Girdhari Singh @APPELLANT@Hash State of Rajasthan & Ors.

S.No.,Section,Rigorous/Simple Imprisonment,"FineÂ

(Rs.)","In default of payment of fine to further

underg

1.,326 or 326/34,Three years’ RI,"2,000/-",Six months’ additional imprisonment

2.,325 IPC,Two years’ RI,"1,000/-",Three months’ additional mprisonment

3.,323 IPC,Six months’ SI Â,- --,- --

4.,341 IPC,Three months’ SIÂ,-  ---,-  ---

I feel inclined to exercise powers under sub-sec.(6) of Section 320 Cr.P.C. for allowing the complainant to compound offence under Sections 326 or,,,,

326/34 IPC. At this stage, it is also relevant that Sections 326 or 326/34 IPC are not compoundable within the four corners of Section 320 Cr.P.C.",,,,

This sort of situation has prompted the Court to rely upon the factum of compromise between rival parties. Apart from that, a very vital fact that",,,,

incident is more than 16 years old in the instant case, I feel inclined to invoke inherent powers in the backdrop of peculiar facts and circumstances ex-",,,,

debito justitiae, i.e., to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the Courts exist.",,,,

 My view is also fortified by a decision of Supreme Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab [(2012) 10 SCC 303], wherein while examining the",,,,

relative scope of inherent power of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. vis-a-vis non-compoundable offences mentioned in Section 320 Cr.P.C., in",,,,

the wake of compromise arrived at between the parties, the Court observed:",,,,

The question is with regard to the inherent power of the High Court in quashing the criminal proceedings against an offender who has settled his",,,,

dispute with the victim of the crime but the crime in which he is allegedly involved is not compoundable under Section 320 of the Code.,,,,

Section 482 of the Code, as its very language suggests, saves the inherent power of the High Court which it has by virtue of it being a superior court",,,,

to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It begins with the words, ""nothing in this Code"" which means",,,,

that the provision is an overriding provision. These words leave no manner of doubt that none of the provisions of the Code limits or restricts the,,,,

inherent power. The guideline for exercise of such power is provided in Section 482 itself i.e. to prevent abuse of the process of any court or,,,,

otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As has been repeatedly stated that Section 482 confers no new powers on the High Court; it merely,,,,

safeguards existing inherent powers possessed by the High Court necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of,,,,

justice. It is equally well settled that the power is not to be resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of an,,,,

aggrieved party. It should be exercised very sparingly and it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision,,,,

of the Code.,,,,

In different situations, the inherent power may be exercised in different ways to achieve its ultimate objective. Formation of opinion by the High Court",,,,

before it exercises inherent power under Section 482 on either of the twin objectives, (i) to prevent abuse of the process of any court, or (ii) to secure",,,,

the ends of justice, is a sine qua non.",,,,

In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice or to prevent",,,,

continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is founded on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine qua res ipsa",,,,

esse non potest. The full import of which is whenever anything is authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required to be done by law, it is",,,,

found impossible to do that thing unless something else not authorised in express terms be also done, may also be done, then that something else will be",,,,

supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for which",,,,

it exists. The power possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and,,,,

circumspection.,,,,

It needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power by the High Court would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is,,,,

neither permissible nor proper for the court to provide a straitjacket formula regulating the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482. No precise,,,,

and inflexible guidelines can also be provided.,,,,

Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of,,,,

offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is",,,,

materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences,",,,,

power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the",,,,

other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the",,,,

material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or,,,,

dismissal of indictment.""",,,,

 The Court further dilated on certain offences, which are not private in nature and have serious impact on society and issued a word of caution not",,,,

to quash criminal proceedings, criminal complaints, or FIRs in such matters. While segregating heinous and serious offences of mental depravity,",,,,

murder, rape, dacoity etc., or under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act, or offences committed by public servants while working in",,,,

their capacity as public servants, the Court held:",,,,

Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled",,,,

although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in",,,,

the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding,,,,

factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the",,,,

wellbeing of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim,,,,

has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of",,,,

serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity uner IPC of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the",,,,

Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and",,,,

the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of",,,,

civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry,",,,,

etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably,",,,,

irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash",,,,

the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender",,,,

being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is",,,,

illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.""",,,,

 Upon examining the ratio decidendi of judgment in Gian Singh (supra), in my considered opinion, on the strength of compromise arrived at between",,,,

the parties, I feel persuaded to upset the order passed by learned trial Court as well as order of learned appellate Court affirming the conviction of",,,,

petitioners for offence under Section 326 or 326/34 IPC. This sort of situation has obviously entailed acquittal of both the petitioners for offence under,,,,

Section 326 or 326/34 IPC,,,,

 At this juncture, the Court cannot eschew some of the facts of great significance. Undeniably, in the instant matter, FIR was lodged by complainant",,,,

in the year 2001 to set the law enforcement agency into motion and the investigating agency after thorough investigation submitted charge-sheet,,,,

against the accused-petitioners. Later on, the learned trial Court took all the pains in completing trial with indictment of both the accusedpetitioners",,,,

for aforesaid offences. The appellate Court has also examined the matter de novo and, concurring with the findings and conclusions of learned trial",,,,

Court, affirmed the judgment of conviction.",,,,

 The settlement of dispute between rival parties having come to an offing during pendency of this revision petition, after a lapse of more than one",,,,

and a half decades, is obviously a cause of concern, which cannot be excused by expressing mere indignation for the conduct of rival parties.",,,,

Therefore, considering the gestation period of more than 16 years, passed during trial, appeal and revision before this Court, and indolence or",,,,

dormancy of rival parties in sorting out their dispute, it would be just and appropriate to saddle the accused-petitioners with some pecuniary cost in the",,,,

form of contribution to legal aid, which may be provided to accused persons having no sufficient means to engage a lawyer or pleader for defence.",,,,

 Considering the facts and circumstances of the instant case, petitioners are directed to contribute a sum of Rs.20,000/towards legal aid by",,,,

depositing a sum of Rs.10,000/- each with Rajasthan State Legal Services Authority within a period of fortnight from the date of receipt of this order.",,,,

 The upshot of above discussion is that instant revision petition is allowed and the impugned judgment affirming the conviction of petitioners for,,,,

offence under Sections 326 or 326/34 IPC is hereby quashed and set aside subject to their depositing the aforesaid amount with the Rajasthan State,,,,

Legal Services Authority. In case requisite amount is not deposited by the petitioners within the stipulated period, as ordered, the Rajasthan State",,,,

Legal Services Authority shall be at liberty to move this Court for appropriate orders.,,,,

The petitioners are on bail, and therefore, they need not to surrender.",,,,