Gokul Krishna Banerji and Another vs Secy. of State

Macpherson, J.—Appeal No. 31 is preferred by Gokul Krishna Banerjee from the decision in case No. 180 and Appeal No. 32 by Sasadhar Mukherjee from the decision in case No. 184. These two cases and seven others arose out of references to the Court under the Land Acquisition Act in connexion with the acquisition for the Indian Copper Corporation, Ltd., of an area of 453 59 acres situated in Mauza Maubhandar about a mile from Ghatsila and about 22 miles from Jamshedpur in the Dhalbhum Estate. Four appeals were preferred of which two (under Section 30) have been separately dealt with. Separate paper-hooks have been prepared and the proceedings have somewhat unfortunately been printed in one of the less important appeals.

The references in cases Nos. 180 and 184 were u/s 18 of the Act, substantially in regard to the amount of compensation. Banerji has been awarded Rs. 5,429-4-3 in respect of 98 78 acres of land including compensation for trees standing thereon. He disputed the measurement and classification of the lands as well as the rates allowed for the different classes of lands. There was also a claim for enhanced valuation of trees and in respect of two tanks. He claimed in all Rs. 21,535-11-10 including 15 per cent u/s 23(2) of the Act. He has long been the Dewan of the Midnapore Zamindary Co. Ltd., lessee from 1905 to 1930 of the Dhalbhum estate, and he claimed as a raiyat under the company. A portion of his tenancy of 340 Dhalbhum bighas was acquired leaving him about 100 bighas--A Dhalbhum bigha equals 418 acre.

In case No. 184 Mukherji also claimed as a tenant under the company. He contended that the sum of Rs. 1,915-15-2 awarded to him in respect of 16 82 acres of land was unfair and claimed Rupees 12,104-9-9.

The Secretary of State pleaded the provisions of Section 25(2), Land Acquisition Act, in bar; but the plea was not sustained. On the question of amount of compensation, the objectors did not at the trial dispute the measurements; Banerji disputed the classification of six plots but unsuccessfully, and the real contest ranged round the reasonableness of the rates allowed for each class of land.

For the purposes of these appeals agricultural lands in Dhalbhum fall into bahal or low rice land, bad or terraced slope, and gora or cultivated upland, the first two classes being also awal or doem, first class and second class, and sometimes soem third class; bastu is house-site land and udbastu is the land outside the bastu, well fenced and manured as distinguished from gora.

The Court found that there were no materials in respect of previous private sales of any portion of the land or indeed in the village and that nothing could be inferred from the prices at which similar lands in the vicinity had been sold. The area is governed by the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act which broadly prevents sales of raiyati holdings. By a notification of June 1924 it was made permissible for a raiyat to sell to a man of his own tribe or caste in certain very limited circumstances.

Only one case of this nature is adduced prior to the date of the notification u/s 4, which was published on 13th May 1925, an area of 1 bigha 8 kathas 4 dhurs was sold for Rs. 76 in Pargana Dhalbhum and the appellants do not rely on that. On behalf of Mukherjee two land acquisition awards were adduced as basis for calculation: one in respect of waste land adjoining Ghatsila Middle English School and situated in close vicinity to the town, and the other in Bhelaipahari in respect of which the Judge remarked:

Neither of these two cases can serve as an index to the value to be assesssed upon similar lands in Maubhandar;

and indeed the second followed the award made-in the decision of Mr. (now Mr. Justice) Scroope in 1920 in the "Greater extension of Jainshedpur" acquisition of 1918. They have not been cited in this Court on behalf of the appellant. On the other hand, it was proved that awards at a far lower rate were made in respect of the acquisition for Mushabani Ghatsila Road and the Ghatsila Charitable Dispensary. The appellants concentrated upon the method of allowing a certain number of years'' purchase of the annual profits of the land, making allowance for situation. They attached little importance to the oral evidence adduced by them to show the capacity of each class of land and took their stand upon the judgment of Scroope, J., aforesaid. The Collector valued the lands-under reference on the basis of that judgment deducting an allowance of about one-sixth (not one-fifth as stated by the Court) for difference of situation. The following table elucidates matters. The relative value of classes of land is based, on the Settlement Report.

___________________________________________________________________________________ Classes of Relative Allowed by Equivalent Per acre Claim by Allowed by land. value of Mr. Scroope per acre allowed by Banerji the Land land per bigha (Jamshedpur) Collector (and by Acquisition (Jamshedpur) in this case Mukherji Court. in appeal) Bahal awal 16 100 287 240 358 300 Bahal Doem 12 75 215 180 262 225 Bad awal 8 50 143 120 191 150 Bad Doem 6 33 107 80 143 100 Gora 1 7 16 17 47 21 1/4 ___________________________________________________________________________________ 8. Mukherji claimed much higher rates originally. The method adopted by Mr. Scroope and followed by the Judge was to take the produce of awal bahal land at 24 maunds per acre as shown in the Settlement Report and the other classes of lands in proportion to the soil rates assessed at the time of fair rent settlement of the pargana in 1907. (The bahal land was about one-thirtieth of the acreage acquired and in Banerji''s case was 74 and 1 64 acres of first and second class bahal respectively). Mr. Scroope took 24 maunds per acre to be 81/2 maunds per bigha or about 41/4 maunds net deducting half as cuitivation expenses. Allowing a selling price of Rs. 2-4-0 per maund the annual profit worked out to Rs. 9-8-0 and after deducting Re. 1 as rent he held the annual net profits per bigha to be Rs. 8-8-0. Allowing 15 years'' purchase he assessed Rs. 120 as the value per bigha of first class bahal. In the present case the Judge found an error in Mr. Scroope''s calculation since 24 maunds of produce per acre would be 10''232 maunds per Dhalbhum bigha and not 8''47 as worked up by Mr. Scroope.

The appellants further claimed that cost of cultivation should be one-third and the number of years'' purchase should be 20; but the Judge refused to give effect to the claim and further held that Rs. 2-4-0 was the correct selling rate per maund. He estimated the annual net profits at Rs. 10 per Dhalbhum bigha on the basis of 5 maunds, worth about Rs. 11-4-0, under deduction of Re. 1 for rent, and allowed fifteen years'' purchase. That would give a rate of Rs. 150 per bigha at Jamshedpur instead of Rs. 120 allowed by Mr. Scroope. He went on:

It is impossible to estimate the value with accuracy, and all we can do is to attempt a fair degree of approximation. There ought to be some difference between the value of lands near Jamshedpur and those near Ghatsila. I think an all round increase of 25 per cent over the rates, allowed by the Land Acquisition Deputy Collector would very fairly compensate the objectors.

With regard to trees, he set out that no argument had been put forward and he considered the claim in respect of the value of tanks to be groundless.

With the increase of 25 per cent on Rs. 3,833-1-7 the value of the land, and the additional compensation there was a decree in favour of Banerji for Rs. 6,530; but in view of his claim being extravagant he was directed to pay Rs. 250 as part of the Collector''s cost. The valuation of his appeal appears to show that he contests the decree so far as it is adverse to his original claim.

Sasadhar Mukherji''s compensation was increased to Rs. 2 379-8-9 including trees, and in view of the extravagance of his claims he was directed to pay Rs. 200 as Collector''s costs. Sasadhar Mukherji values his appeal at Rs. 1,654-6-6 only, apparently including the costs of the Court below.

The Government Pleader has strenuously pressed the plea u/s 25(2) and has specially relied upon the decision in Narain Dat v. Superintendent of Dehra Dun AIR 1914 All. 445. It is convenient however to deal first with the question of valuation.

On behalf of Banerji Mr. S.M. Mullick does not assail the measurements and but lightly challenged the classification of six plots, contends that the value of straw ought to be added ''in and refers to the valuation of mahua trees and to the tanks. His main objection however is that the rate of awal bahal should be Rs. 150 per Dhalbhum bigha or Rs. 358 per acre instead of Rs. 300 as allowed by the Court below with proportionate increase of valuation in the other classes of land, and to obtain this result he challenges the in gredients of the calculation of value in respect of number of years purchase, cost of cultivation, selling rate, non-allowance of straw and omission of fractions. (His Lordship then considered the objections as to classification of land, trees and alleged tanks which were lightly pressed, and proceeded:) Mr. Mullick therefore would follow the method evolved by Mr. Scroope with the correction made by the Land Acquisition Judge, but with the following modifications: that the cost of cultivation should be one-third instead of half, that the multiplier should be 20 years, the selling price Rs. 3, the price of straw should be added and the fractions be considered. For the Secretary of State each individual point is contested and it is also urged that the actual valuation already evolved by this method is not only adequate but excessive. Mr. Scroope''s rate (with allowance for difference of valuation) has been allowed in subsequent land acquisition cases near Maubhandar, the only relevant private rate will not help appellants, while the purchase by Banerji at rent-sale for Rs. 16 of Binode Tanti''s holding, the area of which is 16 bighas including 2 bighas 17 kathas gora, and the purchase by Mukherji of Hara dhan''s holding of 37 bighas for Rs. 81, definitely indicate that very low values indeed obtain locally even if the latter holding were adjudged to be gora only.

As to the cost of cultivation and number of years purchase, it is urged that in most of the important decisions the figure of one-third has been taken and the number of years purchase at twenty. But many of the instances relate to pre-war times and to conditions in Bihar or Bengal and nothing is more unwise or indeed indefen sible than to apply the analogy of these regions to conditions in Chota Nagpur. Mr. Scroope points out:

One has to make allowances for the good and bad years, so 20 years'' purchase of the annual value of a normal crop would be too high; besides, the present rate of interest hardly justifies it. I therefore take 15 years as the multiplier.

He pointed out that cost of cultivation is usually reckoned as half of the produce" and the Land Acquisition Judge states that

it is common knowledge that cultivation expenses are usually taken at half the gross produce.

He also sets out

that though the number of years purchase taken in reported eases is often twenty that would hardly afford us any ground for determining the value of Dhalbhum lands.

Having occupied the same position as these two Judges both before and after the war (in 1924-25) and having knowledge of Singbhum from 1906 to 1925, I am in a position to endorse their views. Furthermore, it is clear "that the cost of labour in the neighbourhood has gone up enormously and that interest was in 1925 about 6 per cent in Government securities. In short the estimate of cultivation expenses at half the gross produce over a period of years is by no means even high and the oral evidence to the contrary cannot be accepted. My own view is that in the area in question 15 years'' purchase errs if at all on the side of excess having regard to conditions of tenancy, the limited right of sale which affected the value to the raiyat, lack of demand and several other adverse considerations, and cannot bear enhancement in this or similar cases. In any event appellants have entirely failed to displace the view of the Court below on these points.

The selling price allowed is Rs. 2-4-0 per maund and Rs. 3 is claimed. So also (witness 6 though more exaggerated estimates are given by other witnesses) Mr. Scroope took the figure from the Bihar and Orissa Gazette for Ranchi at the date of acquisition in August 1918 and Ranchi was then the provincial headquarters where prices are notoriously over high. A selling price of Rs. 48-0 per maund for rice is an extravagant suggestion in respect of a jungle village like Maubhan dar in 1925. It is one thing to sell retail in half-seers at this rate and a vastly different matter to sell large quantities wholesale in an out of the way jungle village. And general prices were falling. There is clearly no reason for disturbing the valuation made by the learned Judge in this regard which is high.

As regards the claim to the inclusion of straw in the valuation, this is an entirely new point based upon a stray statement of a single witness in his evidence that each maund of paddy represents straw worth five annas. It was not mentioned in the Court below and it is not even set out in the grounds of appeal. Now though in arriving at the annual value to the raiyat straw would undoubtedly be an element to be taken into account like any other product what has always been done and rightly in a case of this kind is to take a broad view of the position. Absolute accuracy is not attainable. But in fact the grain and straw are taken together and represented by the figure Rupees 2-4-0 per maund. (The statement that the straw appertaining to a maund of paddy is worth five annas is in any event an egregious over-estimate.) The learned Judge arrived at what he considered very fair compensation" by an all-round increase of 25 per cent which brought the rates per Dhalbhum bigha up to the very high rate of Rs. 125-6-0.

Then as to calculation: it is suggested that not Rs. 10 but Rs. 10,232 should be taken into account and that Re. 1-4-0 should not have been struck off against a rent estimated at Re. 1. As to the rent, the sum of Rs. 1-4-0 would in 1925 be by no means excessive or even adequate for first class bahal as is clear from the fact that the relative rate for gora would then be only one and a quarter annas. The actual deduction is obviously quite inadequate. In taking broad views the plus and the minus generally cancel out. The Court below desired an approximate on which is all that is attainable and was right in striking off the decimal. But in any event in allowing 125 per cent on 8 1/4 maunds, the Court actually allowed 10 5/16 or more than 10.232 maunds. In my judgment the appellants have completely failed to dislodge the award and to show that the decision in appeal is wrong and in fact the compensation so far from being inadequate would appear rather to err and even considerably on the side of excess.

Sasadhar Mukherjee did not go into the witness-box and in his appeal no separate argument was addressed to the Court on his behalf.

It remains to be added that the oral evidence on behalf of the appellants is not at all reliable, being of the "eyewash" and exaggerated type so familiar in references where the amount of compensation is contested. In the trial Court no reliance was placed by the objector on portions of it and nowhere does it impress. As there is no ground for interfering with the award even on the merits, the appeals fail.

23.It behoves one to say something of the plea which has been argued, that SMoney Hai To Honey Hai 25(2) of the Act is a bar to further enhancement of the award in appeal. No cross-appeal has been preferred by the Secretary of State, but reliance is placed upon the decision in Narain Dat v. Superintendent of Dehra Dun (1) for the proposition that the respondent is entitled in appeal to resist further enhancement of the award on the ground that the statute prohibits any enhancement including that already allowed by the Court. The decision certainly supports the proposition. But Mr. Mullick urges that it is wrong and cites Sri Banga v. Srinivasa (2) which is apparently accepted by Mulla in his commentary on Order 41, Rule 22 (1), Civil P.C. But the Allahabad decision is in point and even if the Madras decisions were not otherwise distingusihable, there is serious doubt whether the expression "support the decree" which is used in the rule merely means "support the decision" an expression which might equally readily have been used by the legislature and does not also permit the respondent to show by reference to a ground decided against him in the Court below that the appellant has at least secured by the decree in controversy as much as he is, if not more than he is, entitled to. I do not think that it is correct to describe the plea as a challenge to the decree rather than support of it. It seems to me that Order 41, Rule 22 permits the respondent to avail himself of every plea which he took in the Court below. The Government Pleader admits that some of the papers relating to the plea have not been printed, but the plea is clearly open to him on the basis that he accepts the description and view of them set out by the Court below, and he claims that even on that basis his plea is bound to succeed.

Section 25(2) lays down that when the applicant has refused to make any claim to compensation pursuant to any notice given u/s 9 or has omitted without sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded by the Court shall in no case exceed the amount awarded by the Collector. The first answer to ''this plea in bar was that such a claim to compensation had actually been made; but that has been negatived and the decision has not been contested in appeal. Sub-section (2) therefore applies unless the omission to make the claim was with sufficient reason. The Government Pleader contends that the Judge erroneously allowed that the objector had omitted with sufficient reason to make his claim u/s 9. The question is whether the Judge was in error.

The scheme for the acquisition of land in Maubhandar originally notified in 1923 was for some reason abandoned. The preliminary notification u/s 4 under which the acquisition took place was published on 13th May 1925 and demarcation u/s 8 was made. The declaration u/s 6 made on 11th November described the area which it was proposed to acquire in that village as bounded on the north by the Bengal-Nagpur Railway; on the east by the nala Hatijabara Khal, on the south by the river Subarnarekha; and on the west by a straight line drawn at right angles at a point where the boundary line between the villages Maubhandar and Kitadih crosses the railway line to meet the river Subarnarekha. As usual. it was stated that a plan of the land might be inspected at the office of the Deputy Commissioner of Singbhum. A general notice u/s 9(1) was issued on 4th December 1925 and was served on 6th of that month, a few signatures on the back of it being however dated 8th December. It called upon persons interested to appear before the land acquisition officer at Purulia on 22nd December and to state their claims to compensation and objections to measurements made u/s 8.

It however did not set out the boundaries in the space provided for them. Sub-section (2) requires that the notice shall state the particulars of the land needed and shall require all persons interested in the land to appear personally or by agent before the Collector at a time and place therein mentioned, (such time not being earlier than 15 days after the date of publication of the notice), and to state the nature of their respective interests in the land and the amount and particulars of their claims to compensation for such interests, and their objections (if any) to the measurements made u/s 8. On 21st December Banerjee appeared and preferred an objection as to classification and measurement. Under Sub-section (3) the Collector shall serve notice to the same effect on the occupier (if any) of the land and on all such persons known or believed to be interested therein or to be entitled to act for persons so interested, residing within the district. In the special notice issued on 14th June June 1926 addressed to Banerjee in Case No. 180 the date which was 12th July was left blank and the place which was Ghatsila was incorrectly stated as Purulia.

Some of the plots were to be partially acquired, but only the pots and not the portions were indicated in the notice. Plot 667 was apparently a mistake perhaps for plot 467 there being no plot 667. Admittedly Banerji guessed from the other notices served upon him what the correct time and place of appearance was and in point of fact he entered appearance through one Gaur Chandra Sen, his agent. Gaur produced certain papers of Banerjee and others which the land acquisition officer inspected and apparently also produced the papers of Mukherji. The land acquisition officer stoutly denied that any amount was named before him and it is found that the agent filed no written claim to compensation and also made no verbal statement as to the value of Banerji''s interests or the amount and particulars of Banerji''s claim to compensation for such interests and in short failed to comply with the general and special notice. On the following day Banerji saw the land acquisition officer and signed the order sheet but made no claim. I accept the view of the Court below that no claim as required by the notice u/s 9 was made by the ob jectors.

It is clear that there was no defect in the special notice to Mukherjee and that up to this date he certainly had not sufficient reason for omitting to disclose his claim.

On 12th July the land acquisition officer looked into the papers produced before him and visited the area proposed to be acquired. His testimony is that he made inquiry u/s 11 at Ghatsila, that it was not a fact that he gave time to Gaur Babu or Gokul Babu (Banerji) to put in their claim by 11th August which was on the contrary fixed as the date for making the award. Then he stated:

I went to the spot five or seven times. I went also on 12th July and verified the important classifications of land, existence of houses, tanks and trees standing on the acquired area....I assessed the rates for different classes of lands on the basis of Mr. Scroope''s judgment in connexion with the acquisition for the ''Greater extension of Jamshedpur.'' I did so under instructions from the Deputy Commissioner...The tenants were called and their khatians were compared with my khatians. The note was written by my clerk at my dictation at the dak bungalow. The order sheet was also written there at my dictation. ''Held inquiry u/s 11, Limitation Act,'' was written after the order was written out. After it was read out I found the omission and it was written then and there.

Again he deposed:

As there was no claim I did not inquire into the question of valuation... It was no part of my inquiry to ask about valuation as there was no claim in regard to it.

Again he states that subject to consultation with the Deputy Commissioner under the rules (because the award was expected to exceed Rs. 10,000) and subject to the deposit of the money by the company into the treasury, he adjourned the case in the words, "To 11th August," at the end of his order of 12th July to 11th August as the date for making the award. There cannot be the slightest hesitation in accepting his evidence and in particular that the words, "Held inquiry u/s 11, Limitation Act" were inserted in the order-sheet at the time and on the occasion which he describes. On 14th July he wrote to the requisitioning company inquiring if any portion of the land was urgently required and received the reply that the company did not desire possession in the course of the year whereupon he adjourned the case sine die and directed that, the parties concerned including the objectors be informed. On 29th March 1927 the Deputy Commissioner directed him to complete the valuation and he did so and placed the draft award before the Deputy Commissioner at Chaibassa on 8th April and made the award at Ghatsila on the following day.

The learned Judge held that "sufficient cause" was constituted by the facts set out above, that the appellants had not omitted without sufficient reason to make the claim for compensation set out in Section 9(2) and that therefore they did not fall within the purview of Section 25(2) so as to be debarred from securing a favourable order on a reference to the Court. He held (A) that in the case of Banerjee the pre-requisite for applying the provision did not exist, namely, proper notice because: (1) no date was given and the place was incorrectly given in the special notice in case 180; (2) the portions to be acquired from certain plots were not indicated and plot 667 which had no existence was inserted; (3) the general notice was not self contained because it did not specify the boundaries and moreover it was not served within 15 clear days; and (4) that there was no inquiry u/s 11 as to classification or measurement contested by Banerjee in his petition of 21st December: and (B) that in both cases there was no inquiry u/s 11 as to valuation, the inquiry being incomplete

in that it was not directed towards finding out the valuation so as to enable him to make an award as required by Section 11.

He held that it was the duty of the land acquisition officer to try to find out in the presence of the appellants what the value of the land was likely to be and that as he put off the cases from 12th July without specifying the object of the adjournment and as u/s 13 the inquiry u/s 11 could be adjourned and as from the fact that

there was no inquiry as to valuation and other matters, the objectors might (sic) have been under a reasonable impression that the inquiry u/s 11 was adjourned till 11th August,

before which date the case was postponed sine die and subsequent proceedings took place behind their back, there was here also sufficient reason u/s 25(3) for the omission on the part of each of the appellants to make his claim in pursuance of the notice u/s 9. The Government Pleader contends that the real point has been lost sight of by the learned Judge and certainly the attention of the learned Judge does not appear to have been directed to the two decisions: Ezara v. Secy. of Stale [1903] 30 Cal. 36.

As to (A) the point is not merely whether the notice given u/s 9, pursuant to which Banerjee was bound to make a claim, was in all respects full and legal, but whether the defects in it constituted sufficient reason for omitting to make a claim. None of the items in (A) can be said to constitute such reason nor can all of them together.

It is at once obvious in respect of the general notice that it was not insufficient in law merely because it did not give Banerjee fifteen clear days'' notice of the date fixed. The statute sets out only that the date must not be earlier than fifteen days after the service of the notice. The notice was served on the 8th and the date was the 23rd or exactly 15 days after the service was acknowledged. That was a compliance with the statute. The Judge erroneously took the expression to be fifteen clear days" in which case it would be necessary to exclude both terminal days.

Again the failure to give the boundaries in that notice was immaterial in view of the notification, declaration, demarcation and the fact that the measurements were not contested on 12th July and were not contested on the reference. The particulars" given adequately complied with the statute and the absence of boundaries manifestly occasioned no prejudice. Then as to the petition of 21st December there was in fact an inquiry as to classification, and the reason why there was none as to measurement was that the objection had by 12th July evaporated.

As to the special notice to Banerji on which stress is mainly laid, it is true that it was defective as to date and place, but admittedly he put in appearance at the time and place meant, and all idea of prejudice is an afterthought. The usual steps were taken and it is obvious that the true reason why a claim was not made then was as usual that the recipients of compensation were lying low on the of chance of getting a really high award in their favour. In my opinion they refrained deliberately from naming a figure and did not omit to put in a claim owing to any defect in the notice or anything else connectel with the notice. As the lands had long been demarcated it made no difference that when only a portion of a survey plot was to be acquired the area of the portion (itself a numbered land acquisition plot) was not mentioned. The evidence shows that the appellants knew what land was being taken. And as has been said there was no contest as to measurements. With the demarcation it could make no difference that the Bihari Amin writes badly Bengali figures, the first of which can be read as "6" when Banerjee must have seen by elimination that it was a slip for the only remaining plot, the second and third figures of whose number were "67." And in fact it made no difference. The preliminary notification also contained a sufficient description.

Theoretically the western boundary might be adjudged vague, but the demarcation could leave no room for doubt on the mind of anybody viewing the land and in fact there was no doubt in the objector''s mind. The point is not whether there were mistakes but whether they constituted sufficient reason for omission to make a claim. In my opinion they, could not constitute any reason and in fact they were not the reasons why Banerji did not make a claim.

As to (B) the statement in the petition of reference may first be quoted:

That when a notice under Sub-section (3), Section 9, was served on your petitioner he appeared before your honour and was granted time and your petitioner intended to file written detailed objections as to the amount of compensation on the adjourned date, but on the adjourned date your petitioner was informed by a notice that the matter was adjourned sine die, and accordingly no detailed written objection as to the valuation, etc., could be filed on behalf of the petitioner.

But it is clearly established that the appellant was not granted time, and that neither he nor anyone else asked for time. Further it cannot be believed that he intended to file written detailed objection on the adjourned date" as to the amount of compensation. It is not even alleged that the objection was ready to. be filed after as he states he received on the adjourned date a notice that the matter was adjourned sine die. All these statements are simply falsehoods to keep the matter outside Section 25(2). Further the Court below only thought that the failure of the land acquisition officer to make an inquiry as to valuation on 12th July might have led the appellants to think that he had adjourned his inquiry without a finding. "Might have led them to think," is of course not a sufficient finding. The view is in any event without any justification and in fact the obvious truth is that nothing either did or could lead them so to think. The learned Judge appears to consider that the proceeding u/s 11 is a judicial proceeding. On the decisions cited above that is not so. I hold that the proceedings of the land acquisition officer on 12th July were in circumstances a full compliance with the provisions of Section 11. Obviously there was no necessity for further inquiry with regard to the measurement which has never been seriously contested. Though classification was not objected to the land acquisition officer actually made an adequate inquiry. As to valuation, the Collector is not limited to evidence taken before the opposite party or disclosed at the inquiry. It was obvious to all parties at that time that in the circumstances of the case the only evidence available related to previous awards in land acquisition cases. The view cannot be supported that he was bound "to try to find out in the presence of the appellants what the value of the lands would be likely to be"

in order to:

apprise them as to the amounts they were roughly to get as compensation.

They were called upon to put in their claim in order to help him to come to a decision, and when they failed to assist him in this way he was certainly not bound to make any further inquiry in their presence. It is incredible either that the case was postponed to 11th August for any other purpose than for the award, that is to say, the land acquisition officer considered opinion as to the price he should offer the owners of the land under acquisition, or that anyone was under any such impression. Indeed two days after the hearing the land acquisition officer inquired from the company whether immediate possession was desired. That fact alone would show that he then considered himself to be in a position to deliver possession at once if it was wanted by the requisitioning company. In any case even if the inquiry was postponed, it does not follow that the date for filing the claim was extended. The appellants would not be entitled to postpone their claim because of a postponement or continuance of the inquiry. As already mentioned neither was an adjournment asked for, nor is there any indication that the question of putting in a definite claim ever engaged the attention of the appellants. (B) does not either suffice or help to save the appellants from the bar u/s 25(2). Thus there can be no doubt at all that Mukherji has omitted without sufficient reason to make his claim.

I am also of opinion that in spite of the defect in the special notice Banerji is in the same position.

The plea of the Government Pleader u/s 26(2) is therefore sound, and if the appeal had not already failed on the merits, it would have failed under that provision.

I would dismiss these appeals with costs.

Fazl Ali, J.

I agree that these appeals should be dismissed with costs. Both the land acquisition officer and the District Judge have adopted Mr. Scroope''s method of valuing the lands and the award of the land acquisition officer has been modified by the District Judge merely because it was found that Mr. Scroope had made a slight error in converting the yield per acre into the yield per local bigha. The learned advocate appearing for the appellant in the Court below did not object to Mr. Scroope''s method being employed in this case nor was there any serious objection raised in this Court on that score. Once therefore it is found that the main principle on which the lands have been valued is correct, it is neither usual nor proper for this Court to lightly disturb the conclusion arrived at by the Courts which must be assumed to be familiar with the local conditions, merely because more than one view is possible as to what are mere details. For instance, there has been much argument before us as to whether one-third or half of the produce should be taken to represent the cost of cultivation and whether the net annual proceeds should be multiplied by 15 or 20 in order to get the capital value of the land.

The learned District Judge as well as the land acquisition officer have held that half the produce should be deducted as representing the cost of cultivation and that fifteen times the annual proceeds should be taken as the value of the land. My learned brother who has himself very large experience of the conditions of Chota Nagpur has dealt with the matter very fully and has shown that the District Judge''s valuation should not he disturbed and I fully agree with his view in this matter.

As the appeals fail on the merits I reserve my opinion on the second important question which was urged before us, namely, whether u/s 25, Clause (2), the appellants are debarred from questioning the sufficiency of the award. I wish to express no final opinion, because on the one hand I fully realize the force of what my learned brother has said on this point in his judgment and on the other hand it appears to me that at least in the case of Gokul Krishna Banerjee there is a good deal to be said in favour of the view that Section 25, Clause (2) will not be a bar to his claiming a higher amount than what has been awarded to him. The notice that was served upon him u/s 9, Land Acquisition Act, was defective in certain very material particulars and we cannot also overlook the petition filed by him on 21st December 1925 in which he seems to suggest that he was not fully aware of what land were being acquired. It is however unnecessary for me to pursue the matter because, as I have already said, the appeal fails on the merits.