High CourtsDivision Bench

Girdhari Lal vs Union of India

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 21 April 2014 · Citation: (2014) 04 P&H CK 0083

HON’BLE JUDGES
Surya Kant, J · Lisa Gill, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 14, 19, 21 · Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Section 4, 5-A, 6
CASE NUMBER
CWP No. 17412 of 2004 [O&M]
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Judgment

25 paragraphs · 1,903 words

Surya Kant, J.—This order shall dispose of CWP No. 17412 of 2004 along with connected cases bearing CWP Nos. 10396, 10904, 10708, 10713, 10804, 11391, 11496, 11619, 11695, 11713, 11838, 11842, 11845, 11906, 11911, 11913, 11916, 12059, 12138, 12143, 12278, 12354, 12355, 12394, 12398, 12495, 12503, 12523, 12537, 12718, 12776, 13229, 13272, 13305, 13437, 14087, 14108, 15063, 17592 and 17848 of 2004 as the petitioners in all the cases have laid challenge to the notifications dated 17.04.2002 [published on 21.04.2002] and dated 10.04.2003 [published on 16.04.2003] issued under Sections 4 and 6 as well as the consequential award passed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

2.

Vide the above stated notifications, the State of Haryana acquired land measuring 1227.13 Acres comprising the revenue estate of villages Bahadurgarh, Balore, Barkatabad and Sarai Aurangabad in District Jhajjar for the purpose of development and utilisation of the land as residential, commercial and institutional Sectors 1[Part], 10, 11[Part], 12 and 13, Urban Estate at Bahadurgarh.

3.

Shorn of the details, suffice it is to mention that the above-mentioned acquisition came to be challenged before this Court in a bunch of writ petitions on various grounds including procedural lapses, discrimination, violation of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution, non-compliance of the principles of natural justice and infringement of the State policy on the release of constructed areas.

4.

A Division Bench of this Court allowed those writ petitions vide order dated 21.06.2010 Reshma Footwears (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana and Others, and quashed the acquisition qua the writ petitioners, inter-alia, observing that [i] the petitioners were not given opportunity of hearing as per the procedure contemplated u/s 5-A of the Act; [ii] the acquisition was contrary to the mandate contained in the National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985; [iii] the action of the State in releasing the constructed properties on pick and choose basis was discriminatory in nature; [iv] the petitioners were denied the benefit of Section 48 of the Act for wholly insufficient reasons.

5.

This Court in Reshma Footwear''s case [supra] further held that:-

21.

We are not impressed with the stance of the respondent-State. On the one hand, the respondent State by issuing letter dated 26.6.1991 has laid down that survey of existing construction should be done before notification u/s 4 of the Act is issued and that the existing factories should not be acquired yet residential constructed area and running factory have been acquired without any justification. In paras 8 and 9 of a recent judgment rendered in the case of Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development Authority and others, (CA No. 4097 of 2010, decided on 5.5.2010) emphasis has been laid by Hon''ble the Supreme Court on undertaking proper survey or application of mind while formulating development scheme before inclusion of land of a person in an acquisition proceedings ...

6.

The Bench, thus, concluded that:-

...we are of the view that after framing of policy there was hardly any room for violating the same. There is no indication on the record that prior survey was undertaken and why the constructed area of the houses and factory/industry has been acquired. There is also lack of justification in respect of releasing the land of other house owners/factory owners and acquiring the land belonging to the petitioner. The situation is the same with regard to the vacant area. Accordingly on the ground of discrimination, the acquisition belonging to the area of the petitioner and other connected petitions is liable to be struck down.

7.

This Court, however, also dismissed 69 writ petitions on the ground that the acquisition of land was challenged by those petitioners after the passing of the award. The landowners in those 69 cases successfully assailed the order of dismissal of their writ petitions and in Prahlad Singh and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, the Hon''ble Supreme Court ruled that since there was no conclusive proof of taking possession of the acquired land from the land-losers, they could not be non-suited only on the ground that the Award had been passed or the land stood vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. All the 69 cases have been consequently remanded to this Court for fresh adjudication on merits. The relevant and operative part of the dictum in Prahlad Singh''s case [supra] reads as follows:-

20.

If the present case is examined in the light of the facts which have been brought on record and the principles laid down in the judgment in Banda Development Authority''s case, it is not possible to sustain the finding and conclusion recorded by the High Court that the acquired land had vested in the State Government because the actual and physical possession of the acquired land always remained with the appellants and no evidence has been produced by the respondents to show that possession was taken by preparing a panchnama in the presence of independent witnesses and their signatures were obtained on the panchnama.

21.

A reading of the Khasra Girdawari and Jamabandis, copies of which have been placed on record, shows that actual and physical possession of the acquired land is still with the appellants. Jamabandis relate to the year 2005-2006. Copies of notice dated 10/11.2.2011 issued by Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. relates to appellant No. 1-Prahlad Singh and this, prima facie, supports the appellants'' assertion that physical possession of the land is still with them.

[22]. Respondent Nos. 3 to 6 have not placed any document before this Court to show that actual possession of the acquired land was taken on the particular date. Therefore, the High Court was not right in recording a finding that the acquired land will be deemed to have vested in the State Government.

[23]. The judgments, which have been referred to in the impugned order really do not have any bearing on the case in hand because in all those cases, the Court had found that possession of the acquired land had been taken.

8.

It may be noticed at this stage that against the decision of this Court in Reshma Footwears'' case [supra], HUDA preferred SLP Nos. 3027-3048 of 2011 in which the Hon''ble Supreme Court vide order dated 01.04.2011 condoned the delay and has directed that the "status-quo regarding possession" be maintained.

9.

Equally pertinent is to make a reference to another bunch of writ petitions including CWP No. 11412 of 2004 [Lehri Singh & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.], decided by this Court on 25th August, 2011 wherein also this very acquisition was under challenge. This Court vide order dated 25.08.2011 allowed the writ petitions relying upon its earlier decision in Reshma Footwears'' case [supra], as is evident from the following observations made in Lehri Singh''s case:-

It is an admitted fact that a large number of writ petitions were pending when the awards were passed and qua a huge tract of land stay orders were in existence as in the present case. Not only as above, the acquisition of land vide the impugned notifications came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Reshma Footwears (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana and others, CWP No. 2308 of 2004 decided on 21.06.2010. In that case also acquisition was challenged on the grounds similar to the one which have been agitated before us in this writ petition. Division Bench of this Court by taking note of the grave discrimination done with the land owners and also noting a fact that the construction raised by some was kept out of acquisition and qua the others acquisition was ordered, it was observed as under...

10.

State of Haryana preferred SLP [C] No. 11864 of 2012 against the decision of this Court in Lehri Singh''s case [supra] but the said SLP was dismissed by the Hon''ble Supreme Court vide a self-speaking order dated 29.08.2012, approving all the reasons which found favour with this Court for quashing the subject acquisition in Reshma Footwears'' case [supra] as may be seen from the following observations:-

Learned counsel for the petitioners could not show as to why the respondents were discriminated in the matter of release of the acquired land. Thus, the ratio of the judgment in AIR 1983 185 (SC) is squarely applicable in the instant case.

Although, the High Court has not made the issue of noncompliance of the provisions of National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985 as the ground for quashing the acquisition proceedings, we are satisfied that in the absence of any exemption granted by the Competent Authority, the petitioners were bound to comply with the provisions of that Act and their failure to do so has the effect of vitiating the acquisition proceedings.

11.

We are informed that HUDA has preferred a separate SLP in Lehri Singh''s case in which some interim relief has been granted and the matter is still pending before the Hon''ble Supreme Court. As noticed earlier, HUDA''s SLP in Reshma Footwears'' case is also pending.

12.

These cases have admittedly arisen out of the same acquisition which has been quashed by this Court firstly in Reshma Footwears'' and again in Lehri Singh''s cases [supra]. So far as this Court is concerned, the matter has attained finality. It is undeniable that the claim of the petitioners in no way is distinguishable from that of Reshma Footwears'' and Lehri Singh''s cases [supra]. No such attempt as to draw any distinction has been made by the respondents. The reasons assigned by this Court in both the cited decisions are neither peculiar nor with reference to individual cases only. Those are rather based upon general principles, i.e., discrimination, violation of mandatory provisions of law by the respondents while carrying out the subject acquisition etc. and are, thus, mutatis-mutandis applicable to the instant cases as well. In this view of the matter, we see no reason to keep these writ petitions pending before this Court, especially when in Lehri Singh''s case [supra], the Hon''ble Supreme Court has already dismissed the SLP by passing a reasoned order.

13.

We are, however, equally conscious of the fact that the SLP in the lead case of Reshma Footwears [supra] and the one filed by HUDA in Lehri Singh''s case [supra] are still pending.

14.

Keeping this fact in view and as agreed to by learned counsel for the petitioners, we allow these writ petitions in terms of the decisions of this Court in the pending SLPs in Reshma Footwears'' and Lehri Singh''s cases [supra], subject to the condition that the decision by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Reshma Footwears'' case or Lehri Singh''s case [supra] shall be equally applicable to the petitioners and they shall abide by the same even if no separate SLP is filed by the State of Haryana or HUDA in their cases.

15.

For the reasons afore-stated, these writ petitions are allowed; the impugned notifications as well as the award qua the acquisition of the petitioners'' land are hereby quashed, subject to the condition that they shall abide by the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Reshma Footwears'' case and Lehri Singh''s case [supra] irrespective of the fact that no SLP is filed by the State of Haryana or HUDA in these cases. The petitioners, however, shall not change the nature of the subject land nor shall alienate the same in any manner till the above mentioned SLPs are decided.

16.

Disposed of.