Gotthimang Rongmei And Others vs State Of Manipur And Others

Kh. Nobin Singh, J

[1] Heard Shri P. Tomcha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners; Shri Julius Riamei, learned counsel appearing for the private respondent and Shri Niranjan Sanasam, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State respondents.

[2] By the instant writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ to set-aside the registration of the "cancellation of gift deed" registered vide registration No. 242 of 2001 dated 17-2-2001 of the Sub-Registrar (H.Q.), Imphal, Manipur.

[3.1] Facts and circumstances as narrated in the writ petition, are that the petitioner No.1 was the owner and possessor of the land known as „Joulang‟ or „Doudong‟ of Ramphanbutlong Hill situated within the village boundary of Kahulong Village. In the year 1987, the petitioner No.1 executed a registered gift deed being registration No. 5836 dated 17.10.1987 of the Sub-Registrar (HQ), Imphal in favour of the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 gifting a portion of the said land, described in the schedule of the gift deed, measuring 2.5 kilometer (East to West) and 2 kilometer (North to South). After the said gift deed being executed, the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 have been residing inside the said portion of the land.

[3.2] In the year 2013 when the land was being acquired for widening the Tamenglong- Khongsang Road, it was discovered that a so-called deed under the name and style "Cancellation of Gift Deed" was found to have been registered vide registration No. 242 of 2001 dated 16.2.2001 in the office of the Sub-Registrar (HQ), Imphal cancelling the earlier gift deed which was purportedly executed by the petitioner No.1. The said cancellation gift deed was not executed by them and the same is forged and fabricated document.

[3.3] By the notification dated 13.09.1962 issued by the Chief Secretary, Manipur Administration, the Sub-Registrar, Imphal was amalgamated with the 0ffice of the Registrar for the entire territory of Manipur and it was allowed to exercise and perform the duties of the registrar. In exercise of the power conferred upon it, the documents including gift deed for landed properties located inside Tamenglong District, were allowed to be executed and registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, respondent No. 2 herein and therefore, the gift deed was lawfully executed and registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, respondent No. 2.

[3.4] In the year 1988, the Commissioner (Revenue), Government of Manipur, in exercise of his powers conferred by Section 3, 5 and 6 of the Registration Act, 1908 and in supersession of all previous orders, issued an order dated 18.02.1988 which was to take effect from 1.3.1988, by which the office of respondent No. 2 has no power and jurisdiction to register any document in respect of landed properties located inside Tamenglong District including the deed of cancellation. Therefore, the registration of cancellation gift deed as has been done in the year 2001 in the office of the respondent No. 2, is without jurisdiction and is accordingly null and void.

[3.5] The petitioners discovered the existence of the said cancellation gift deed in the early part of 2013 when the Tamenglong-Khongsang Road was being widened by acquiring the land. Being aggrieved by the registration of the cancellation gift deed, the instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioners on the inter-alia grounds that the cancellation gift deed by the Sub-Registrar, respondent No.2 is arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction, and that it has caused a great prejudice to the right and ownership of the present petitioners and previes over the land gifted under the said gift deed.

[4] No counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State Government. However, an affidavit-in-opposition has been filed by the private respondent wherein an objection as regards the maintainability of the writ petition has been raised and in addition thereto, it has been stated that the petitioners approached this court by suppressing material facts. According to the private respondent, the land in question belongs to him and Shri Hujandiyang of Kahulong Village as per deed of exchange dated 28-01-2001 by which the land of the private respondent located at Ramgaijang village and the share of the land belonging to the petitioner No.1 were exchanged and they are enjoining their respective lands. The Village Pei and elders of Kahulong Villade are witness to the said deed of exchange. In this regard, the claim of the petitioners was rejected vide communication dated 25-08-2014 of the Sub Divisional Officer addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Tamenglong which remains unchallenged. After the claim of the petitioners being rejected towards payment of compensation, the portion of the land was acquired for widening of Tamenglong- Khangsang Road. The stand of the petitioners that the respondent has no jurisdiction to register land or other documents of Tamenglong District after 01-03-1998 is incorrect for the reason that the petitioners got a gift deed executed on 16-03-2013 and registered in book No.1, Vol. No.3 of page 2013 at page No.562 to 564 being 909 for the year 2013 dated 20-03-2013 before the respondent No.2.

[5] On perusal of the pleadings of the parties, it is seen that there is no much dispute as regards the execution of gift deed. The case of the petitioners is that they have not executed the cancellation gift deed and they were not aware of it and came to know about it only in the year, 2013 and that the respondent No.2 has no jurisdiction to register it. On the other hand, the case of the private respondent is that the gift deed had been cancelled and in the same year, 2001, there was an exchange of land between the petitioners and the private respondent. In support of their contentions, incidentally, the counsels appearing for the parties have relied the same decision rendered by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Satya Pal Anand Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & ors., 2016) 10 SCC 767. Before adverting the rival contentions and in order to appreciate them, this court deems it appropriate to peruse the decision, the facts thereof, in brief, are that a plot was allotted to the appellant‟s mother by a Housing Society vide a registered deed dated 22-03-1962. Since the appellant‟s mother having expired on 12-06-1988, the Society executed unilaterally a deed of extinguishment on 09-08-2001 cancelling the allotment and the Society executed and got a registered deed dated 21-04-2004 in favour of respondent No.5. The appellant objected to the transaction but on a compromise deed executed between the Society and respondent No.5 on the one hand and the appellant on the other hand, the appellant received the consideration. Notwithstanding the compromise deed, the appellant filed a dispute under Section 64 of the Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 before the Deputy Registrar challenging the Society‟s action by registering extinguishment and allotment deed. Since the appellant resorted to multiple proceedings, the respondents demanded refund of the consideration amount. Without paying any heed to the demand, the appellant filed an application, praying for cancellation of the extinguishment deed and subsequent deeds, which was rejected by the Sub-Registrar and the appeal preferred before the Inspector General also failed. The appellant approached the High Court by way of a writ petition questioning the orders passed by the Sub-Registrar and the Inspector General. The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that since the appellant had already resorted to a remedy before the appropriate forum, it was not feasible to invoke the writ jurisdiction.

The appeal before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court came up before a Division Bench of two Judges and because of the differences of opinion between them, the appeal was referred to a Division Bench of three Judges. Six issues were farmed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court for consideration and the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while dismissing the appeal, held:

"25. It is a well-established position that the remedy of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is extraordinary and discretionary. In exercise of writ jurisdiction, the High Court cannot be oblivious to the conduct of the party invoking the remedy. The fact that the party may have several remedies for the same cause of action, he must elect his remedy and cannot be permitted to indulge in multiplicity of actions. The exercise of discretion to issue a writ is a matter of granting equitable relief. It is a remedy in equity. In the present case, the High Court declined to interfere at the instance of the appellant having noticed the above clinching facts. No fault can be found with the approach of the High Court in refusing to exercise its writ jurisdiction because of the conduct of the appellant in pursuing multiple proceedings for the same relief and also because the appellant had an alternative and efficacious statutory remedy to which he has already resorted to. This view of the High Court has found favour with Dipak Misra, J. We respectfully agree with that view.

As the writ petition is liable to be dismissed with liberty to the appellant to pursue other statutory remedy already invoked by him, examining any other contention at his instance would be awarding premium to a litigant who does not deserve such indulgence. The fact whether the compromise deed entered into by the appellant was voluntary and at his own volition or under duress, is essentially a question of fact. That cannot be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction. Depending on the answer thereto, the other issues may become relevant and would arise for consideration. The only relief that can be granted and which has already been clarified by the High Court in the impugned judgment, is to keep all questions open to enable the appellant to pursue the statutory remedy already invoked by him. It is open to the appellant to contend in those proceedings that the extinguishment deed could not have been unilaterally executed by the Society. That plea can be examined by the statutory forum provided for that purpose.

The role of the Sub-Registrar (Registration) stands discharged, once the document is registered (see Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan). Section 17 of the 1908 Act deals with documents which require compulsory registration. Extinguishment deed is one such document referred to in Section 127(1)(b). Section 18 of the same Act deals with documents, registration whereof is optional. Section 20 of the Act deals with documents containing interlineations, blanks, erasures or alterations. Section 21 provides for description of property and maps or plans and Section 22 deals with the description of houses and land by reference to government maps and surveys. There is no express provision in the 1908 Act which empowers the Registrar to recall such registration. The fact whether the document was properly presented for registration cannot be reopened by the Registrar after its registration. The power to cancel the registration is a substantive matter. In absence of any express provision in that behalf, it is not open to assume that the Sub-Registrar (Registration) would be competent to cancel the registration of the documents in question. Similarly, the power of the Inspector General is limited to do superintendence of Registration Offices and make rules in that behalf. Even the Inspector General has no power to cancel the registration of any document which has already been registered.

Section 35 of the Act does not confer a quasi-judicial power on the Registering Authority. The Registering Officer is expected to reassure that the document to be registered is accompanied by supporting documents. He is not expected to evaluate the title ore irregularity in the document as such. The examination to be done by him is incidental, to ascertain that there is no violation of provisions of the 1908 Act. In Park View Enterprises it has been observed that the function of the Registering Officer is purely administrative and not quasi-judicial. He cannot decide as to whether a document presented for registration is executed by person having title, as mentioned in the instrument. We agree with that exposition."

[5] The facts of the said case are not identical with that of the present case but the observation made therein that the question of fact as to whether the compromise deed entered into by the appellant was voluntary and at his own volition or under duress, cannot be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction, is relevant and applicable. In the present case, there are mainly two issues involved herein- one, whether the petitioners have executed the cancellation gift deed and two, whether the respondent No.2 has any jurisdiction to register the said cancellation gift deed. These two issues are inter-linked and the decision on the second issue will depend upon the decision to be given by this court on the first issue. As regards the first issue, it has been submitted by Shri Julius Riamei, the learned counsel appearing for the private respondent that it cannot be decided by this court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution for the reason that there is a disputed question of fact and it is for the civil court to decide it. The contention of Shri Julius Riamei appears to have some force and the first issue can be decided only on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties. In the event of the cancellation of gift deed being found to have not been executed by the petitioners, it will be void ab-initio and therefore, the question as regards the validity of registration whether at Tamenglong or at Imphal, will not arise at all. So far as the second issue is concerned, it has been submitted by Shri P. Tomcha, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that after the order dated 18-02-1988 being issued by the State Government, no document in respect of land situated at Tamenglong District can be registered by the respondent No.2 at Imphal. His contention appears to be correct to that extent but it is nowhere stated in the order dated 18-02-1988 that after the same being issued by the State Government, the registration of documents of lands situated at Tamenglong by the respondent No.2 is impermissible and that if it is done so, it will be rendered illegal. Moreover, it has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the private respondent that since the petitioners have got a gift deed executed on 16-03-2013 by respondent No.2 in book No.1, Vol. No.3 of page 2013 at page No.562 to 564 being 909 for the year 2013 dated 20-03-2013, they cannot be permitted to contend that the respondent No.2 has no jurisdiction to register documents relating to lands situated at Tamenglong. If that be so, the petitioners cannot take contradictory stances. Moreover, without the first issue as to whether the petitioners have executed the cancellation gift deed being decided, there is no point of deciding the second issue. Therefore, this court is of the view that the writ petition is not maintainable and is accordingly liable to be dismissed on that count.

[6] In view of the above and for the reasons stated hereinabove, the instant writ petition being not maintainable, is dismissed with no order as to costs. However, it is open to the petitioners to approach the appropriate forum for redressal of their grievances in accordance with law.