Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others vs Battarusetti Chenna Kesavarao and Others

G. Bikshapathy, J.—Feeling aggrieved by the common orders of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition Nos.2054/95 and Batch dated 25-3-1995, the Government has come up with this Batch of Writ Appeals.

The Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders in the Districts of Andhra Pradesh filed Writ Petitions challenging the orders passed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh terminating their services before the expiry of their term. It is their case that they were appointed by the respective District Collectors on the basis of panels forwarded by the respective District Judges. There are no statutory rules prescribing the method and manner of appointment of Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders. Therefore, the Government issued executive instructions in G.O. Ms. No. 57 Law Department, dated 16-3-1990 stipulating the procedure to be followed while making appointment to the post of Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders in the Districts. Thus they were appointed in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Government. The principal grievance of the Government Counsel is that once they were appointed for a particular tenure, their services cannot be terminated before the completion of the tenure by invoking the provision of the one month notice. The orders passed by the Government terminating their services arbitrary and colourful exercise of power. In the general elections held in the year 1994 there was a change in the Ruling party and therefore only idea of changing all the Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders in the Districts was to accommodate their own persons. The wholesale termination of the services was mala fide and the same was sought to be set aside. The contention of the Government was that under the guidelines issued they are entitled to terminate the services by giving one month notice and therefore such termination was not justiciable. Thus, it was sought to be argued that the action of the Government is beyond the pale of judicial review by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The learned Single Judge by detailed order allowed the Writ Petitions. Aggrieved by the said orders, the State has filed the present Writ Appeals.

It is contended by the learned Additional Advocate General Sri Chalameshwar that the order of the Government is quite legal and valid and the learned Single Judge erred in allowing the writ petitions. It is his contention that it is open for the Government to terminate the services by giving one month notice and the said action was up-held by the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. U.P. State law Officers Association AIR 1994 SC 1655. He also submits that the action of terminating the services of a Government Pleader by resorting to one month notice cannot be said to be arbitrary and the said provision was held to be valid by this Court in Vilas Rao v. State of A.P. 1993 1 ALT 588. This contention was considered by the learned Single Judge. It was found that in Vilas Rao''s case (2nd cited supra), it was an individual grievance where the services of the Government Pleader were terminated by giving one month notice and such a termination was up-held by this Court. But in the instant case, it is a case of en masse termination of all Government Pleaders in all the Districts of the State and the only reason advanced on behalf of the Government was that due to change in the Ruling party of the State Government, such a step was taken as the State Government should be at liberty to appoint their own Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders. The contention was repelled by the learned Single Judge holding that merely because of change in the Ruling Party that would not ipso facto result in termination of services of the Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders more especially when the Government Pleaders are the holders of the public posts. We see no infirmity in the reasoning assigned by the learned Judge. While the power to terminate the service of the Government Pleader by giving one month notice vests with the Government, but at the same time, the reasons assigned for termination are required to be reasonable and fair. When the Government Pleaders are appointed on the basis of their respective merits irrespective of the change in the Ruling Party they should be allowed to complete their tenure unless there is a dereliction of duties on the part of the Government Pleaders. In the instant case, there are no such incidents, but yet a decision appears to have been taken by the Government to replace all the Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders en masse without any reason. A similar and identical issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, . The Supreme Court had to heavily comment upon the action of the U.P. Government and declare that such terminations are wholly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The learned Judge has also copiously referred to the passages of the Supreme Court judgment and we need not burden this appeal by again repeating the same. Suffice to say that the action of the Government is perse, illegal and arbitrary. In State of U.P. v. U.P, State Law Officers Association (1 supra), the matter relates to the termination of the services of Government Pleaders in the High Court. The Supreme Court observed that the procedures for appointment of Government Pleaders in the Districts and the Government Pleaders in the High Court are dissimilar. The Supreme Court has categorically held that the appointment of Districts Government Counsel are strictly made on the basis of the comparative merits and after due screening. The termination of their services was held to be not consistent in the public interest. In the instant case, we are only concerned with the appointment of the Government Pleaders and the Assistant Government Pleaders in the Districts and therefore the case of U.P. State Law Officers Association is not applicable.

We may also point out that the Government Pleaders are appointed on tenure basis. There is no rule or statutory provision which enjoins upon the Government to terminate their services as and when there is change in the Ruling party. That cannot be a valid ground to terminate their services. Though the power to terminate the services by giving one month notice is available to the Government, but the said power has to be exercised in a bona fide manner, uncoupled with the extraneous considerations. The Court is entitled to lift the veil and find out whether valid reasons existed for such termination. Therefore, the contention that the termination of the services by giving one month notice is beyond the reach of judicial review cannot be accepted. The Supreme Court in Srilekha''s case (3 supra) has clearly spelled out that "without assigning any cause" is not to be equated with "without existence of any cause" though the reasons may not be indicated in the order, but yet the reasons must exist. Therefore, the termination without existence of any cogent reasons in furtherance of the object for which the power is given was held to be arbitrary and against the public policy. In the said case, the reason for en masse termination was that the Govenrment intended streamlining the conduct of the Government cases and effective prosecution there of, such a reason was held to be drastic and sweeping action. But, however, in the instant case, it is clearly stated that there was no reason except change of Government which we have already held unsustainable.

Viewed from any angle, we find no merits in the Writ Appeals and accordingly the Writ Appeals are dismissed. It is, however, made clear that it is open for the Govenrment to terminate the services of the Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders in the Districts, if they find that their performance was not up to the mark and their continuance in the post was prejudicial to the interest of the Government. There shall be no order as to costs.