AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
No AI summary yet
Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.
Judgment
19 paragraphs · 1,388 wordsSabina, J.—This petition has been filed by Gulab Rai u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C. for short) for quashing of FIR No. 235 dated 11.12.2004, under Sections 409/420/468/471 of the Indian Penal Code ("IPC" for short), registered at Police Station Sadardadri, District Bhiwani.
The petitioner was working as a Lab Assistant in M & P Lab, Charkhi Dadri, District Bhiwani in Dakshan Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam.
As per the allegations made in the FIR, the petitioner had submitted his claim for Leave Travel Concession (''LTC'' for short) in the month of March, 1998 for travelling from Charkhi Dadri to Trivendrum along with his family through Nagaland Tourism Department. Payment of Rs. 19,950/- was made to the petitioner against his claim for Rs. 20,000/-. During inquiry conducted by the Vigilance Department, it was found that the bus bearing No. UIIF-9784 had never gone on the route alleged by the petitioner.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in terms of Rule 2.2 of the Haryana Civil Services Rules (for short ''the Rules'') no action could be taken against the petitioner with regard to an incident, which had occurred four years before institution of the criminal proceedings.
In support of his arguments, learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on K.C. Duggal v. State of Punjab 1989 (2) RSJ 513 (P&H), Sardul Singh v. State of Punjab 1993 (2) RCR (Criminal) 417 (P&H), R.C. Gupta v. P.S.E.B. 2002 (1) RSJ 509 (P&H), Gurdev Singh v. State of Punjab 2004 (2) RSJ 325 (P&H), O.P. Kharab v. HVPN Ltd. and Ors. 2007 (2) RSJ 314 (P&H) and Baldhir Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors. 2009 (1) RSJ 351 (P&H).
Learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has submitted that so far Rule 2.2 of the Rules is concerned, the same is not applicable to the criminal proceedings.
In support of his arguments, learned Counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on State of Punjab Vs. Kailash Nath, and Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab 2001 (4) SCT 1089 (P&H).
Rule 2.2(b) proviso 3 of the Rules reads as under:
No such judicial proceedings, if not instituted while the officer was in service, whether before this retirement or during his re-employment shall be instituted in respect of a cause of action which arose or an event which took place more than four years before such institution;
In the present case, admittedly, the criminal proceedings were initiated against the petitioner after four years of the alleged incident of withdrawal of the LTC.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on judgments of this Court in K.C. Duggal''s case (supra) and Sardul Singh''s case (Supra) wherein it was held that criminal proceedings could not be initiated in respect of the allegations which related to a period exceeding four years in terms of Rule 2.2 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume II. The other judgments relied upon by learned Counsel for the petitioner relate to departmental proceedings sought to be initiated after four years of the incident in question and it was held that departmental proceedings initiated after more than four years of the incident were liable to be set aside. The legal position is, however, no longer res integra.
The Apex Court in Kailash Nath''s case supra has held as under:
In the normal course what falls within the purview of the term "conditions of service" may be classified as salary or wages including subsistence allowance during suspension, the periodical increments, pay -scale, leave, provident fund, gratuity, confirmation, promotion, seniority, tenure or termination of service, compulsory or premature retirement, superannuation, pension, changing the age of superannuation, deputation and disciplinary proceedings. Whether or not a government servant should be prosecuted for an offence committed by him obviously cannot be treated to be something pertaining to conditions of service. Making a provision that a government servant, even if he is guilty of grave misconduct or negligence which constitutes an offence punishable either under the Penal Code or Prevention of Corruption Act or an analogous law should be granted immunity from such prosecution after the lapse of a particular period so as to provide incentive for efficient work would not only be against public policy but would also be counter productive. It is likely to be an incentive not for efficient work but for committing offences including embezzlement and misappropriation by some of them at the fag end of their tenure of service and making an effort that the offence is not detected within the period prescribed for launching prosecution or manipulating delay in the matter of launching prosecution. Further, instances are not wanting where a government servant may escape prosecution at the initial stage for want of evidence but during the course of prosecution of some other person evidence may be led or material may be produced which establishes complicity and guilt of such government servant. By that time period prescribed, if any, for launching prosecution may have expired and in that event on account of such period having expired the government servant concerned would succeed in avoiding prosecution even though there may be sufficient evidence of an offence having been committed by him. Such a situation, in our opinion, cannot be created by framing a rule under Article 309 of the Constitution laying down an embargo on prosecution as a condition of service.
There is another cogent ground on account of which the submission that giving a government servant peace of mind after his retirement in his old age can be a good ground to grant him immunity from prosecution cannot be accepted. This would on the face of it be discriminatory and thus arbitrary inasmuch as if peace of mind in old age can be a good ground for immunity from prosecution for offences committed by a person, there seems to be no reason why such immunity may not be available to all old persons and should be confined only to government servants. On the face of it, the government servants cannot constitute a class by themselves so as to bring their cases within the purview of reasonable classification, if the purpose of granting immunity from prosecution is ensuring peace of mind in old age.
Even on a plan reading of Rule 2.2, it is apparent that the intention of framing the said rule was not to grant immunity from prosecution to a government servant, if the conditions mentioned the rein are satisfied. As seen above, Rule 2.2 is in chapter II of the Punjab Civil Service Rules which deals with ordinary pension. There can be no manner of doubt that making provision with regard to pension falls within the purview of "conditions of service". The embargo on prosecution spelt out by the High Court is not to be found in the main Rule 2.2 but in the third proviso to the said rule. It is the third proviso which enjoins that no judicial proceedings, if not instituted while the officer was in service, whether before his retirement or during his re-employment shall be instituted in respect of a cause of action which arose or an event which took place more than four years before such institution. The scope of a proviso is well settled.
It was then urged by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the third proviso to Clause (b) of Rule 2.2 is in the nature of a beneficent legislation and in case of doubt has to be interpreted in favour of the person for whose benefit the Rule has been framed. In our opinion, keeping in view the scope of the power to frame a rule under Article 309 and the purpose of Rule 2.2, there is no doubt with regard to the interpretation of the said rule. By applying the rule of interpretation with regard to a beneficent legislation, a benefit never intended to be conferred cannot be conferred.
Thus, no immunity can be granted to a Government servant for prosecution after four years have passed when the cause of action had occurred in terms of proviso to Rule 2.2 of the relevant Rules.
No other contention has been raised. Hence, no interference is called for.
Accordingly, this petition is dismissed.
