Ghana Katali vs Lachu Poroja & others

Defendant no.2 is the appellant against a reversing judgment.

Plaintiff-respondent no.1 instituted the suit for declaration of title over the suit land and recovery of possession. Case of the plaintiff was that

Kamal Lochan Katali and Jagabandhu Katali were brothers. Kamal Lochan died leaving behind three sons Trilochan and defendants 1 and 2.

Jagabandhu died leaving behind defendants 3 and 4 as his sons. The suit land fell to the share of defendants 3 and 4 in the family partition.

Defendants 1 to 4 sold the suit land to the plaintiff by means of a registered sale deed dated 6.3.1964 for a valid consideration. The plaintiff is in

possession of the suit land. Defendants 4 and 5, who are related to defendant no.1, set up defendant no.1, who created disturbance in the peaceful

possession of the plaintiff.

Defendants 2 to 4 entered contest and filed a written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. According to them, the alleged sale

deed was procured by playing fraud and misrepresentation. The defendants were not aware of the contents of the sale deed. Defendant no.2 was

a minor at the time of the alleged sale in the year 1964. The suit land fell to the share of the defendant no.2 in the family partition. He is in

possession of the suit land and as such, perfected title by way of adverse possession. Defendants 1,5 and 6 were set ex parte.

Stemming on the pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck eight issues. Parties led evidence, both oral and documentary, to substantiate

their case. Learned trial court came to hold that the suit lands were not allotted to the share of defendants 3 and 4 in the family partition. The

plaintiff had not purchased the suit land from the original owners. The sale deed was not supported by consideration. No delivery of possession

was made to the plaintiff. Defendants 3 and 4 are not the owners in possession of the suit land. Held so, it dismissed the suit. Assailing the

judgment and decree, plaintiff filed Title Appeal No.16 of 1991 before the learned Addl. District Judge, Jeypore. Learned appellate court came to

hold that the suit land is the ancestral property of defendants 1 to 4 and Trilochan. The same was recorded in the name of Jagabandhu, Trilochan

and Ghana-defendant no.2 in the ROR vide Ext.A. Registered sale deed was supported by consideration. Defendants 2 to 4 have not adduced

any evidence to prove that the sale deed in question was procured by fraud and misrepresentation. The plaintiff has laid the foundation for leading

secondary evidence under Sec. 65 of the Evidence Act. Defendants 1 to 4 and Trilochan sold the suit land to the plaintiff by means of a registered

sale deed on 6.3.1964 for a consideration of Rs.1000/-. Held so, it allowed the appeal. It is apt to state here that during pendency of the appeal,

respondent no.5 died. On the request of the appellant, the name of respondent no.5 is expunged.

The second appeal was admitted on the substantial questions of law enumerated in Ground Nos.II and VII. The same are -

I. For that the learned lower appellate court having held that the plea of the party is not specifically denied the said pleading be deemed to have

been admitted, grossly erred in law in decreeing the plaintiff''s suit. Though the contesting defendants have denied the plaint allegation with regard

to execution of sale deed, consideration and delivery of possession along with an averment that the sale deed was procured by fraud and

misrepresentation, the learned lower appellate court committed an error of law apparent on the face of record in holding that the contesting

defendants have not denied the specific averments of payment of consideration. Therefore, the lower appellate court wrongly held that the learned

trial court was not justified in frame issue no.4 as to whether consideration amount of Rs.1000/- was passed and recorded a finding against the

plaintiff on the said issue.

VII. For that learned lower appellate court committed an error in not taking into consideration Ext.C series in which defendant no.2 has paid the

arrear rent and Ext.D series the rent receipts. It is settled position of law that rent receipts are the evidence of actual possession. Therefore, the

learned lower appellate court wrongly failed to hold that the contesting defendants have been in possession of the suit land since family partition

and as such they acquired right, title and interest by adverse possession.

Heard Mr. Manoj Kumar Mohanty along with Mr. Tutu Pradhan, learned counsel for the appellant. None appeared for the respondents.

Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the plaintiff has not produced the sale deed said to have been executed by

defendants 2 to 4 in their favour. The plaintiff has not laid foundation for leading secondary evidence. The party sought to produce secondary

evidence must establish for non-production of primary evidence. Unless it is established that the original document was lost or destroyed or

deliberately withheld by the party in respect of that document sought to be used, secondary evidence in respect of that document cannot be

accepted. He further contended that neither mere admission of a document in evidence amounts to its proof nor mere making of an exhibit of a

document dispense with its proof, which is otherwise required to be done in accordance with law. He relied on the decision of the apex Court in

the case of Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri and others, 2015 (II) CLR (SC) 1233 .

In Rakesh Mohindra (supra), the apex Court held that as a general rule, documents are proved by leading primary evidence. Sec. 64 of the

Evidence Act provides that documents must be proved by the primary evidence except in cases mentioned in Sec. 65 of the Evidence Act. In the

absence of primary evidence, documents can be proved by secondary evidence as contemplated under Sec.63 of the Act. Sec.65 of the Act deals

with the circumstances under which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given to prove the existence, condition or contents of the

documents. The pre-conditions for leading secondary evidence are that such original documents could not be produced by the party relied upon

such documents in spite of best efforts, unable to produce the same which is beyond their control. The party sought to produce secondary

evidence must establish for non-production of primary evidence. Unless it is established that the original documents is lost or destroyed or is being

deliberately withheld by the party in respect of that document sought to be used, secondary evidence in respect of that document cannot be

accepted. It was further held that it is well settled that if a party wishes to lead secondary evidence, the Court is obliged to examine the probative

value of the document produced in the Court or their contents and decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence. At the

same time, the party has to lay down the factual foundation to establish the right to give secondary evidence where the original document cannot be

produced. It is equally well settled that neither mere admission of a document in evidence amounts to its proof nor mere making of an exhibit of a

document dispense with its proof, which is otherwise required to be done in accordance with law.

Reverting to the facts of the case in hand and keeping in view the enunciation of law laid down in Rakesh Mohindra (supra), this Court finds that

the plaintiff has specifically pleaded that the original sale deed was lost. There is no denial to the said fact. Learned appellate court came to hold

that the plaintiff has been able to lay foundation for leading secondary evidence under Sec.65 of the Evidence Act. Certified copy of the registered

sale deed dated 6.3.1964 has been marked as Ext.1 without objection.

In Dula Dei and others v. Jadi Bewa and others, 31 (1965) CLT 889, this Court held that the proper time to object to the admissibility of

evidence is at the trial when the evidence is tendered and it is then that the court should rule as to the admissibility or inadmissibility of the evidence.

In view of the same once a document is admitted in evidence without any objection by a party in the first court, the party is precluded from

objecting to the admissibility of the document in appeal.

In Collector, Cuttack v. Rajib Bhoi, AIR 1972 Orissa 200, this Court held that once secondary evidence by way of certified copies of

registered documents is admitted without objection and the documents are marked as exhibits, it is not open to the party against whom they are

offered in evidence to raise any objection that the proper procedure has not been followed or the proper foundation not laid for admission of such

secondary evidence.

On an anatomy of the pleadings and evidence on record, learned appellate court came to hold that P.Ws. 1 to 4 deposed that the contents of

the sale deed dated 6.3.1964 were read over and explained to the defendant nos.1 to 4 and Trilochan Katali and they put their L.T.Is and

signatures on the same. Though P.Ws.1 to 4 had been subjected to extensive cross-examination but nothing has been elicited from them. On

scanning of the registered sale deed it appears that Trilochan Katali and defendants 1 to 3 for self and on behalf of his minor brother put their

L.T.Is and signatures on the sale deed. The minor discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesses examined by the plaintiff do not affect their

intrinsic worth of the testimony regarding execution of the sale deed by defendants 1 to 4 and Trilochan Katali in favour of the plaintiff. It came to

the conclusion that defendants 1 to 4 and Trilochan Katali sold the suit land to the plaintiff by means of a registered sale deed dated 6.3.1964 for a

valid consideration. There is no perversity in the said finding. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly.

In the wake of the aforesaid, the appeal sans merit, deserves dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to

costs.