respondents

to surrender vacant possession of the property to the petitioners.

Thus, one of the prayers made in the petition is to strike off the defence in CS No. 970 of 1991 and direct the respondents to surrender vacant

possession of the property. This has been refused by the learned single Judge. Of course, we do not find may reason in the order of refusing that

prayer except stating that the other reliefs claimed in the contempt application regarding striking off the defence and so on are not accepted. It is

contended on behalf of the respondents in the contempt appeal No. 5 of 1994 who are appellants in the LPA that the contempt jurisdiction being a

special jurisdiction, it is open to the Court while exercising jurisdiction not only to punish the contemner but also to pass such orders in the facts

and circumstances of the case as are necessary in the interest of justice. Therefore, it is submitted that the learned single Judge ought to have struck

off the defence of the contemners (defendants) in CS No. 970 of 1991 and directed them to surrender vacant possession. It is no doubt true that

the contempt jurisdiction is a special jurisdiction, and apart from the provisions contained in the Contempt of Courts Act, this Court being the court

of records, can also take action under Article 215 of the Constitution of India and punish for contempt of itself. However, it is necessary to notice

that under Sub-section (2) of section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, it is provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for

the time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in subsection (1) for any contempt either in respect of itself or of

a Court subordinate to it. Thus, the non-obstante clause contained in the opening words of sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act makes it clear

that even though the Court may have a power under any other law for the time being in force, in the matter of contempt it shall not impose a

sentence in excess of what is specified in sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act. Of course, this provision cannot be construed as affecting the

power of High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution to punish for the contempt of itself. In the decision Sukhdev Singh v. Teja Singh, C.J.

reported in AIR 1954 SC 186 : 1954 Cri LJ 460, the Supreme Court has pointed out that the power of the High Court to initiate proceedings for

contempt and punish where necessary is a special jurisdiction which is inherent in all courts and such proceedings are not governed by the Criminal

Procedure Code and hence the Supreme Court has no power u/s 527 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to transfer such proceedings from one

High Court to another. Even though it is a special jurisdiction when the aforesaid decision was rendered the Contempt of Court Act, 1977 was not

on the statute. The provision similar to sub-section (2) to section 12 of the Act was also not there. In addition to that, the jurisdiction as a special

jurisdiction to any other, it cannot be held that it can go to the extent of overlooking the law dealing with that jurisdiction. There is one more reason

why we should not interfere with the order of the learned single Judge refusing to strike off the defence. The relief as to striking off the defence can

only be sought in the suit. In a proceeding for contempt, what is required to be seen is to punish the contemner for an act of contempt and also to

enssure that the order of the Court that has been wilfully disobeyed is implemented. Of course, any other order necessary for the effective exercise

of the jurisdiction to vindicate the majesty of law and justice, can be passed, but the striking off defence cannot be considered as directly

connected to the contempt committed by the respondents in the L.P.A. as the wilful disobedience to the order can otherwise be adequately dealt

with. Therefore, striking off the defence in our view in the contempt of court proceedings inquesting in the facts and circumstances of the case,

cannot be the implementation of the order which is wilfully disobeyed. Again, it cannot be said that it can form part of the punishment to be

imposed for the contempt. However, learned counsel for the appellants in the L.P.A. placed reliance on the decision Dasari Venkatacharyulu Vs.

Manchala Yesobu and Another, . It was a case in which the striking off the defence was sought for in the suit. We have no doubt that there is a

power vested in the Court to strike off the defence if such action is called for. But such a step or course is not required to be adopted in the

contempt proceedings in question. The decision in Dasari Venkatacharyulu Vs. Manchala Yesobu and Another, does not relate to a contempt of

court proceedings. It is a case in which the jurisdiction u/s 151 of the CPC has been exercised for striking off the defence in the suit. This decision

is followed in Narayana Nadar v. Jayakodi Ammal reported in (1989) 104 Mad LW 423. Again, that is also a case in which the power to striking

off the defence is exercised in the suit and not in a proceedings for contempt. That being so, we are of the view that this relief the plaintiffs can seek

in the suit. Therefore, we keep open this relief to enable the plaintiff in C.S. No. 970 of 1991 to seek such relief in the suit.

1. That being the position, we do not consider it necessary to pronounce upon the maintainability of the LPA. Consequently, it also follows that

the question of granting the relief regarding striking off the defence does not arise. In view of the conclusion arrived at by us, though various

decisions were cited at the Bar by both sides, we do not consider it necessary to deal with them in detail. As the relief as to striking off the defence

in the instant case can be sought only in the suit, the granting of such relief by way of punishment in the contempt of Court proceedings does not

arise. Accordingly, reserving liberty to the plaintiff in CS No. 970 of 1991 who are the appellants in the LPA, to seek such relief in the suit, point

No. 3 is answered as follows :

It is not necessary to decide the maintainability of the LPA as the appellants in the LPA can seek the relief of striking off the defence of the

respondents/defendants in the suit itself.

Point No. 4 : As we have answered the points 1 and 2 in the affirmative, under this point we have now consider whether the punishment

imposed is just and proper and if not, whether it deserves to be altered ? It is well known that justice must not only be done but must also seem to

be done by all concerned. In this case, the facts already stated by us go to show that the plaintiffs have leased the demised premises consisting of

ground floor, first floor and second floor and the rent of which altogether would come to Rs. 85,000/- per annum. The lessees who are the

accused, after paying the rent for some time have failed to pay the same. Ultimately, the lessors were driven to the necessity of terminating the lease

and file a suit for possession and also for recovery of arrears of rent and damages. As already pointed out, the suit has been filed in the month of

August, 1991. It is in the suit, the order, the disobedience of which is complained of, was passed as long back as 30-4-1992. The contemners,

who have been enjoying the property, running restaurant and hotel in the leased premises, have not deposited even a pie in the Court after the

order was passed on 30-4-1992. Even when the order became final on the refusal by the Supreme Court to grant special leave and also in the

meanwhile, this Court refused to extend the time for deposit. The contemners have not made any attempt to deposit the amount, except to assert

that they are prepared to pay. Even before us also, the same attitude was adopted and we adjourned the matter on more than one occasions,

because, we did not want to impose any punishment on the contemners, in the event, they were to comply with the directions of this Court to

deposit the amount. But they do not appear to have appreciated our approach to the case and have not made efforts to deposit the amount if not in

full, at least a substantial amount. Even today, it is submitted before us that a draft for a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs would be given; except an oral

submission no Bank draft has been handed over to the plaintiffs. Therefore, the contemners appear to have entertained an idea that nothing is going

to happen. In a case like this, the punishment of Rs. 1,500/- and in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for 30 days, would be nothing but a

mockery of justice and would enable the contemners to go on with impunity disobeying the order of this Court in depositing the amount. In a case

like this, it is not only necessary that the contemners are punished, but it is also necessary to ensure that the party, who has suffered because of the

wrong committed by the contemners, is compensated. In other words, the benefit of the order to which the party is entitled to should get it. Section

12(1) of the Act specifically says, that ""Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, or in any other law, a contempt of court may be punished

with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or, with fine, which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both."" Sub-

section (3) thereof further provides ""Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the

Court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary, shall, instead of sentencing him to

simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit."" Therefore, we are of

the view that in order to ensure that the Court orders are punctually obeyed and no scope is given to persons who only tend to disobey the order

and take undue advantage of their own faults, it is necessary in a case like this, to point out that the penalty of fine alone is not sufficient to meet the

ends of justice. Of course, we entertained a doubt as to whether we can alter the sentence in a contempt appeal, therefore we adjourned the case

to hear the learned counsel appearing on both sides on this aspect and also to show cause as to why the sentence should not be enhanced. But no

decision has been brought to our notice that no such power exists in the Court to alter the punishment in the appeal in the Contempt proceedings.

As the appeal is the continuation of the original proceedings and it is nothing but carrying the cause to a superior Court and as the Contempt of

Court jurisdiction stands on a different footing than ordinary criminal appeal under the Code of Criminal Procedure against an order of conviction

and sentence, where no appeal is preferred by the State, the Court cannot alter the sentence unless notice for enhancement of sentences is given;

we are of the view that under contempt of Court jurisdiction, the Court, after drawing the attention of the contemner, as to why the sentence should

not be enhanced, and affording an opportunity to explain as to why the sentence should not be enhanced, can consider the same in the appeal.

Therefore, we hold that this is a case in which the contempt of Court is committed and the learned single Judge is justified in holding that a

contempt of Court is committed and as such it deserves enhancement of sentence. Hence, we are of the view that the sentence imposed by the

learned single Judge has to be altered and in addition to the penalty, it is a case in which the contemners should be detained in civil prison, if not

imprisoned, for a period of two months. Accordingly, we alter the sentence and direct detention of the contemners in civil prison for a period of

two months in addition to the penalty imposed by the learned single Judge. However, the detention will come to an end no sooner than the amount

is deposited as ordered in the case or paid to the plaintiffs and necessary receipt is obtained. It is further ordered that this order should be

executed punctually.

As the learned counsel for the contemners submits that the contemners undertake to make the payment of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs

only) by 2.15 p.m. on 1-8-1994, a direction as to enforcement of this order may be postponed till 2.15 p.m. on 1-8-1994.

Call this case on 1-8-1994 at 2.15 p.m.

As per the undertaking recorded by us in our judgment dated 29th July, 1994, today the appellants in Contempt Appeal No. 5 of 1994 have

paid a sum of Rs. 10 lacs to the appellants in LPA No. 172 of 1993 and they have also passed the stamped receipt to the appellants in Contempt

Appeal No. 5 of 1994. Learned counsel for the appellants in LPA No. 172 of 1993 submits that the same be placed on record and made part of

the judgment. A Memo to that effect is also filed by the appellants in the LPA. Accordingly, we place on record the submission made by both

sides and record payment of Rs. 10 lacs to the appellants in LPA No. 172 of 1993 by the appellants in Contempt Appeal No. 5 of 1994. Instead

of depositing in Court, we have permitted it to be paid to the appellants in LPA No. 172 of 1993 because the object of directing the appellants in

Contempt Appeal No. 5 of 1994 to deposit the amount was to enable the appellants in LPA No. 172 of 1993 to draw the same. Regarding

payment of further amount, we will hear both the sides tomorrow and till then, implementation of the judgment dated 29-7-1994 is kept in

abeyance. Call tomorrow at 10.30 p.m.

We have recorded yesterday the payment of a sum of Rs. 10 lacs to the appellants in LPA 172 of 1993. Today, the case was (sic) for further

orders as to implementation of our judgment dated 29-7-1994. Today, the appellants in Contempt Appeal 5 of 1994 have filed an under taking

which reads thus :-

The Appellants undertakes to deposit a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lakhs only) per month towards compliance of the order in

Application No. 4181 of 1991 in CS No. 970 of 1991.

The payment to be made on or before 10th of every succeeding month commencing from 10-9-1994. Out of this a sum of Rs. 2,15,000/-

(Rupees Two Lakhs and Fifteen Thousands only) will be towards arrears and Rs. 85,000/- (Rupees Eighty Five Thousands only) towards current

payment.

The moment the arrears are cleared the monthly payment will be Rs. 85,000/- (Rupees Eighty Five Thousands only) as per order in Application

No. 4181 of 1991.

The undertaking is placed on record. However, for the undertaking to be effective, it must be necessary that there must be a defaulting clause and

the consequences flowing out of such default. Therefore, placing on record the memo of undertaking, was postpone the implementation of our

judgment directing the appellants in Contempt Appeal 5 of 1994 to be put in civil prison on the following conditions :-

The appellants in Contempt Appeal 5 of 1994 as per the undertaking shall pay to the appellants in LPA 172 of 1993 a sum of Rs. 3 lacs per

month on or before the 10th of each month. The first payment to be made on or before 10th September, 1994. Thereafter, the further payments

are to be made on or before the 10th of each succeeding month. The appellants in LPA shall execute proper stamped receipt for having received

the same. Out of the aforesaid sum of Rs. 3 lacs, Rs. 2,15,000/- will be towards the arrears and Rs. 85,000/- will be towards the monthly rent.

The receipts shall also be given accordingly. As soon as the entire arrears are wiped out, the appellants in Contempt Appeal 5 of 1994 will

continue to pay only a monthly rent of Rs. 85,000/-. If any one default is committed, the respondents in Contempt Appeal 5 of 1994 shall

immediately bring it to the notice of the Court by filing a memo after serving a copy on the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants in

Contempt Appeal 5 of 1994 the default committed by the appellants and seek appropriate orders for implementation of our judgment dated 29-7-

1994. In the event without any default, the directions are complied with, that shall also be reported to this Court for passing orders as to the

implementation of the judgment dated 28-7-1994.

Order accordingly.