Gian Kour vs S.Atma Singh

Kotwal, J.

(1) This appeal has a chequered history and arise in the following circumstances:

(2) One Raibahadur Ganda Singh owned property in more than one place. He was survived by three sons, namely, Mal Singh, Atma Singh and

Balwant Singh; all of whom agreed to appoint two persons as arbitrators to partition among them the entire property left by their father A written

agreement, accordingly, came to be executed on 10th of Katik 1999 Samvat and two persons, namely S. Gurmukh Singh, S. Mool Singh Khosla

were appointed as arbitratothers The arbitrators gave their award on 20th Katik 2000 Samvat. Mai Singh moved an application under section 14

of the Arbitration Act (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the act') in the High Court on 18th Phagan 2007 Samvat with a composite prayer that the

arbitrators be directed to file the award in the court. This application was transferred by the High Court to the Distrist Judge Srinagar on March

26, 1951. The District Judge, on receipt of the file, issued notices to the respondent in the said application, namely: Atma Singh and Balwant Singh.

Pursuant to these notice, the respondents appeared in the court, and on 18th Har 2008 Samvat the court also issued directions to the arbitrators to

file the award in the court. The arbitrators filed the award in the court on 3rd of Sawan 2008 Samvat in presence of the applicant and counsel for

the nonapplicants who were given notice of the filing of the award the same day by the court. The counsel for the parties sought time to file their

objections wherein he stated that he would have no objection in case the award was made a rule of the court. Counsel for respondent Atma Singh,

however sought another opportunity, to file objections, which were ultimately filed by him on 4th of Bhadon 2008 Samvat. In his objections, he not

only pleaded that the application under section 14 was barred by time but also took various objections to the validity of the award. The

controversy, between the applicant and the respondent Atma Singh, gave rise to a number of issues Both of them joined the issues and led

evidence in support of their cases. Mai Singh applicant died in the mean time. His widow Mst. Gian Kour, the appellant herein was brought on

record as his sole heir. The District Judge vide his order dated June 4, 1959, refused to make the award a rule of the court and dismissed the

application under section 14 inter alia holding:

(i) that the application was not barred by time as the arbitrators had failed to serve upon the applicant notice in writing that they had made the

award:

(ii) that it was not possible to say whether or not the award was made within time;

(iii) that the arbitrators had committed legal misconduct, inasmuch as, they had made the award after the long delay of 8 years which had in turn

resulted in miscarriage of justice; and

(iv) that the arbitrators did not go beyond the terms of reference though they failed to give the award in respect of all the matters referred to them.

It is this order which has been challenged in the present appeal. The other respondent No. 1 herein alone has contested the appeal. The other

respondent, namely; Balwant singh has chosen to remain absent.

(3) This appeal was filed on July 2, 1960. Initially, it was heard by a Bench consisting of Chief Justice S. M. F. Ali (as His lordship then was) and

Late Bakshi Ishwar Singh J. The court being of the view, that in the absence of any evidence, as to when the arbitrators had entered upon the

reference, it would not be possible to hold, whether or not the award was made beyond limitation, remitted the case back to the District Judge,

with the direction that he shall return his finding after recording fresh evidence on the point. As none of the parties chose to lead any evidence, the

District Judge submitted his report on September 21, 1974 that it was not possible to say as to when the arbitrators had entered upon the

reference. Objections to this report were invited from the parties, but they preferred not to file any.

(4) Mr. Bhat, has assailed the judgment of the lower court on the following grounds:

(i) the objections to the validity of the award having been filed beyond the statutory period, the trial court sought to have passed a decree in terms

of the award;

(ii) the trial court had no jurisdiction to set aside the award suo moto on the ground of misconduct;

(iii) the trial court had erred in holding that the award was made beyond the statutory period; and

(iv) in any event this court was competent to condone the delay, in the peculiar circumstances of the case in exercise of its power under section 28

of the Act.

(5) Mr. Qureshi, while supporting the judgment on all other points has questioned its correctness on the finding that the application under section

14 was barred by time.

(6) Before dealing with the points raised by Mr. Bhat it may be more appropriue to dispose of the objections raised by Mr. Qureshi. In support of

his contention that the application made by the appellant's husband Mai Singh under section 14 of the Act, was barred by time, Mr. Qureshi has

relied upon the statement of one of the arbitrators, namely Mool Singh Khosia, that the arbitrators had verbally informed the parties on the very

day of making the award, that the award had been so made. Admittedly, no notice in writing to that effect was served upon the parties by the

arbitratothers This, according to the learned counsel, was a sufficient notice of the making of the award within the meaning of Article 178 of the

Limitation Act.

(7) Article 178 requires an application for filing of an award to be made within 90 days from 'the date of service of the making of an award'. The

terminus a quo is the date of service of the making of the award. This Article itself does not speak of the manner in which such a service is to be

made. This naturally takes one back to the provisions of the Arbitration Act itself, to find out, whether any mode of such a service is previded in

the Act, only that mode has to be followed and no other mode. Law is now well settled, that if an act is done in a particular manner it shall be done

in that manner alone, or not done at all. Subsection I of section 14 of the Act provide.

when the arbitrators or umpire have made their award, they shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the making and

signingthereof and the amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration and the award.

On its plain reading, sub section (1) speaks of a notice to the parties which has to be necessarily in writing. This is the only provision under which

the parties are entitled to get notice of making an award. The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that service mentioned in Article 178 refers to

the notice provided in subsec (1) of section 14 of the Act and a verbal notice would not be the one contemplated by Article 173 of the Limitation

Act. The abjection raised by Mr. Qureshi is, therefore, overruled and the finding given by the trial court on issue No. 1 is confirmed (also see Misri

Lal and another versus Bhagwati Prasad, AIR 1955 All. 573 and Mst. Angari Devi Vs. Bal Ram Ganpat Rai and others. A. I. R. 1960 Punjab:

204)

(8) The scheme of the Act shows that after an award has been made, notice in writing of the same in terms of subSection (1) of Section 14 has to

be given to the parties by the arbitrators or umpire as the case may be. The parties may then request the arbitrators or umpire are bound to file the

award in the court on receiving such request or direction. After the award has been filed in the court, the court is bound to give notice of its filing to

the parties. All this is borne out from subsection 2 of section 14. It is, therefore, for the parties to choose their own course, i.e. either to get the

award made a rule of the court, or to get it modified, remitted or set aside. An award cannot be set aside except on the grounds mentioned in

section 30 of the Act, and that too on an application to that effect as provided in section 33 of the Act The period for making such an application is

30 days from the date notice is served by the court on the party in terms of Subsection 2 of section 14, that the award has been filed in the court as

provided in Article 153 of the Limitation Act. Procedure for passing judgment in terms of an award is laid down in section 15 of the Act which

reads:

where the court sees no cause to remit the award or the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the award the court

shall, after the time for making an application to set aside award has expired, or such application having been, made, after refusing it, proceed to

pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow, and no appeal shall lie from such decree

except on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with, the award.

(9) A careful reading of the section shows that the court in which an award has been filed may suo moto remit it or remit any matter referred to

arbitration for reconsideration to the arbitrator or umpire or may set atide the award suo moto. Where however, it seems no cause to either remit

the award or any matter for reconsideration, or to set aside the same, it has to pass a decree in terms of the award, but, no such decree can be

passed before the period of limitation for an application as provided in Article 158 of the Limitation Act has expired, or where such an application

has been made, the same has been rejected by it. The opening words of the section ""where the court sees no cause"" clearly suggest that the court

has power to remit or set aside the award even suo moto. Again, the expression: ""such an application"" used in the section, clearly denotes that an

application for setting aside an award of which this section speaks would be the one which has been made within the period prescribed and an

application made beyond the period of limitation shall not be treated as one contemplated by this section. The award in this case has been set aside

on the ground of legal misconduct. This ground is clearly covered by clause (a) of section 30 of the Act. It has also been that that notice of the filing

of the award in the court was given to the parties on 3rd Sawan. 2008 Samvat and the objections to its validity were filed by respondent No. 1 on

4th Bhadoon, 2008 Samvat i. e. more then thirty days from the date of the said notice. The court, ought to have, therefore, declined to take notice

of these objections and if otherwise permissible, proceeded to pass a decree in terms of the award. Law on this point has now been finally settled

by the Supreme Court in Madan Lal Vs. Sunder Lal and another: A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1233 wherein it has been held:

It is not in dispute in the present case that the objections raised by the appellant were covered by S. 30 of the Act, and though the appellant did

not pray for setting aside the award in his objection that was what he really wanted the court to do after hearing his objection. As in the present

case the objection was filed more than 30 days after the notice it could not be treated as an application for setting the award, for it would then be

barred by limitation. The position thus is that in the present case there was no application to set aside the award on grounds mentioned in S. 30

within the period of limitation and, therefore, the court could not set aside the award on those grounds. There can be no doubt on the scheme of

the Act, that any objection even in the nature of a written statement which falls under S. 30 cannot be considered by the court unless such an

objection is made within the period of limitation (namely 30 days), though if such an objection is made within limitation that objection may in

appropriate cases be treated as an application for setting aside the award.

(10) In order to overcome this difficulty, Mr. Qureshi has taken two pleas. His first plea is that whether or not the objections filed by respondent

No. 1 were barred by limitation was a mixed question of law and fact which should have been raised in the trial court itself and which cannot be

raised for the first time in appeal. If allowed to be raised, in appeal, contends the learned counsel, the respondent would also be deprived of an

opportunity to prove facts entitling him to claim benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act. His second plea is that even in the absence of any

objections the trial court had power to set aside the award suo moto, if satisfied that grounds for doing the same existed. The trial court, argues the

learned counsel, must be deemed to have exercised its power suo moto in setting aside the award in the peculiar circumstances of the case.

(11) Whether or not an application for setting aside an award on the grounds mentioned in section 30 is barred by time is undoubtedly a mixed

question of law and fact. But, once it is shown, that the party filing the objection petition had received notice from the court on a particular date that

the award had been filed in the court, and no facts and circumstances could conceivably be pleaded to either get the delay condoned or claim

extension in period of limitation, the question would be reduced to a pure question of law which could be raised for the first time in appeal. As

already pointed out, interim order dated 3rd of Sawan, 2008 Samvat makes a mention of the filing of the award in the court and its intimation to

the parties or their counsel. This is a sufficient notice within the meaning of subsection 2 of section 14. No particular form of such a notice has been

prescribed under the Act. Unlike the notice mentioned in subsection 1 which must always be in writing, notice under subsection (2) may be even

oral provided it is given by the court in which the award has been filed. Again, a notice to the pleader of a party is as good as a notice to the party

itself. (See Nikantha Sidremappa Ningashetti Vs. Kashinath Somanna Nigashetti and ors AIR 1992 SC 666 and Finance Centre Vs Shri Ram

Prakash 1977 KLJ 218). It is, thus, not difficult to hold, that respondent No. 1 had notice of the filing of the award on 3rd Sawan 2008 Samvat.

(12) The next question which falls for determination is whether or not respondent No 1 could claim benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act. If the

answer to this question is in the negative then surely the hurdle of Limitation in the way of respondent No. 1 would be insuperable; there being no

other provision of law under which extended period of limitation could be claimed. On its terms, section 5 does not apply to an application for

setting aside an award. But, these provisions may be made applicable to such applications as well by or under any other enactment as provided in

the section itself. The only provision in regard to limitations under the Act is contained in Section 37. It is now well settled that section 5 of the

Limitation Act cannot apply to applications for setting aside an award on grounds mentioned in section 30 of the Act even if the provisions of

section 37 are brought in to aid (See Chandanmull and Co, V. Monambal M. Mehta and others AIR 1953 Mad. 561; Hastimal Dalichand Bora

and ors Vs. Hiralal Motichand Mutha AIR 1954 Bombay 243 and Ganesh Chaudra Misra Vs. Artatrana Misra and ors: AIR 1965 Orissa: 17).

Under the Indian Limitation Act of 1963, however, provisions of section 5 have now been made applicable to such applications. The objection

petition filed by respondent No. 1 on 4th Bhadoon, 2008 Samvat was therefore clearly barred by time. Mr. Qureshi then wanted the court to

condone the delay in exercise of its inherent powers. This prayer too cannot be granted for the simple reason that a court may extend the period

fixed by it, but it cannot extend the period fixed by a Statute.

(13) Then comes the question of the inherent power of a court to set aside an award suo moto. That a court has such power has been already

observed. Not a single court in the country has 'held to the contrary. The Supreme Court in Madan Lal's case (Supra) too must be deemed to

have taken a similar view by necessary implication, though it has also observed that if an award is sought to be set aside on any ground falling

under section 30, the court can do it only on an application made to it within the period prescribed and not under the garb of its inherent power.

The following observations of the court may be reproduced with some advantage:

Learned counsel for the appellant, however, urges that S, 17 gives power to the court to set aside the award and that such power can be

exercised even where an objection in the form of a written statement has been made more than 30 days after the service of the notice of the filing

of the award as .the court can do so suo moto. He relies in this connection on Hastimal Dalichand v. Hiralal Motichand. AIR 1954 Bom 243 and

Saha and Co v. Isharsingh Kripal Singh, AIR 1956 Cal. 321 (FB). Assuming that the court has power to set aside the award suo motu, we are of

opinion that that power cannot be exercised to set aside an award on grounds which fall under S. 50 of the Act, if taken in an objection petition

filed more than 30 days after service of notice of filing of the award, for if that were so the limitation provided under Article 158 of the Limitation

Act would be completely negatived. The two cases on which the appellant relies do not in our opinion support him. In Hastimal's case AIR 1954

Bom 243, it was observed that 'If the award directs a party to do an act which is prohibited by law or if it is otherwise patently illegal or void it

would be open to the court to consider this patent defect in the award suo motu, and when the court acts suo moto, no question of limitation

prescribed by Article 158 can arise"". These observations only show that the court can act suo moto in certain circumstances which do not fall

within S. 30 of the Act"".

(14) By force of the same implication, the Supreme Court, shall also be deemed to have held, that a patent illegality or voidity in an award or a

direction in it, which if carried out, would contravene any provision of law, may constitute good grounds for invoking the inerrant power of the

court to set aside an award. This may be so even where any patent illegality is related to any one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 30.

Take for instance a case where an award itself says that it has been passed by the arbitrator without giving the aggrieved party any opportunity to

prove its case, even though it had a right to lead evidence, because in the opinion of the Arbitrator it could not have changed his decision: or a case

where an award itself states that the evidence led by the parties was found evenly balanced, but, the arbitrator passed the impugned award

because any other view would have caused loss to the department, which was incidentally headed by him.

(15) These are undoubtedly cases of misconduct covered by clause (a) of Section 30 and the illegality is apparent on their face. Should then the

court refuse to set aside such awards in the absence of any application to that effect, merely because they are covered by any one or more of the

clauses contained in Section 30? According to Mr. Bhat the court is powerless to set aside an award in Such circumstances, because, it would, as

observed by the Supreme Court in Madan Lal's case (Sup) tantamount to completely negativing the Limitation provided in Article 158 of the

Limitation Act. The illegality, according to the learned counsel, must be such, as is not in any way related to the grounds mentioned in Section 30.

Mr. Qureshi on the other hand has contended that the power of the court to set aside an award suo moto is coextensive with its power to set aside

it on grounds mentioned in Section 30, consequently a court is not debarred from setting aside an award under its inherent power on ground

mentioned in Section 30 even in the absence of any application to that effect.

(16) As will be noticed, the Supreme Court in Madan Lal's case (Supra) did not illustrate the distinction between grounds mentioned in Section 30

and other grounds on which an award could be set aside, nor provided any guidelines, even broadly, to draw a line of demarcation between these

two categories of grounds. No difficulty has been experienced in drawing a distinction between grounds covered by clause (a) and (b) of Section

30 and other grounds, but legal battles, it appears, are still being fought on the interpretation and scope of clause (c), more particularly, of the

expression 'is otherwise invalid' used in it. One view is, that this expression should not be read ejasdem generis to the expression immediately

occurring before it and, is capable of including in its ambit, nonexistence or invalidity of the agreement or reference, with the result, that a party

desirous of getting an award set aside, on the ground of its invalidity not only resulting from any violation of clauses (a) or (b), but also arising out of

any defect in the agreement or reference to arbitration, must make an application within the period prescribed under Art 158 of the Limitation Act.

(See A. R. Savkur v. Amritlal Kahdas and ors AIR 1954 Bom 293, Soha and Co v. Isher Singh Kripal Singh and Co., AIR 1956 Cal. 321

Ardesher Irani v. The State of M. P: AIR 1974 M.P. 199). The other view is that section 30 pre supposes a valid reference of the dispute to an

arbitrator. Consequently, where an award is challenged on grounds of absence or invalidity of either the agreement or reference to arbitration,

section 30 shall have no application and a party seeking to challenge the award need not make an application within 30 days as provided in Article

158 of the Limitation Act; this article being attracted only to applications containing grounds mentioned in Section 30 (See Chahabba Lal v Kallu

Lal and others AIR 1946 P. C. 72, Bihar State Cooperative Bank Ltd., v. The Phosphate Company Limited and another AIR 1975 Patna 63 and

M/s Kashmir Hill Forest v. The State of J and K and others AIR 1978 J and K 59).

(17) Section 33 of the Act read in juxta position to section 30 appears to be much wider in scope. Unlike section 30 which is restricted to award

alone, section 33 take into its sweep besides award, agreement laying foundation for reference to arbitration. Again, unlike section 30, section 33

does not specifically speak of setting aside an award, though adjudging invalid or nonexistent the arbitration agreement or reference may produce

the same result. The Legislature has maintained this distinction between the phraseology of these two sections only to emphasise that section 30

presupposes a valid reference to arbitration. If the expression ""is otherwise invalid"" occurring in clause (c) of section 30, is construed to include

invalidity of an award arising out of any defect in the agreement or reference also, then the raisin deter of section 33 might disappear, and this

section might become redundant. Such an intention cannot be attributed to the legislature. Furthermore, an arbitrator is not authorised to give his

decision on his own authority to arbitrate by adjudging the existence pr validity of an arbitration agreement, on the other hand, it is only the court

which is empowered to do so. Consequently, an intention cannot be attributed to the Legislature, that it wanted to include invalidity of an award

resulting from any flaw in the agreement or reference as a ground for setting aside the same by using the words 'is otherwise invalid' in clause (c) of

section 30. Whether an award is assailed on a ground mentioned in section 30, or on the basis of the nonexistence or invalidity of the arbitration

agreement or reference, the only provision in the Act which requires a party challenging the award to make application for the purpose is contained

in section 32. Section 30 it self does not speak of any such application. Whereas every application challenging an award OR grounds mentioned in

section 30 is to be made under section 33, every application challenging an award under section 33 need not be restricted to grounds mentioned in

section 30

(18) As held by the Supreme Court in Madan Lal's case (Supra) Article 158 of the Limitation Act applies to these applications alone where an

award is sought to be set aside on any one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 30, Consequently, where an application under section 33

is founded upon any one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 30 the period of Limitation for the same would be governed by Article 153

of the Limitation Act, but where it is based upon grounds of nonexistence or invalidity of the arbitration agreement or reference, this Article will

have no application and the period of limitation will be governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act.

(19) Court's power of set aside an award suo moto under section 17 of the Act on grounds of patent illegality or voidity or direction therein to a

party to do any act prohibited by law, granted, the only question which remains to be answered is whether any one or more of the grounds the one

owing its genesis to any such illegality can also be grounds mentioned in section 30? Mr. Bhat, argues, that it cannot be, and relies heavily on these

observations of the Supreme Court in Madan Lal's case (Supra)

Assuming that the court has power to set aside the award suo moto, we are of the opinion that that power cannot be exercised to set aside an

award on grounds which fall under section 30 of the Act, if taken in an objection petition filed more than thirty days after service of notice of filing

of the award, for if that were so, the limitation provided under Article 158 of the Limitation Act would be completely negatived.

(20) Mr. Bhat, it appears, is straining these observations too much. Examples have been already quoted to illustrate some patent illegalities arising

out of misconduct of an arbitrator. The court is bound to take notice of such patent illegalities under section 17 of the Act and set aside the award

accordingly. It would be really failing in its duty not to take notice thereof merely because no application has been filed within thirty days as

provided under Article 158 of the Limitation Act. The observations made by Bombay High Court in Hastimals case (Supra) which have been

approved by the Supreme Court in Madan Lai's case (Supra) are general in nature and include every kind of patent illegality. An application to be

filed within thirty days after the notice of the filing of the award will be imperative only where a ground taken under section 30 raise a mixed

question of law and fact which cannot be decide except on recording evidence. Support for this view is available from observations contained in a

Bench decision of Kerala High Court in P. Mulji and sons v. Kerala produce Exporting Co, and anr. AIR 1976 Kerala 3, which read:

But, the suo moto power of the court to invalidate the award can be exercised only if there is any patent illegality or viodness or the award directs

a party to do an act which is prohibited by law. If this illegality is not patent and requires an enquiry to find out that the court may not be justified in

expressing its suo moto jurisdiction.

(21) From what has been stated above the following conclusions may be drawn:

An award may be set aside by the court suo moto where it contains a direction to a party to do an act prohibited by law or where its viodity or

any other illegality including the one relating to any one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 30 is apparent on its face.

Where an award is sought to be set aside on grounds mentioned in section 30 and the plea raised is such which requires evidence to be

recorded an application within the period prescribed under Article 155 of the Limitation Act shall be imperative.

An award may be challenged either on grounds mentioned in section 30 or on grounds of nonexistence or invalidity of the arbitration agreement

or reference, but in each case an application shall have to be made under section 33 of the Act.

Where an award is to be challenged on grounds mentioned in section 30, the period of limitation for making an application to that effect shall be

30 days as provided under Article 158 and where it is to be challenged on grounds of nonexistence or invalidity of the arbitration agreement or

reference the period of limitation shall be three years as provided in Article 181 of the Limitation Act.

(22) The learned District Judge, as has been already noticed, has refused to pass a decree in terms of the award on the ground that the award was

vitiated by the misconduct of the arbitrators. That this misconduct was not apparent on the face of the award is established beyond doubt. Even the

Bench hearing the present appeal at an earlier stage realised the necessity of remitting the case to the District Judge to elucidate certain facts by

calling upon the parties to lead further evidence. These facts were relevant to determine as to whether or not the arbitrators were actually guilty of

any misconduct. Clearly, therefore, this was not a ground. Even though covered by section 30, which did not involve a decision on tacts. The

objection petition having been filed more than 30 days from the date respondent No. 1 got notice of the filing of the award in the court, ratio of the

judgment in Madan Lal's case (Supra) applied with full force to the present case. The learned District Judge was therefore powerless to set aside

the award suo moto. It may also be pointed out that the learned District Judge's reliance on two authorities viz Bhogilal Purshottem v. Chiman Lal

Amritlal AIR 1928 Bom 49 and Kesholal Ramdayal Kahar v. Laxman Rao RamKrishna Rao Desh Pande AIR 1940 Nagpur 386 was clearly

misplaced. In both these cases appeals had been preferred under clause (f) of section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure which at the relevant time

read as under:

An order filing or refusing to file an award in an arbitration without intervention of court.

The trial court, in both the cases had directed the award to be filed in the court and had also made the same a rule of the court. The High Court in

the peculiar circumstances of both the cases held that since the delay in making the award remained unexplained, it was a ground on which the

order of the trial court directing filing of the award in the court needed to be set aside. This law was amended in the year 1940 and no appeal is

now provided against such an order. The award, made by the arbitrators, in the present case therefore, remains effective.

(23) Admittedly, the award does not embrance all the matters referred to arbitration. Some land in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and some

other immoveable property in Amritsar has not been partitioned by the arbitratothers It has also been stated at the bar that both the arbitrators are

dead.

(24) For what has been stated above, the appeal is allowed the order passed by the trial court set aside and the caseremitted back to it with the

directions that it shall first of all decide as to whether the arbitration agreement discloses any intention on the part of the parties to fill up the

vacancy caused by the death of the arbitrators. In case it finds that no such intention is disclosed, it shall cease to have effect with respect to the

property yet to be partitioned and pass a decree in terms of the present award. In case, however, it comes to the conclusion that the agreement

discloses such an intention, it shall appoint new arbitrators by following the procedure laid down in sections 8 and 9 of the Act and remit the

dispute pertaining to the property left unpartitioned for their adjudication. After the supplementary award is received, the court shall proceed under

section 17 of the Act and pass a decree in terms of both the awards in accordance with law. Parties are left to bear their own costs.