Gottuparthi Lakshminarayana Sarma vs G. Narasamma and others

Hon''ble Mr. Gopal Rao Ekbote, Chief Justice

This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of our learned brother M. Krishna Rao, J. given in Appeal No. 300 of 1968 on 24-3-1971 whereby the learned Judge allowed the appeal and remanded the case for further trial. The facts lie in a narrow compass, as the question of law itself lies, and are not at all in dispute;

One Narasimha Rao died on 6-4-1954 leaving behind him agricultural lands. The appellant claimed himself to be his adopted son. The 1st respondent is his wife, 2nd and 3rd respondents being his brothers. The 4th and 5th respondents are aliences of some of the items.

The 1st respondent-plaintiff filed the suit for partition of A and B schedule properties claiming the property under the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act.

The defence set up amongst other things by the appellant-defendant was that in as much as Narasimha Rao died before the Hyderabad Hindu Women''s Rights to Property (Extension to Agricultural Land) Act XXXII of 1954 (hereinafter called the 1954 Act) came into force in the former State of Hyderabad, the plaintiff cannot claim by way of inheritance anything in the agricultural lands left by Narasimha Rao.

The trial Court accepted the plea of defence by holding that as the 1954 Act is not retrospective, it came into force only on 22-10-1954 and as Narasimha Rao died on 6-4-1954, the plaintiff cannot inherit the agricultural land left by him. In that view of the matter, the trial Court did not consider it necessary to deal with the other issues. As a result, the suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed.

Aggrieved by that decision, the respondents came in appeal. Our learned brother allowed the appeal on two grounds. He firstly held that the Hyderabad (Application of Central Acts) Act No. XLVIII of 1952 (hereinafter called 1952 Act) extending the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act, 1937 to the Hyderabad State covers agricultural lands also. And since that Act had come into force on 7-2-1953 long before Narasimha Rao died, the plaintiff is entitled to indent the agricultural lands left by Narasimha Rao. The learned Judge secondly found that in any case since the 1954 Act is retrospective in its character, the plaintiff''s suit ought not to have been dismissed. It is this view that is now assared in this appeal.

The contention of Sri K. Jagannadha Rao, the learned counsel for the appellant, is, that when the 1952 Act extended the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act, 1937, subject to the modifications mentioned in the schedule and when section 5 of the 1937 Act was not modified, then the Legislature must be deemed to have extended the Act with words "all property" to the State of Hyderabad covering thereby the property excluding agricultural lard as was the case with the 1937 Act as interpreted by the Federal Court. It is only to cover the agricultural lands that the Act of 1954 was passed. He therefore contented that we should hold that the 1952 Act applied to all non-agricultural property and it is only the 1954 Act which brought within its fold she agricultural lands also. And since the 1954 Act is prospective in its nature, the plaintiff cannot inherit agricultural lands left by Narasimha Rao. We are unable to accede to this line of reasoning.

In the Parhament had extended the Hindu Women''s Rights to property Act, 1937 to the State of Hyderabad, then the words "all property" appearing in Section 5 of the Act may also have meant the entire property left by the deceased. The Parliament, however, was not competent to apply its laws to agricultural lands that being a State subject. In the context of the Central Act, then the words "all property" were interpreted to mean only non-agricultural property.

It must, however, be remembered that it is the State Legislature which has adopted the 1937 Act with modifications which were, in view of the competence of State Legislature, thought necessary. It is true that the term "all property" appearing in section 5 of the 1937 Act have not been modified by the State Legislature. In fact it was not necessary for them to modify that term. In the context of the State''s competence to legislate, it would mean all property including agricultural lands.

Therefore merely because no modification was made in Section 5 of the 1937 Act, it does not mean that the State Act as was brought into force with modifications does not cover agricultural land.

More over, the method of legislation adopted by the 1952 Act leaves no room for any such argument. What section 3 does is to extend and to bring in force in the State of Hyderabad the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act, 1937 with modifications as are mentioned in the Annexure. Annexure C is the relevant Annexure. As stated earlier, the whole of 1937 Act is put in Annexure C with some modifications. The effect of this kind of legislation is that the State Legislature must be deemed to have enacted for itself the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act. Once that position relating to the legislation is kept in view, it would not be difficult to understand the words appearing in Section 5. The words used are ''all property'' which must be given their natural and ordinary meaning. The sense must be that which the words used ordinarily bore at the time when the Statute was passed it is difficult to construe these words to mean property excluding agricultural lands. All property must necessarily mean every kind of property including the agricultural lands. When the State Legislature was competent to enact in regard to agricultural land, the words used in Section 5 must be given full effect. They are words of wide amplitude and no reason exists to narrow them down. The intention of the Legislature also is clear. They enacted in 1952 the State Act adopting and applying the 1937 Act with modifications as were made to all kinds of property left by the deceased and in regard to which he has not made a testamentary disposition.

It is true that in 1954, an Act to extend the 1952 Act, to agricultural land was passed by the Legislature. It is also true that section 2 of the said Act says that the term "property" in the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act 1937, as in force in the State of Hyderabad, shall include agricultural land. Arguments were addressed which sought to establish the interpretation of the 1952 Act by deduction drawn from the language of the later 1954 Act or from the presence in them or absence from them, of some particular provision. The question, therefore, is whether this Act narrows down the effect of the 1952 Act. In other words, can it be validly contended that because of the 1954 Act, the interpretation of Section 5 of the adopted Act should be confined only to non-agricultural property left by the deceased? We do not think the 1954 Act has that effect.

It is not strictly permissible to interpret a Statute by reference to what has been done in a subsequent Statute. A subsequent Act cannot, generally speaking, afford any useful guide to the meaning of an earlier Act. In construing a provision of an earlier Act, the provisions of a later Act cannot be taken into account except in a limited class of cases. The law therefore does not, in all cases, reject such aids to interpretation. Of course, where the later Act amends the earlier Act or purports to declare its meaning, the later Act operates directly by its own force. But where the provisions of the later Act could only operate indirectly as an aid to the construction of words in the earlier Act, those provisions can only be used for that purpose, if certain conditions apply to the earlier Act when it is considered by itself.

It is clearly established that subsequent legislation on the same subject may be looked into in order to see what is the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous. But if the subsequent legislation proceeded upon an erroneous construction of previous legislation, it cannot alter the previous legislation. It is only when there is any ambiguity in the earlier legislation that the subsequent legislation may fix the proper interpretation which is to be put upon the earlier legislation. What follows therefore is that the conditions under which a later Act may be resorted to for the interpretation of an earlier Act are strict. Both must be laws on the same subject, and the part of the earlier Act which it is sought to construe must be "fairly and equally open to diverse meanings". There is, however, a clear distinction between legislature exhibiting an erroneous opinion as to the scope and effect of the existing law and its enacting that the law shall be altered or changed.

It is a well-known principle that the function of the Legislature is ordinarily not to construe but enact. Their opinion, not expressed in the form of a declaratory or interpretative Act, it is plain, would not be binding on courts whose duty it is to expound the meaning of the Statute the legislature has enacted. We can with benefit quote what Craies on Statute, Law, sixth edition, at page 14 says-

Parliament has power to declare by Statute the common law or the meaning of any prior Statute, and may declare wrong or repeal any judicial legislation effected by interpretation or misinterpretation of Statutes, and may make the declaratory or repealing enactment retrospective. But subject to this power, the interpretation of Statutes is within the special province and under the exclusive control of the Judicature, a control exercised only in the course of a legal proceeding and generally only upon examination of the terms of the Statute itself.

What is plain from the above said extract is that although Parliament or the Legislature has the power to declare by Statute the common law of the meaning of any prior statute, it has no power to interpret the earlier Statutes passed by it except by way of declaratory or interpretative enactment. Wherever there is any declaratory enactment or an enactment giving specific meanings to the terms employed in the Act, they would, of course, be binding on the Courts. But in all other cases, the final authority to construe an Act vests only in the Judiciary and none else.

If we view the 1954 Act in the background of this principle, it would be plain that the 1954 Act is neither a declaratory Act nor an interpretative Act. That Act does not repeal partly or wholly the 1952 Act. On the other hand it says that Act shall cover the agricultural lands also, a thing which was already provided by the 1952 Act. Even if we understand the subsequent Act to have proceeded on construing that the 1952 Act did not in terms apply to agricultural lands, even then in the absence of a declaratory or interpretative enactment, the extension of the 1952 Act to agricultural lands or such an erroneous construction cannot be said to be proper. The erroneous legislative interpretation of the 1952 Act on the basis of which the 1954 Act seems to have been enacted is not at all binding upon us. It is plain that reference to earlier statute will be of little value if the legislature has proceeded upon a mistaken view of the scope of the existing state of the law. The rule is that the legislature does not alter the law merely by betraying an erroneous opinion of it. Subsequent ; legislation, if it proceeded upon an erroneous construction of previous ; legislation, cannot alter the scope and effect of the previous enactment. One must not, however, confuse an express enactment by parliament that the existing law shall be altered, with an expression of opinion as to what that law is or means.

We are therefore free to construe the words "all property" employed in section 5 of the adopted Act of 1952. As stated earlier, we have no manner of doubt that the words are plain and admit of no other meaning except that it applies to all kinds of property including agricultural lands left by the deceased within the meaning of the Act We have therefore no hesitation in reaching the conclusion that since the 1952 Act itself has covered the agricultural land, It was quite unnecessary for the Legislature to enact the I 1954 Act. We think it is a piece of unnecessary and superfluous legislation. It is mere surplusage, and unfortunately such surplusage is not uncommon in Acts of Legislatures. Surplusage and even tautology is often noticed in the language of enactments. It neither abridges the scope or extent of the 1952 Act nor in any manner alters it. The 1954 Act is enacted on an erroneous construction of the 1952 Act. The scope and extent of the words "all property" in section 5 have been mistakenly interpreted and understood. If the width of the language and the competence of the State Legislature had been properly appreciated, the 1954 Act would not have been enacted. The 1952 Act, in so far as the agricultural land is concerned, remains what it was. In these circumstances, we must hold that the 1952 Act, which came into force on 7-2-1953, applied to agricultural lands. Narasimha Rao, as stated earlier, died on 6-4-1954, after the 1952 Act came into force which applied to agricultural land. The plaintiff therefore is entitled to inherit the property of Narasimha Rao and she cannot be denied her rights.

In the view which we have taken above, we consider it unnecessary to deal with the other question, that is to say whether the 1954 Act has retrospective effect. We should not, however, be taken to have agreed with the view expressed by the learned Judge. Since no other contention was urged and as we agree with the learned Judge in conclusion for the reasons which we have given above, the appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs.