Gopal Sadh vs State Of Rajsthan And Ors

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the issue raised in the present writ petition is squarely covered by the judgment in the case of Lokesh Meena v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. : SBCWP No.18212/2018, decided on 20.02.2019.

In the impugned order dated 11.12.2018 (Annex.8), the determination made by the respondents reads as under :-

"3. बिन्दु संख्या 2 में उल्लेखित आपराधिक प्रकरण के अनुसार अभ्यर्थी को धारा -323 325 341 34 आईपीसी में माननीय न्यायालय निर्णय 28.01.2018 को माननीय न्यायालय ने साक्ष्य के अभाव में दोषमुक्त किया गया है। अभ्यर्थी के विरूद्ध तुच्छ दर्ज ;ज्तपअपंस पद दंजनतमद्ध की श्रेणी में नहीं है, अपितु गम्भीर धाराओं में न्यायिक कार्यवाही की गई है। इसलिये अभ्यर्थी नियमानुसार नियुक्ति के पात्र नहीं है।"

In the case of Lokesh Kumar (supra), it was laid down by this Court as under :-

"A perusal of Circular dated 28.02.2017 reveals that the respondents have indicated the categories, in which, the candidates would be eligible for appointment, which includes acquittal by the Court on according benefit of doubt and acquittal based on compromise between the parties.

In view thereof, as in both the cases the petitioner has been given benefit of doubt/acquitted based on compromise, the case of the petitioner would be covered by the said Circular.

So far as the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Avtar Singh (supra) are concerned, the relevant portion of the directions, read as under:-

"(c) If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee."

(emphasis supplied)

A perusal of the above direction would reveal that Hon'ble Court directed that if acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving mortal turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal or benefit of doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee.

A perusal of the order impugned i.e. 29.11.2018, whereby, the candidature of the petitioner has been rejected, the respondents have observed as under:-

"2- आपके विरूद्ध चालान संख्या 16/2015 धारा 147,149,341,323,427 भादस में न्यायालय निर्णय दिनांक 02.07.18 द्वारा धारा 147 भादस में संदेह का लाभ देकर दोषमुक्त किया गया एवं 341,323,427,149 भादस में राजीनामा के आधार पर दोषमुक्त किया गया।

3- बिन्दु संख्या 2 में उल्लेखित प्रकरण में आपको न्यायालय निर्णय दिनांक 02.07.2018 द्वारा धारा 147 भादस में संदेह का लाभ देकर दोषमुक्त किया गया एवं 341,323,427,149 भादस में राजीनामा के आधार पर दोषमुक्त किया गया है। जो ससम्मान बरी नहीं है। अतः आप नियमानुसार नियुक्ति के पात्र नहीं है।"

(emphasis supplied)

As noticed hereinbefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that even in a case where acquittal is not clean or benefit of doubt has been given, the employer is required to consider all relevant facts available as to the antecedents and take an appropriate decision. However, in the order passed by the respondents the same has been passed mechanically by merely indicating that the acquittal is not clean neither the antecedents nor the relevant facts with regard to acquittal of the petitioner have been considered by the respondents and, therefore, the order dated 29.11.2018 (Annexure-10) passed by the respondents cannot be sustained.

In view of the above discussion, as the petitioner is entitled as per the Circular dated 28.03.2017 (Annexure-9) of the respondents, based on the acquittals and the order Annexure-10 does not fulfill the requirement of directions given in the case of Avtar Singh (supra), the order dated 29.11.2018 (Annexure-10) and the action of the respondents in denying the appointment to the petitioner cannot be sustained."

Learned counsel for the respondents is not in a position to dispute that the issue raised in the present writ petition is similar to that of Lokesh Meena (supra).

In view of the above fact situation, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is allowed. The order dated 11.12.2018 (Annex.8) is quashed and set-aside. The respondents are directed to accord appointment to the petitioner pursuant to his selection. The petitioner would be entitled to notional benefits from the date appointment has been accorded to the candidates lower in merit to the petitioner. However, actual monetary benefits would be paid to the petitioner from the date of appointment.

Needful be done within a period of four weeks.