Government Kerala vs Kumaran Nair

T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, J.—Defendants are the Appellants. They are the Government of Kerala and the Tahsildar, Kunnathunad Taluk. The suit was one filed by the Respondent for injunction restraining the Appellants from proceeding against the plaint schedule properties under the Revenue Recovery Act for recovery of certain dues to the Government. An amount of Rs. 7,700 had been granted to the Respondent under the Travancore-Cochin State Aid to Industries Act. As security for repayment of the said amount, the Respondent executed the mortgage Ext. B-1 on 13th February 1957 over his lands situate in Kunnathunadu and Mazhuvanoor villages. It was provided in Ext. B-1 that if the amount due could not be recovered from the mortgaged properties, Government may proceed against the Respondent personally as also against other properties of his.

The mortgaged properties were in the possession of tenants who had fixity of tenure under the Land Reforms Act, with the result they became unavailable for being proceeded against for recovery of the dues under the mortgage. The Respondent having defaulted in repayment of the amount due, the Appellants initiated, proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act for realisation of the dues. They attached certain other properties belonging to him whereupon he filed the instant suit for the relief mentioned earlier. If was the Respondent''s contention that his personal liability had become barred by the lapse of three years from the date of the mortgage and therefore, the Appellants were not entitled to proceed against his other properties. This plea found acceptance with the lower appellate Court, who decreed the suit, in reversal of the Munsiff who had dismissed it for want of notice u/s 80 Code of Civil Procedure, It is this decree that is challenged in the second appeal.

The reason stated by the lower appellate Court to decree the suit is that the Respondent''s personal liability had become barred on the expiry of three years from the date of Ext. B-1. The Court went further and held that even the mortgage had become time barred after the expiry of twelve years from its date, by the time the recovery proceedings were initiated in 1977. Either way, the lower appellate Court held that the recovery of the amount due to the Appellants had become barred by time, and therefore the proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act were liable to be restrained.

I am afraid this view of the lower appellate Court is unsupportable in law and is liable to be set aside. The law laid down by this Court in Nanu v. State of Kerala 1987 KLT 921 is that the machinery of the Revenue Recovery Act cannot be invoked to recover debts the recovery of which has become barred under the Limitation Act. In other words, the Act could be resorted to only for recovery of those amounts for the recovery of which a suit will be in time under the law of limitation. The question therefore is whether the recovery of the amount due under Ext. B-1 had become barred under the ordinary law of limitation in 1977, when the proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act were initiated. The lower appellate Court assumed that the personal liability expired at the end of three years and even the mortgage liability ceased at the end of twelve years, and therefore whether it be the enforcement of the personal liability or of the mortgage liability, the proceedings had become barred by the time the recovery proceedings were initiated in the year 1977.

I am afraid, the lower appellate Court has committed a gross error in holding so. He has overlooked the special period of limitation prescribed for suits by Government, under Article 112 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, namely thirty years from the date on which the period of limitation would begin to run against a like suit by a private person. This article overrides all the other articles in the Limitation Act so far as suits by Government are concerned. This is the only article to be applied for suits by Government, whatever be its nature, whether it be a simple suit for realisation of money personally or under a mortgage, for recovery of possession of property or any other. All categories of suits instituted by Government of whatever description and for whatever relief are in time if they are instituted within a period of thirty years from the date on which the period of limitation begins to run. Thus it was held in Roop Kishore Seth v. State of U.P. 1978 ALJ 280 that promissory note debts due to a private person in September, 1958 which devolved on the State h escheat on 16th January, 1960 could be enforced by Government within thirty years and therefore the suits filed in 1963 were in time.

Similarly it has been held that the period o possession necessary to prescribe title adversely to Government is not twelve years (as in the case of private persons) but sixty previously under the Limitation Act of 1908, and thirty under the present Limitation Act, because of the special period of limitation for suits by Government See Krishna Sastri and Others Vs. Singaravelu Mudaliar and Others, Ambu Nair v. Secretary of State AIR 1924 P.C. 150.

The rationale behind the prescription of such a long and differential period of time for suits by Government was explained by the Supreme Court in Nav Rattanmal and Others Vs. The State of Rajasthan, In the case of Government, if a claim becomes barred by limitation the loss falls on the public on the community in general, to the benefit of a private individual who derives advantage by the lapse of time. It has also to be mentioned that in the case of Governmental machinery things do not move as quickly as in the case of private individuals. For these and other reasons, it was necessary for the legislature to provide a longer period of limitation for institution of suits by Government so that public interest may not suffer.

Precisely the same approach informed the decisions of the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, and G. Ramegowda, Major and Ors Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, In the latter case the Supreme Court had occasion to refer to cases where public interest was likely to suffer on account of the acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of the officers or agents of Government.

I have referred to these aspects only because paramount public interest is involved in Article 112. It was unfortunate that the lower appellate Court overlooked the Article while dealing with the appeal and held the personal liability-nay, even the debt-to be time barred.

It is therefore clear that the recovery of the debt had not become barred when the proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act were initiated in 1977 within a period of thirty years from the date of Ext. B-1. The decision of the lower appellate Court is contrary to law and unsustainable.

No other points were argued before me.

The judgment and the decree of the lower appellate Court are therefore set aside and those of the trial Court restored. The Respondent shall pay the costs to the Appellants in this Court and in the lower appellate Court.