Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation vs Yogeshbhai Kalidas Vadasara

N.V.Anjaria, J

Heard learned advocate Ms. Sejal K. Mandavia for the petitioner â€" Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation.

The present petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution, is directed against the order 24.10.2019 of the 12th Additional District Judge, Motor

Accident Claims Tribunal (Auxiliary), Ahmedabad (Rural), Ahmedabad in an application below Exhibit-5 under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles

Act, 1988 whereby the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal allowed the applicants - claimants to recover Rs.50,000/-from the opponent â€" petitioner

corporation herein with interest at 9%.

The facts were that, one Kalidas Nathubhai Parmar died succumbed to the injuries suffered by him in an accident which took place on 5.8.2017

involving the State Transport bus of the petitioner corporation bearing registration No.GJ.18.Y.9078. The heirs of the deceased filed an application

under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 at Exhibit-5 while simultaneously preferring regular claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor

Vehicles Act, 1988 for recovery of compensation of Rs.55,55,000/-.

3.1 It was stated in the application under Section 140 that the accident had occurred on the said date at 4.00 p.m. on Sabarmati Highway Road, near

BRTS bus stand, Chandkheda and near Visat Petrol Pump which was within the jurisdiction of Chandkheda police station and for that, an FIR was

registered with the police station as registration No.171 of 2017. In the application, the registration number of the vehicle bus was mentioned as

GJ.18.9098. Thereafter, by submitting application Exhibit-15, it was corrected to GJ.18.Y.9078.

3.2 The Tribunal considered various documentary evidences, including the FIR, Panchnama of the Scene, P.M. report, Death Certificate, Letter of the

Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation regarding police papers from Chandkheda police station, Driving Licence of the bus driver, RC Book and

other identity documents including the charge-sheet against the driver of the State Transport bus and after taking into account the provisions of Section

140, passed the order to award Rs.50,000/- as interim compensation.

The order of the Tribunal was assailed by learned advocate for the petitioner corporation who submitted that the application was wrongly allowed

by the Tribunal, that the respondents had not seen the accident and they were not aware about the true facts. It was submitted that in the Panchnama

prepared, number of the bus was not mentioned, but GJ.18.9098 only mentioned which was not the correct number. It was harped that, in this view,

the Tribunal ought not to have allowed the application. Learned advocate for the petitioner highlighted all the grounds set forth in the memorandum of

the application.

Section 140 of the Act provides that where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a

motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the motor vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be

liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of the said section. The amount payable under

this provision is a fixed sum to be paid with interest. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a beneficial piece of legislation in which Section 140 is

incorporated providing as above.

5.1 In New India Assurance Co.Ltd., Ahmedabad v. Mithakhan Dinakhan Notiyar & Ors. [1995 (2) GLR 1111], this Court considered the nature of

provisions of Section 140 of the Act and the kind of claim thereunder, to observe further that in construing social welfare legislation, the Courts should

adopt a beneficial rule of construction. It was observed that the liability under this section is made indefeasible, peremptory and total.

5.2 The Court observed in paragraph No.7 in Mithakhan Dinakhan Notiyar (supra) as under,

“7. Rule 231 of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 contains adequate provisions which would enable the Claims Tribunal to satisfy itself in

respect of matters necessary for awarding compensation under Section 140 of the Act. Sub-rule (9) of Rule 231 provides that the Claims Tribunal

shall proceed with the application for compensation, on the basis of -

(i) First Information Report;

(ii) Injury certificate or Post-mortem report in case of death;

(iii) Registration certificate of the motor vehicle involved in the accident;

(iv) Cover note, certificate of insurance or the policy, relating to the insurance of the vehicle against third party risks;

(v) The nature of the treatment given by the medical officer who has treated the victim.

While making an order under Section 140 of the Act, the Tribunal is not required to follow the procedure contained in Rules 211 to 230 and 232 of the

Gujarat Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. Where compensation is claimed in respect of death or permanent disablement under Section 140 and also in

pursuance of any right on the principle of fault, the claim for compensation under Section 140 of the Act is required to be disposed of in the first place

in view of Sub-section (2) of Section 140 of the Act. For awarding compensation under Section 140 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal is required to

satisfy itself in respect of the following matters :-

(i) an accident has arisen out of the use of a motor vehicle;

(ii) the said accident has resulted in permanent disablement of the person who is making the claim or death of the person whose legal representative is

making the claim;

(iii) the claim is made against the owner and the motor vehicle involved in the insurer of the accident.â€​

5.3 It was further held,

“8. ....It must be seen that Section 140 of the Act speaks of peremptory awards in cases of permanent disablement or death. The object underlying

this consideration is the immediate relief to the disabled victim of accident in case of permanent disability. Provision of Section 140 is a piece of

beneficial and ameliorative legislation providing for an immediate aid to the hapless and helpless victims of the motor vehicles. The objects for which

Section 140 of the Act is enacted would be defeated if the Claims Tribunal is required to hold regular trial in the same manner as for adjudicating a

claim made in a petition filed under Section 168 of the Act....â€​

5.4 In view of above legal position in respect of the operation of the provision of Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, none of the contentions

of the petitioner could be sustained. The liability arising to pay the compensation under Section 140 is absolute in nature once there is an accident and

a person is found to have suffered death or disablement. The aspect of negligence or any other aspect are not germane while passing the order under

Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It would suffice to establish that accident took place involving a motor vehicle in which death or

disablement occurred.

In the present case, it was established that the vehicle of the petitioner corporation namely, the bus was involved in the accident which has resulted

into death. The bus belonging to the petitioner corporation and was driven by the driver of the petitioner corporation. Mere inaccuracy in mentioning

the number of the bus by the claimants would not be a ground for denial of compensation under the provision. Once the accident was established and

the factum of the involvement of the bus was evident, the petitioner corporation could not have disclaimed its liability to pay the compensation in law

under this provision.

For the foregoing discussion and reasons, the impugned order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is imminently just and proper. No

interference is called for. The present petition is summarily dismissed.