Gochipathula Samudralu alias Sundara Rao vs State of Andhra Pradesh

Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J.—The short but oft-debated question which arises in this appeal is when an accused inflicts single injury resulting in the death of the victim, what offence does he commit ?

To appreciate this question, we shall refer to the relevant facts of this case. On 31-10-1990 the sole accused in Sessions Case No. 264 of 1989 on the file of the II Addl. Sessions Judge, Guntur, was convicted of offences under Ss. 447 and 302, I.P.C. and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months and imprisonment for life, respectively. He filed that appeal against his conviction and sentence.

In respect of land of an extent of Ac. 196 cents of Murukondapadu village, belonging to PW8, there was dispute between Karumanchi Venkateswarlu, the husband of PW8 (hereinafter referred to as "the deceased") who was looking after the said land, and the accused. On 12-2-1989 the accused is said to have gone to the said land where a heap of paddy was lying and threatened the watchman of the deceased that he would thrash the crop and should anybody interfere, he would thrash him as well. On 13-2-1989 at about 7-30 a.m., PWs 1 to 7 and the deceased went to the said land for thrashing the paddy. The accused went there and questioned the deceased as to why he was thrashing the paddy in his land. The deceased asked the accused to show documents that the land belonged to him. Then the accused is said to have climbed the heap of paddy where the deceased was standing and stabbed him in the abdomen. The deceased fell down on the ground. PW 1 took him to the hospital in a bullock-cart driven by PW 10 who is the servant of PW 9. On the outskirts of the village, they got a car and took the deceased to the Government Hospital, Bapatla, in the car. PW 15, a Civil Assistant Surgeon, examined the deceased between 9-00 and 10-00 a.m. and issued a wound certificate (Ex. P-12). He sent a requisition (Ex. P-10) to the 2nd Addl. Munsif-Magistrate, Bapatla, (PW 14) for recording dying declaration. PW 14 reached the hospital at 10-45 a.m. and recorded the dying declaration (Ex. P-11) at about 11.00 a.m. After he was admitted into the hospital, PW 21 (Head-constable, Out-post) received admission intimation and PW 19 (Head-constable, Vedullapalli Police Station) collected a copy of the dying declaration and registered a case, Crime No. 7 of 89, under S. 307, I.P.C. PW 15 sent the deceased to the Government General Hospital, Guntur, for expert treatment. PW23, Sub-Inspector of Police, took up the investigation on the instructions of the Superintendent of Police, Bapatla. He went to the scene of offence and prepared observation report Ex. P-7 in the presence of PW 12. He examined PWs 1 to 6 and PW11. On 14-2-1989 he went to the Government General Hospital, Guntur and examined PW7 and the deceased. On 17-2-1989, the fifth day after the occurrence, the deceased expired. On receiving the intimation of death. Vedullapalli police altered the crime to S. 302, I.P.C. Thereafter, PW 24, Circle Inspector of Police, Bapatla took up further investigation. He held inquest at the mortuary. Ex. P-13 is the inquest report. The dead body was sent for post-mortem examination. PW 20, Tutor, Forensic Department, conducted the post-mortem examination and issued the post-mortem certificate (Ex. P-18). The accused was arrested on 24-2-1989 by PW 24 who seized M.O. 9 from the possession of the accused. After completion of the investigation, he laid the charge sheet.

The plea of the accused was one of denial.

To prove its case, the prosecution examined PWs 1 to 24, of whom PWs 1 to 7 are eye-witnesses. Exs. P-1 to P-26 were marked for the prosecution. M.Os. 1 to 9 were produced before the Court, of which M.O. 9 is the knife said to have been used in the commission of the offence. No oral evidence was adduced by the accused. However, Ex. D 1 was marked in the statement of PW 12 recorded under S. 161, Cr.P.C. On a consideration of the evidence on record, the learned Sessions Judge found the accused guilty of offences under Ss. 447 and 302, I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months for the offence u/s 447, I.P.C. and imprisonment for life for the offence u/s 302, I.P.C.

The only question urged before us by Sri T. Bali Reddy, the learned counsel for the appellant, is that having regard to the facts of the case, the accused could not be found guilty of the offence under S. 302, I.P.C. as it is a case of a single injury. The learned counsel submits that there was an altercation between the accused and the deceased and then the accused stabbed the deceased with the knife and therefore no intention to cause the death of the deceased can be inferred and that the intention to cause that particular injury had not been proved by the prosecution; this is a case to which the principle of "hit and run" applies, so the conviction of the appellant can only be under S. 304 Part-II, I.P.C.

The learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, contends that the accused had lost in the civil litigation in respect of the said land as his suit was dismissed on 20th September, 1988 and, therefore, he had no connection whatsoever with the field in dispute. In spite of that, on 12-2-1989, a day prior to the commission of the offence, he went to the field and threatened the watchman (PW 11), in respect of which a complaint was given to the police and he was bound over. After that, he had no business to go to the field in question. But on 13-2-1989 the accused went to the field and stabbed the deceased on the abdomen. All this, submits the learned Public Prosecutor, establishes the intention of the accused to cause death of the deceased which is a pre-meditated act and the intention is evident from the manner the accused had behaved.

On these contentions and having regard to the facts of the case, we have to consider the question as to what offence is committed by the accused who by single stab injury caused the death of the accused. Before adverting to the material evidence, it would be appropriate to refer to the decisions relied upon by Sri Balli Reddy.

Virsa Singh Vs. The State of Punjab, . In that case, there was only one injury on the body of the deceased and the trial Court and the High Court recorded the finding that the appellant caused that injury. That injury was caused as a result of spear-thrush. The doctor who conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased opined that the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The Supreme Court laid down the following principle (para 12) :-

"The prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under S. 300 ''thirdly'';

First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present;

Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations;

Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended;

Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and;

Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type, just described, made up of the three elements set out above, is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.

Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout), the offence is murder under S. 300 ''thirdly''. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death, or that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature ........ or even that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the enquiry is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death."

On the facts of that case the Supreme Court observed that where no evidence or explanation was given about why the accused thrust a spear into the abdomen of the deceased with such force that it penetrated the bowels and three coils of the intestines came out of the wound and that digested food oozed out from cuts in three places, it would be perverse to conclude that he did not intend to inflict the injury that he did. It has also been observed that if the totality of the circumstances justify an inference that the prisoner only intended a superficial scratch and that by accident his victim stumbled and fell on the sword or spear that was used, then of course, the offence is not murder. But that is not because the prisoner did not intend the injury that he intended to inflict to be as serious as it turned out to be, but because he did not intend to inflict the injury in question at all.

In Gudar Dusadh Vs. State of Bihar, , the accused gave a lathi blow on the head of the deceased. The attack was pre-meditated, not accidental. The injury inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and actually resulted in the death of the victim. It was held that the accused was guilty of murder. In that case the Supreme Court observed that it was the intention of the accused to cause the precise injury found on the head of the deceased. It would be clear from that fact that the accused aimed a blow on the head with a lathi and the mere fact that the accused gave one blow on the head would not mitigate the offence of the accused so as to make him guilty of the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

The same question fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in Kulwant Rai Vs. State of Punjab, . In that case, only one blow was given with a dagger which landed in an epigastrium area. The deceased succumbed to the injury. The accused was convicted of the offence under S. 302, IPC. The Supreme Court observed that there was no pre-meditation but it was something like hit and run and in such a case part 3 of S. 300, IPC would not be attracted because it could not be said that the accused intended to inflict that particular injury which was ultimately found to have been inflicted. It held that in the circumstances, it would appear that the accused inflicted an injury which he knew to be likely to cause death and the case would accordingly fall u/S. 304 Part II, IPC.

In Tholan Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, the accused started remonstrating against the organisers of a chit fund in filthy language, who had no connection with the deceased. The incident happened in front of the house of the deceased. The deceased came out of the house and asked the accused to go away. The accused then, at the spur of moment, gave only one blow with a knife to the deceased and pushed him to some distance. On those facts, it was held that though requisite intention of murder could not be attributed to the accused, he wielded a weapon like knife and, therefore, he could be attributed with knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death, and therefore, he could not be convicted under S. 302, IPC but would be guilty of committing an offence under S. 304 Part II, IPC.

In G. Yadagiri v. State, (1989) 1 APLJ (Short Notes) 62 a Division Bench of our High Court, of which one of us (Syed Shah Mohd. Quadri, J.) was a member, held that in a situation where there was an altercation between the deceased and the appellant, in the course of which the appellant had drawn out a knife from his pocket and inflicted a single blow and ran away thereafter, there was no premeditation and the accused could not have intended to cause the death of the deceased particularly when the attack was not on the vital part of the body but that he must be attributed with the knowledge that the stab injury would in all probability lead to the death of the person on whom the injury is inflicted and the conviction of the accused was altered from S. 302, IPC to S. 304 Part II, IPC.

In Hem Raj v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1980 SC 2252 : (1990 Cri LJ 2665) the accused inflicted a stab injury on the chest of the deceased. It was found that the occurrence happened on the spur of the moment and in the heat of passion upon a certain quarrel and that there was no premaditated intention to cause death or cause a fatal injury and that intention to cause fatal injury could not be imputed against the accused. On these facts, it was held that the offence was punishable u/S. 304, Part-II, I.P.C. but not u/S. 302, I.P.C.

In State of Gujarat v. Haribhai Keshavbhai Patel, 1990 SCC (Cri) 606, the plea of the accused who was convicted u/S. 302, IPC that there was a single stab injury and therefore, the conviction could not be sustained u/S. 302, IPC. and that it should be altered to one u/S. 304, Part II, IPC found favour by the High Court of Gujarat. On appeal the Supreme Court held that as the accused returned to the place of occurrence with a knife in his hand and then inflicted a fatal injury on the abdomen of the deceased, which was certified by the doctor to be an injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the learned Sessions Judge was justified in awarding conviction to the accused u/S. 302, IPC and that alteration of the offence from S. 302, IPC to S. 304 Part I, IPC by the High Court, was not justified.

From the above discussion, the following principles emerge :

(1) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case.

(2) Where the prosecution proves that the accused has the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under ''Thirdly'' of S. 300, IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.

(3) In determining the question whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one u/S. 304, Part II, I.P.C.

In the instant case the accused did not have any claim in law to the field or the crop thereon, his suit having been dismissed on 20th September, 1988. He visited the land in question on 12-2-1989, a day prior to the date of the occurrence and threatened the watchman (P.W. 11) that he would thrash the crop as well as those who would interfere. This fact is spoken to by P.W. 11 and is corroborated by the complaint given by the deceased (Ex. P-14). On that, he was bound over and he executed a bond (Ex. P-15). This is established by the statement of P.W. 19, the Head Constable. Not only that no cross-examination was directed on these aspects, but the accused also, in his statement u/S. 313, Cr.P.C. admitted having executed the bond. Further, the fact that the accused came with a knife to the field of the deceased and inflicted a stab injury on his abdomen, clearly shows that the accused had the intention to cause the death of the deceased. The doctor (P.W. 14) who conducted autopsy on the dead body opined that the death was due to the said injury. In this case, there is ample evidence to show that the accused intended to cause death of the deceased so the mere fact that the accused was content with inflicting only one injury would not mitigate against the offence being u/S. 302, IPC. None of the exceptions to S. 300, IPC applies. On these facts it cannot be said that as the accused inflicted a single injury so he cannot be found guilty of the offence u/S. 302, IPC and that conviction has to be altered to one u/S. 304, Part II, IPC. In this view of the matter, we are in agreement with the reasoning and finding of the learned Sessions Judge that the accused is guilty of the offence u/S. 302, IPC. Accordingly his convictions and sentences are confirmed and the appeal is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.