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Judgment
18 paragraphs · 708 wordsK.L. Shrivastava, J.—This appeal u/s 30 of the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 (for short ''the Principal Act'') is directed against the order dated 14.9.1983 awarding compensation passed by the Commissioner, Workmen''s Compensation, Indore (for short ''the Commissioner'') in Claim Case No. 74 of 1979.
It is not in dispute that in the instant case, the claim for compensation has to be determined with reference to the law as it existed prior to its amendment by the Act No. 22 of 1984. By the Workmen''s Compensation Amendment Act, 1976 which was brought into force on 1.10.1975. Schedule IV of the Principal Act was amended. According to this amended Schedule for a workman with not more than Rs. 150/- as monthly wages in case of 100% permanent total disablement the amount of compensation was Rs. 18,900/-.
Circumstances giving rise to the appeal are these. Respondent No. 3, Satyanarayan aged 15 years and his parents filed an application before the Commissioner for compensation on the averments that the said Satyanarayan was working with the Appellants on Rs. 5/- per day. In December 1978 while working on their sugarcane Charkhi he was involved in an accident whereby he sustained injuries and lost half the palm and three of his fingers of the right hand.
The application was contested by the Appellants.
At the conclusion of the trial, the learned Commissioner held that the Respondent Satyanarayan was a workman of the Appellants @ Rs. 5/- per day and was operating their Charkhi. It was further held that he had sustained permanent/partial disablement to the extent of 50% and was awarded Rs. 9,450/- as compensation.
The main contention of the Appellants'' learned Counsel is that on the material on record, the disability was only 30%.
The point for consideration is whether the appeal deserves to be allowed.
Relevant portion of Section 3 of the Act occurring in Chapter II ibid providing for employer''s liability for compensation runs thus:
Employer''s liability for compensation. (1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay-compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.
Section 30 of the Act provides for appeal from the orders of the Commissioner. The first proviso to the section is relevant and it reads thus:
Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal.
As pointed out in the decision in United India Fire and General Insurance Co. v. Krishna 1985 MPWN 147, finding that the Respondent Satyanarayan was Appellant''s workman is one of fact and is not open to challenge in appeal u/s 30 of the Act.
The only question for consideration is as to the percentage of disability.
In the instant case the Respondent Satyanarayan (PW 2) has deposed that he has completely lost three of his fingers and his 4th finger has been rendered totally useless. This version of his has not been assailed in his cross-examination. Therefore, absence of medical evidence on the point is inconsequential. It may be pointed out that in part II of Schedule I of the Act after serial number 48 there is a note appended which reads as under:
Complete and permanent loss of the use of any limb or member referred to in this Schedule shall be deemed to be the equivalent of the loss of that limb or member.
In view of this note complete and permanent loss of the use of the fourth finger is by friction equivalent to its physical loss. According to item No. 7 ibid loss of four fingers in one hand results in 50% permanent/partial disablement. In this connection the decision in E.S.I.C. v. J.C. Mills 1981 (1) MPWN 20, is pertinent. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the learned Commissioner committed no error in assessing the disablement at 50%.
For the foregoing reasons, I find that no case for interference in an appeal u/s 30 of the Act has been made out.
In the result, the appeal which is without merit fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.
