High CourtsDivision Bench(2003) 06 J&K CK 0015

Ghulam Hassan Mir and Others vs State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others

Jammu And Kashmir High Court · Decided on 10 June 2003 · Citation: (2003) 3 JKJ 418

HON’BLE JUDGES
V.K. Jhanji, Acting C.J. · Bashir-Ud-Din, J
CASE NUMBER
LPA No's. 241 and 283 of 1998

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

84 paragraphs · 1,831 words

V. K. Jhanji, ACJ

1.

Letters Patent Appeal No. 241/19998 has been directed against order dated 6th April, 1998 passed in writ petition, SWP No. 2509/94, by the

learned Single Judge, dismissing the writ petition. Letters Patent Appeal No. 283/98 has been directed against order dated 19th August, 1998

passed by another learned Single Judge of this Court in writ petition, SWP No. 90/98, dismissing the writ petition. Letters Patent Appeal No.

283/98 has been directed against dated 19th August, 1998 passed by another learned Single Judge of this Court in writ petition, SWP No. 90/98,

dismissing the writ petition. Since the two appeals involve identical relevant facts and common questions of law and, in fact, the two appeals have

been clubbed together, therefore, we proceed to dispose of both the appeals by this common order. However, while adverting to the facts and the

observations made in the impugned judgements, we would refer only to the judgement out of which LPA No. 241/98 arises as, out of the total

number of fifty-nine appellants, fifty eight persons are appellants in the said LPA.

2.

The appellants are contingent paid employees, working as safaiwallas in the Education Department. The case of the writ-petitioners namely, the

appellants, is that the respondents have been utilising their service in different offices and Schools for more than one decade and that they are

working for the whole day, but are being paid Rs. 25/- to Rs. 250/-per month. Their case further is that, on account of the nature of their job, they

are bound to perform their duties regularly in the Schools from morning till evening and, as such they are entitled to the minimum wages as are

being paid to other daily-rated workers. The learned Single Judge rejected the contention of the appellants with regard to payment of minimum

wages on the ground that the appellants do not render the services as are being discharged by the daily-wagers, who have to work for minimum

hours on a day, whereas the appellants are performing the duty for limited hours. The contention of the appellants, that similarly situated contingent

employees have been adjusted against class IV posts by the respondents, has also been rejected by the learned Single Judge on the ground that if

an illegality has been committed in case of others, the same cannot be allowed to be committed in the case of the appellants. The learned Single

Judge also observed that in case this contention of the appellants is accepted, then the State would have to be directed to create new posts in the

category of Class IV, not only equal to the number of appellants, but for all Safaiwallas, who discharge their duties for an hour or so in a day. The

appellants have come in appeal against the said judgement and order of the learned Single Judge.

3.

The submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the learned Single Judge has failed to take into consideration the attendance

register duly signed by the Zonal Education Officer concerned, showing that the appellants have been working on full-time basis. It is contended

that the appellants are not only entitled to the minimum wages, but their services are to be regularised. On the other hand, learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the respondents, submitted that the appellants are contingent paid employees and are not working against regular posts, nor

they are engaged as full-time workers and, therefore, neither their services can be regularised nor they can be paid the minimum wages, as they are

working only for an hour or so in a day.

4.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have carefully gone through the record of this case.

5.

The admitted fact in this case is that the appellants have been engaged for keeping the offices and Schools clean, i.e., as Safaiwallas, and they

have been discharging their such duties over a period often years on meagre payments. It is beyond one's imagination that a person would be in a

position to make his both ends meet with the sort of negligible remunerations these persons are being paid. One should not take it as their fail

acconipli. On account of the socio-economic conditions of the general masses in the Country as a whole and, in particular the State of Jammu and

Kashmir, there is a great need not only for providing job security but also to remunerate such workers commensurate with having, atleast, two

meals so that people, like the appellants herein, are not exploited. It would be apt to refer herein to the observations made by their lordships of the

Supreme Court in K. C. Rajeevan v. State of Kerala (1991) 1 SCC 31 while dealing with similar almost a situation:

India is a developing country. It has a vast surplus labour market. Large scale unemployment offers a matching opportunity to the employer to

exploit the needy. Under such market conditions the employer can dictate his terms of employment taking advantage of the absence of the

bargaining power in the other. The unorganised job seeker is left with no option but to accept employment on take-it-or-leave-it terms offered by

the employer. Such terms of employment offer no job security and the employee is left to the mercy of the employer. Employers have betrayed an

increasing tendency to employ temporary hands even on regular and permanent jobs with a view to circumventing the protection offered to the

working classes under the benevolent legislations enacted from time to time. One such device adopted is to get the work done through contract

labour....

6.

The case of the appellants herein is no less worse. They are also at the mercy of the concerned School or office heads and, in such

circumstances, it cannot be expected that they should be leaving these Office or School premises after doing their jobs in the morning. When a

cheap labour is available, there are least chances of the concerned Heads leaving them before the close of office hours. Even otherwise, since these

persons are not governed by any set of norms and are engaged at the choice of the heads of offices and Schools, they must always be feeling the

Damocles sword hanging on their heads that, in case they leave the premises, they might be substituted. Of course, that is the plea of the appellants

that their services are, in fact, being utilised full-time.

7.

The case of contingent paid employees earlier came up before the Division Bench of this Court in Zoona Bibi v. State 2000 SLJ 352 and, his

lordship Hon'ble Mr. Justice H. K. Sema, (as His Lordship then was), speaking for the Bench, observed as under:

....It is unthinkable that in the present context of society, where prices of essential commodities are sky high, a person can survive by a meagre

income of Rs. 260/- per month. It would amount to exploitation. Sections 13 and 19 of the Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in the

Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, a adopted on 26th January, 1967, provide that there shall be socialistic pattern of society with a vow to

promote social order and welfare of the people of State and all sort of exploitation has been abolished. Keeping in view the Directive Principles of

the State Policy as enshrined in Sections 13 and 19 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, it is a high time that, to give a meaningful

interpretation to Sections 13 and 19 of the Constitution, the State should evolve a formula or a scheme so that the citizen like the appellant at hand,

who toil and labour for earning daily bread, must have two coarse meals a day. Keeping them a meagre contingent paid of Rs. 260/- per month,

whatever nature of the employment may be, in our view, is too meagre for them to survive. The appropriate Govt. must, therefore, seriously

consider the plight of these lowest strata of the people in the State and either to frame a scheme or any other formula so that they can survive with

honour and dignity.

8.

The Division Bench further observed that:

....The right to life, as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as to live with dignity and honour and

not mere living...

9.

Apparently, the State does not seem to have taken note of the aforesaid observations and concern of the Court. If that had been the case, then

some sort of formula or scheme would have come into existence. No such formula or scheme has been produced before the court by either of the

parties. We feel that the judgement might not have been brought to the notice of the concerned authorities. We, therefore, repeat the concern of

this Court expressed in the aforesaid judgement.

10.

In the aforesaid case, the division Bench directed that till such time the scheme or a formula was framed by the appropriate Government, the

case of the appellant therein may be considered to be paid at the rate prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act as applicable in the State of

Jammu and Kashmir. The direction was, however, made subject to the condition that the engagement was full-time and not part-time. The Court

also observed as under:

...We are also of the view that till the Government formulate a scheme or any other formula, such contingent engagements, subject to the quantum

of work, may be made for the full job so that they can get the daily wages at the rate of Minimum Wages Act framed for the purpose.

11.

We are of the view that the case of the appellants herein is squarely covered by the above decision and, therefore, they are entitled to the same

treatment as was given to the contingent paid employees in Zoona Bibi v. State (Supra).

12.

However, at this stage, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, submitted that the directions given in Zoona Bibi v. State

(supra) was subject to the condition that the engagement of the contingent employees is full-time and not part-time and, since in this case the

appellants engagement was part-time, the said judgement would not apply to the case of the appellants.

13.

However, we are of the view that this exercise can be undertaken by the Zonal Education Officer, Baramulla. In case the Zonal Education

Officer finds that the appellants have been working full-time, then the same direction, as was given in Zonna Bibi v. State (supra), would follow in

the case of the appellants. The Zonal Education Officer shall also give a hearing to the appellants so as to enable them to furnish proof of the fact

that they have been working as full time Safaiwallas. This exercise shall be completed by the Zonal Education Officer within three months from the

date of receipt of the certified copy of this judgement.

14.

The appeals are, accordingly, disposed of in terms of the above.