Ghanshyam @APPELLANT@Hash State of Rajasthan & Ors.

By the instant revision petition under Section 397/401 Cr.P.C, accused-petitioners have challenged order dated 26th of February, 2018, passed by

Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, framing charge against petitioner No.1 for offence under Sections 341, 323 or 323/34, 307 or 307/34 and 302/34 IPC and

against petitioner No.2 for offence under Sections 341, 323 or 323/34, 307 or 3/34 and 302 IPC.Â

Succinctly stated, the facts of the case are that on 26th of February 2017, complainant-respondent No.2 submitted a written report before Police

Station Bhopalgarh, inter-alia, stating therein that on 26th of February, 2017, at about 11:30 AM, while his mother was taking out garbage from

drainage, one Geeta W/o Baksaram Meghwal came there and asked her not to do so and on denial gave threatening to kill her mother.  After

sometime, accused persons, including the petitioners, with common intention, laced with lathis, sariyas and stones entered into his house and gave

beatings to the family members, due to which he, his father Padmaram, brother Ranjeet and mother sustained injuries.Â

On the basis of said report, police registered FIR No.32/2017 for offence under Sections 143, 341, 323, and 451 IPC and commenced

investigation.   During the course of investigation, police added offence under Section 307 IPC and upon death of Padmaram on 08/09.03.2017,

also added offence under Section 302 IPC. Police after investigation submitted charge-sheet against accused-petitioners for offence punishable

under Sections 341, 323, 307, and 302/34 IPC. Subsequently, the case was

committed to learned trial Court by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pipar City, by resorting to Section 209 Cr.P.C.  The learned trial Court, thereafter,

heard arguments before framing charges and while resorting to Section 228 Cr.P.C. framed charges against the petitioners as aforesaid.

Challenging the impugned order, it is contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that learned trial Court has completely overlooked the basic

ingredients of Sections 307 and 302 IPC and has not scrutinized the requisite material available on record in right perspective.  Learned counsel

further contends that the learned trial Court, while framing charges, has not made any endeavor to examine true purport of Sections 227 & 228

Cr.P.C. and has mechanically exercised power under Section 228 Cr.P.C. in framing the charges. It is contended by learned counsel for the

petitioners that from the statements recorded during investigation it is clear that petitioner No.1 has not been attributed any injury to Padmaram and

the allegation against him is that he caused injuries to respondent No.2, who sustained simple injuries.Â

Learned Public Prosecutor, Mr. Rajesh Bhati, submits that at the stage of framing charge Court is required only to see prima facie case against

accused persons showing possibilities of the commission of crime as against certainty and the same is clearly discernible from the impugned order.

Learned Public Prosecutor contends that learned trial Court after examining the material available on record has rightly framed the charge against

petitioners, and therefore, no interference with the impugned order is warranted.

I have bestowed my consideration to the arguments of learned counsel for the parties advanced at Bar, perused the impugned order and thoroughly

scanned the materials available on record.

There remains no quarrel that at the stage of framing charge Court is required to examine both the Sections, i.e., Section 227 & 228 Cr.P.C. and if the

Court considers that no sufficient grounds exist for proceeding against accused, then the accused can be discharged after recording reasons for doing

so. Thus, the emphasis under Section 227 Cr.P.C. is on insufficiency of grounds for proceeding against accused. Per contra, Section 228 Cr.P.C.

envisages that if in the opinion of Court, there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed offence, then the Court may proceed to frame

charge against him. Thus, a reading of Section 227 & 228 together in juxtaposition, makes it clear that at the beginning of trial, the truth, veracity

and effect of evidence, which the prosecutor proposes to adduce, need not be meticulously judged.

The Supreme Court, in State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh [(1977) 4 SCC 39], while considering relative scope of Sections 227 & 228 Cr.P.C., has

held:

“The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not

exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under section 227 or section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to 'see whether

there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the

matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a

strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the

Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at

the, initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the

contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. if the evidence which

the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by

the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.

An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just

illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the

conclusion of the, trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But, if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of

making an order under section 227 or section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one

under section 228 and not under section 227.â€​

The Supreme Court in State of A.P. Vs. Golconda Linga Swamy & Anr. [(2004) 6 SCC 522], while examining power of the Court at the time of

framing charge, has held:

“At the time of framing the charge it can be decided whether prima facie case has been made out showing commission of an offence and

involvement of the charged persons. At that stage also evidence cannot be gone into meticulously. It is immaterial whether the case is based on

direct or circumstantial evidence. Charge can be framed, if there are materials showing possibility about the commission of the crime as against

certainty.

The Court further held:

“Ultimately, the acceptability of the materials to fasten culpability on the accused persons is a matter of trial.â€​

Same view is reiterated by the Supreme Court in case of Sajjankumar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation [(2010) 9 SCC 368], the Court held:

“At the stage of framing of charge under Section 228 of the Cr.P.C. or while considering the discharge petition filed under Section 227, it is not for

the Magistrate of a Judge concerned to analyse all the materials including pros and cons, reliability or acceptability etc. Â It is at the trial, the Judge

concerned has to appreciate their evidentiary value, credibility or otherwise of the statement, veracity of various documents and free to take a decision

one way or the other.â€​

The same principle is further reiterated by Supreme Court in a later judgment in case of State through Inspector of Police Vs. A. Arun Kumar & Anr.

[(2015) 2 SCC 417].

 In the instant case, as prima facie case is made against the accused-petitioners, learned trial Court has rightly exercised its jurisdiction for framing

charge against them. The learned trial Court, while recording its satisfaction about possibilities of commission of crime by the accused persons, has

also examined the material available on record. Therefore, in my opinion, impugned order is based on sound reasonings and by no means can be

categorized as outcome of illegal or improper exercise of discretion.Â

In view of foregoing discussion, I am unable to find any illegality, infirmity or impropriety in the impugned order requiring interference in exercise of

revisional jurisdiction.

Consequently, the revision petition fails and is hereby rejected.