Govinda Devadiga vs The State of Karnataka, Land Tribunal and Sri Vaikunta Kamath

Ram Mohan Reddy, J.—Petitioner''s application in form No. 7 u/s 48A(1) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, for short Act, for being registered as occupant of 1 acre of land in S. No. 12/13A of Kote village, Udupi Taluk and District was partly allowed by order dated 23-9-1981 Annexure ''B'' of the Land Tribunal conferring occupancy rights over 77 cents of land, which when called in question in a writ proceedings instituted by the landlord, was quashed and the proceeding remitted for consideration afresh over the extent of 77 cents. On remand, the Land Tribunal held an enquiry, considered the material on record including the evidence both oral and documentary and concluded that the land in question was not tenanted and that the petitioner was not a lawful tenant of the said land as on the appointed date and accordingly rejected the claim of the petitioner by the order dated 28.10.1998, Annexure ''A''. Hence this writ petition.

The petition is opposed by filing statement of objection dated 23-1-1999 of the 3rd respondent landlord inter alia contending that the claim of the petitioner is speculative and in the absence of clinching evidence both oral and documentary to establish lawful tenancy, more appropriately in the light of the entries in the pahani RTC for the relevant years disclosing the name of the petitioner as the cultivator of the land in question, the findings recorded and the conclusions arrived at, do not call for interference. In addition it is contended that one Sanjeeva Poojary and Bittu Serigara had applied for grant of ownership rights over an extent of 5 cents each in the very same survey number, on the premise that there existed two dwelling units being thatched houses, which the 3rd respondent conceded. It is denied that the petitioner is a sub-lessee under one Menka Shetty who it is contended is a stranger and not a member of the family, Lastly it is contended that the lands in question are at a distance of more than 2 kilometers from Mattu-Moodubettu village, where the petitioner resides and cultivates his own lands.

Sri Prakash Shetty, learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the receipt dated 25-8-1974 for Rs. 50/- strongly suggests that the land was tenanted in favour of the petitioner and that the Land Tribunal tell in error in recording a finding that it did not amount to a lease of agricultural lands. Learned Counsel would characterise as perverse, the finding of the Land Tribunal that there was no landlord and tenant relationship as between the petitioner and the 3rd respondent.

Per contra, learned Counsel for the 3rd respondent seeks to support the order impugned as being well merited, fully justified not calling for interference.

Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, perused the pleadings and examined the order impugned, the question for consideration is whether the order of the Land Tribunal Annexure ''A'' is just, legal and proper.

Fact that grass is grown on the land is not in dispute. Except for the receipt dated 25-8-1974 disclosing payment of Rs. 50/- for the grass on the land in question, the lease deed (sic) having taken on lease the land in question from, the 3rd respondent is not forthcoming. The documents alleged to be rent receipts by the petitioner when confronted to the 3rd respondent in his cross-examination, resulted in a denial. The only oral evidence on record is the self-serving testimony of the petitioner, which is neither corroborated nor supported. In addition, since the name of the 3rd respondent is shown as the cultivator in the RTC pahanies in respect of the property in question as on the appointed date and prior thereto, a presumption arises in favour of the 3rd respondent, which is not rebutted.

The Land Tribunal having considered the material on record and the evidence both oral and documentary and having regard to the fact that the presumption over the entries in the revenue records stood unrebutted, held that the receipt dated 25-8-1974 for Rs. 50/- for the grass cannot be regarded as a lease of agricultural lands. An examination of the order impugned discloses that the Tribunal being expected to reasonably and judiciously adjudicate, has by an objective process of reasoning concluded that the land was not tenanted on the appointed date and that the petitioner was not a lawful tenant. In my opinion, the findings recorded and the conclusions arrived at by the Land Tribunal cannot be said to be based on perfunctory and slender material but is based on the legally acceptable evidence, landings arrived at by the Land Tribunal cannot be characterised as based on surmises and conjectures.

It is trite that Certiorari jurisdiction though available is not to be exercised as a matter of course, and the writ court would be justified in refusing the writ of certioraris if no failure of justice is occasioned. The exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, it follows, is to command the inferior Court or Tribunal to certify its record or proceedings to the High Court for its inspection so as to enable the High Court to determine whether on the lace of the record the interior Court has committed any of the preceding errors occasioning failure, of justice. In Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and Others, their lordships of the Supreme Court while summing up the conclusions, observed thus:

(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting grass errors of jurisdiction, i.e., when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice.

In my considered opinion the order impugned is well merited, fully justified on the materials available on record and it is neither shown to suitor from any infirmity in law or vitiated on account of perversity of approach calling for a different conclusion. In the result, there is no merit in the Writ Petition and hence I decline to interfere with the order.

The Writ Petition is accordingly rejected.