G.S. Chandra Sekaren vs The Collector, , The Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) and The Managing Director, State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu (SIPCOT)

K. Chandru, J.—The Petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking for a direction to make a reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition

Act, 1894 in respect of the Petitioner''s land in Pondur ''C'' village, Sriperumbudur Taluk, Kancheepuram District.

The writ petition was admitted on 3.1.2011. On the application for fixing an early date, this Court posted the main writ petition to be heard

during third week of October, 2011. However, the matter came to be posted before this Court on being specially ordered by the Hon''ble Chief

Justice.

Heard the arguments of Ms. Rathina Asohan, counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. RM. Muthukumar, learned Government Advocate appearing for

Respondents 1 and 2 and Ms. Narmada Sampath, learned Counsel for third Respondent.

The case of the Petitioner was that he was the absolute owner of vacant land to an extent of 2.95 acres in Pondur ""C"" village in various survey

numbers. The State Government by G.O. Ms. No. 61, Industries Department, dated 24.2.1997 had proposed to acquire land for setting up an

industrial park and an emergency clause u/s 5A was invoked. Hence the enquiry was dispensed with. Section 6 declaration was issued on

12.11.1997 and possession was taken over on 5.8.1999. The Award was passed in Award No. 1/1999, dated 15.1.1999. It was stated that only

Rs. 400/- per cent was given as a compensation. The cheque was made ready on 8.6.2005. It is stated by the Petitioner that he received the

cheque under protest on 10.6.2005 and he wanted enhanced compensation. Only after the Petitioner insisted, a copy of the Award was given to

him on 22.6.2005. The Petitioner had waited for a month hoping that the Respondents will make a reference to the jurisdictional reference court.

After sending a further letter dated 13.7.2005, the Petitioner moved this Court with W.P. No. 12106 of 2010 seeking for a direction to pay

differential compensation. In that writ petition, this Court held that his request for higher compensation on the basis of the other land owners

receiving compensation by a judgment and decree in A.S. Nos. 331 to 371 of 2008, dated 30.11.2009 cannot be considered and hence the same

was dismissed. It is at this stage, the Petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking for a reference.

Admittedly, u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, an aggrieved person can seek for reference to the reference court for enhanced

compensation provided he makes a written application to the Collector seeking for reference u/s 18(2)(a). The reference will have to be claimed

within six weeks from the date of the Award or in other cases, six weeks from the date of receipt of notice from the Collector u/s 12(2) or within

six months from the date of the Collector''s Award. In the present case, the Petitioner was fully aware of the proceedings including passing of the

Award dated 15.1.1999. Therefore, he cannot state that it is only after receiving the compensation, he knew about the Award. The statement

made by the Petitioner cannot be believed. In the absence of the Petitioner making an appropriate application as per the limitation found under the

Act, the question of granting any relief to the Petitioner will not arise.

In this context, it is necessary to refer to a judgment of the Supreme court in Mahadeo Bajirao Patil Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, . The

following passages found in paragraphs 14 and 15 may be usefully extracted below: 14. We are here not concerned with the correctness of the

decision, but the fact remains that having considered the claim of the Appellant for compensation, the Special Land Acquisition Officer rejected the

claim. This does amount to the making of an award, commonly described as #nil award#. If the Appellant was aggrieved by such an award, it was

open to him to seek reference u/s 18 of the Act which the Appellant actually did. We, therefore, cannot hold that no award as envisaged by

Section 11 of the Act was declared on 29-8-1994, since the claim of the Appellant was considered and was totally rejected. There was,

therefore, no question of giving any calculation of the manner in which the compensation was computed. Since, the application u/s 18 was not filed

within six weeks of the receipt of notice u/s 12(2) of the Act, the High Court did not commit any error in holding that the application was barred by

limitation. It was not disputed before us that the Land Acquisition Officer making a reference, or the Court considering a reference u/s 18 of the

Act has no power of condonation of delay in making an application under the aforesaid Section 15. The next ground on which the High Court held

the application to be barred by limitation is that in any event the Appellant had knowledge of the award being made on 8-12-1994, since he filed a

copy of the award as annexure to the writ petition filed on 9-12-1994 and, therefore, should have filed the application u/s 18 of the Act within six

weeks. The submission urged on behalf of the Appellant relying upon the decision of this Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Dy. Land

Acquisition Officer2 that in the instant case even if it is assumed that the Appellant had knowledge of the award at least on 8-12-1994, he could

make an application within six months from the date of such knowledge, would have deserved serious consideration, but for the finding recorded

by us earlier that the Appellant had notice u/s 12(2) of the Act and, therefore, the period of limitation for filing the application u/s 18 was six weeks

from the date of receipt of the notice and not six months from the date of knowledge of the award.

Further, the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka Vs. Laxuman, in paragraphs 9 and 10 has held as follows:

As can be seen, no time for applying to the court in terms of Sub-section (3) is fixed by the statute. But since the application is to the court,

though under a special enactment, Article 137, the residuary article of the Limitation Act, 1963, would be attracted and the application has to be

made within three years of the application for making a reference or the expiry of 90 days after the application. The position is settled by the

decision of this Court in Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer v. Thakoredas1. It was held: (SCC p. 414, para 3)

Admittedly, the cause of action for seeking a reference had arisen on the date of service of the award u/s 12(2) of the Act. Within 90 days from

the date of the service of the notice, the Respondents made the application requesting the Deputy Commissioner to refer the cases to the civil court

u/s 18. Under the amended Sub-section (3)(a) of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner shall, within 90 days from 1-9-1970 make reference u/s 18

to the civil court which he failed to do. Consequently by operation of Sub-Section 3(b) with the expiry of the aforestated 90 days, the cause of

action had accrued to the Respondents to make an application to the civil court with a prayer to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make a

reference. There is no period of limitation prescribed in Sub-section (3)(b) to make that application but it should be done within limitation

prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Since no article expressly prescribed the limitation to make such application, the residuary article

under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act gets attracted. Thus, it could be seen that in the absence of any special period of limitation

prescribed by Clause (b) of Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act, the application should have been made within three years from the date of

expiry of 90 days prescribed in Section 18(3)(b) i.e. the date on which cause of action had accrued to the Respondent claimant. Since the

application had been admittedly made beyond three years, it was clearly barred by limitation. Since, the High Court relied upon the case in

Municipal Council2 which has stood overruled, the order of the High Court is unsustainable.# This position is also supported by the reasoning in

Kerala SEB v. T.P. Kunhaliumma3. It may be seen that under the Central Act sans the Karnataka amendment there was no right to approach the

Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction to compel a reference and no time-limit was also fixed for making such an approach. All that was

required of a claimant was to make an application for reference within six weeks of the award or the notice of the award, as the case may be. But

obviously the State Legislature thought it necessary to provide a time-frame for the claimant to make his claim for enhanced compensation and for

ensuring an expeditious disposal of the application for reference by the authority under the Act fixing a time within which he is to act and conferring

an additional right on the claimant to approach the civil court on satisfying the condition precedent of having made an application for reference

within the time prescribed.

A statute can, even while conferring a right, provide also for a repose. The Limitation Act is not an equitable piece of legislation but is a statute

of repose. The right undoubtedly available to a litigant becomes unenforceable if the litigant does not approach the court within the time prescribed.

It is in this context that it has been said that the law is for the diligent. The law expects a litigant to seek the enforcement of a right available to him

within a reasonable time of the arising of the cause of action and that reasonable time is reflected by the various articles of the Limitation Act.

In the light of the above, the writ petition will stand dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.