Gummala Abraham vs Lankapalli Venkadu and Another

Masankaram, J.—This Second Appeal and the connected Civil Revision Petition were directed to be posted before a Bench by the learned Chief Justice of the Madras Hi;:ch Court in order to reconsider the decision in Chinna Nagiah v. Pullayya, AIR 1931 Mad 010 (A), and to define the scope of S 13 of the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act. They have since been transferred to the Andhra High''Court under the Andhra State Act. .

The Second Appeal and the Civil Revision Petition arise out of two Original Suils Nos 287 and 272 of .1947 respectively. They both relate to what is found to be Charnari service Inam land. The two Plaintiffs in Order Section No 287 of 1947 and the father of the sole Plaintiff, in Order Section No. 272 of 1947, while being holders of the office of Charnari service in the village of Artha-muru alienated the items covered in both the suits In favour of one (luminal a Abraham who is the Defendant in both the suits, under two separate usufructuary mortgage deeds of the same date, i. e., 30th October, 1927. The Plaintiffs in both the suits question the validity of these alienations and seek, to recover the property from the Defendant on the ground that the alienations are void in law. The Defendant disputed inier alia the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suits.

The question for determination, therefore, in both these cases is whether the suits are maintainable in the Civil Court. The exact scope of Section 13 of the Act which confers an exclusive jurisdiction upon the Revenue Court in regard to certain matters and the effect of Section 21 which ousts the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in such matters has been the subject of several decisions of the Madras High Court. There are also two decisions of this Court, both rendered by one of a-, sitting alone reported in Krishna Rcddy v. Venkatasubbaiah, 1954 Andh L T 47 (B) and Ryali Macharayya Vs. Palakollu Chintanna and Others, . In the later of these two decisions, after a review of some of the Madras Rulings in point, the legal position was stated thus:'' "To summarise Section 21 ousts the jurisdiction of Civil Courts only in regard to matters in respect whereof jurisdiction is conferred u/s 13 on the Revenue Court. A suit by a service-holder claiming a right to succeed or in actual possession of the office for recovery of emoluments is cognisable by the Revenue Court. The denial ol the character of the property by the Defendants does not affect its jurisdiction. But the essential requisite is that the Plaintiff shall allege and , rely upon the fact that that the land, is an emolument attached to the office and make that a foundation for the relief claimed.

But. if his cause of action and his right to possession do not depend upon his title to the emoluments as a service-holder but on a collateral fact, Section 21 is not a bar. If he is dispossessed by a trespasser, if his lessee refuses to deliver possession after the expiry of the term, if a person holding a derivative title under him does not give possession after the termination of the derivative title either on, the expiry of the term or otherwise, in all these cases, his cause of action and his right to relief do not depend upon his title as a service-holder to the emoluments but only on his right to possession."

We think that this passage sums up the position correctly. Now applying these principles to the present case, what is the position ? The Defendant is a person in possession of the properties under deeds executed by the holders of a village office and those deeds being in respect of inalienable lands are void, (4) As pointed out by Miller J., in Kesaram Narasimhulu v, Narasimhulu Patnailu. I L R 30 Mad 126 (PB) (D); a Plaintiff in such a case car only succeed by showing (1) that he is the officeholder entitled as such to enjoy the emolument, and (2) that the land for which he sues constitutes the emoluments of his office. Both these are grounds of suit which give him right of action before the collector u/s 13 (1). In that view, these suits would be clearly outside the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by vinue of Section 21, The observations of their Lordships of the Madras High Court in (Kammara) Chinna Nagiah and Another Vs. Yerraguntla Pullayya and Others, , are in consonance with the view above expressed. That was a case very similar to the present case.

There the validity of a sale-deed of certain service inam lands executed by the Plaintiff in favour of the contesting Defendant was questioned and possession, was sought. In the plaint, the Plaintiffs stated that they owned the land as blacksmith inam and that according to law any sale in respect of service inam land is not valid. The prayers in the plaint were for the cancellation of the sale-deed and for recovery of possession. Reilly J" made the following remarks in his judgment;

Now of the two prayers in the plaint, which I have mentioned, I do not think, there can he any doubt the substantial relief prayed for was the recovery of possession. In such a case, when the Plaintiffs describe the land as village service Inam land, as Artisan inam in this case, and sue for recovery Sections 13 and 21, Madras Act III of 1895, exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and make die suit one to be tried by a revenue Court."

Anantkrishna Ayyar J" the other Judge, concurred in his colleague''s judgment and observed as follows:

Now on my reading of the plaint, the substantial point of dispute in the present case is whether the suit lands constitute the emoluments of the office of the village blacksmith; and such a question when it arises in a suit, can only be decided by the revenue Court. No doubt a suit filed to recover possession of such lands on the ground that the lands were leased to a tenant and that the term of the lease was seeking to recover possession from him in those circumstances, would be cognizable by a Civil Court. In such, a case the question whether the lands constitute the emoluments of the office would not Properly arise we express our respectful agreement with the views of the learned Judges in that ease. Though that case was not referred to in cither of the judgments of this Court, there is no conflict between the law as laid down in that case and that as laid down in the two cases of this Court already referred to. In the earlier case decided by this Court also, similar observations were made and it was held that .

if it is not necessary for the Plaintiff either to desk for recovery of the office or to ask for the recovery of the emoluments attached thereto, he could seek relief in a Civil Court.

It is contended by Mr. Bapiraju that the terms of Section 13 show that it refers only to the suits by persons who claim to be entitled to an office and has no application to suits by those actually in office. This argument was rejected by Venkata Subba Rao J., in Veerarvna v. Mo-chararnma, 1938-1 Mad T.J -5.0C: AIR 1938 Mad 505) (E), referring to the view of Miller J., in ILR 30 Mad 126 (FB) (D), and those of Spencer and Phillips JJ., in Devineni utterly v. K''.anclu-kuri Kotaiah 5 Mad T W 151: (AIR 1917 Mad 38) (P). We agree with the learned Judge.

We therefore, sold that the decision of the lower appellate Court is wrong and that the trial Court is right. In the result, the orders in both the suits passed by the learned District Munsif directing the return or the plaints is restored. The Appellant will be entitled to his costs here and in the lower appellate Court both in the Second Appeal as well as in the Civil Revision Petition.