Gunda vs Workmen's Compensation Commissioner

P.V. Dixit, C.J.—This order will also gave Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 248 and 250, both of 1961.

The circumstances in which these three petitions under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution have been filed are that the Petitioners engaged One Gulabsingh and Shivcharan for digging a well on their land on a contract basis. These contractors employed four other persons for the digging operations. One of them was Raghubira. During the digging operations, dynamite was used for blasting the rocks. On 2nd March 1960 there was an explosion in the dynamitting operations as a result of which Gulabsingh, Raghubira ana Shivcharan sustained severe injuries. Gulabsingh and Raghubira succumbed to the injuries. Shivcharan survived. The widows of the deceased persons and Shivcharan then filed applications before the Commissioner for Workmen''s Compensation for payment of compensation to them under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923. The Commissioner found that the Petitioners had employed Gulabsingh, Raghubira and Shivcharan for the digging operations that these three persons were ''workmen'' within the definition given in Section 2(1)(n) of the Act; and that the injuries which Gulabsingh, Raghubira and Shivcharan sustained, were caused to them by an accident arising out of and in the course of their employment. Accordingly, the Commissioner directed the Petitioners to pay Rs. 3,000 as compensation to Puttibai, the widow of Gulabsingh, Rs. 3,000 to Bakhtia, the widow of Raghubira and Rs. 2,100 to Shivcharan.

By these applications, the Petitioners seek the quashing; of the directions made against them by the Commissioner for payment of comgensation to the Respondents Puttibai, Bakhtia and Shivcharan. The applicants did not file any appeals u/s 30 of the Act as, according to them, they were too poor to make any deposit as required by the third proviso to Section 39(1) of the Act.

Before us, Shri Shrivastava, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners, did not dispute that the three workmen were employed by the Petitioners for digging a well, and that the dynamite explosion, which caused injuries to them, was an accident arising out of and in the course of their employment. He, however, contended that though these workmen were employed by the Petitioners, none of them was a ''workman'' as defined by Clause (n) of Section 2(1) of the Act. It was said that their employment was of a casual nature but they were not employed by the Petitioners for the purpose of any trade or business of theirs, and that the finding of the Commissioner that the workmen were employed for the purpose of the Petitioners'' business as agriculturists was erroneous.

In our judgment, the Petitioners are entitled to great sympathy but there exists no ground on which these petitions can be granted. The sole question that arises for determination is whether each of the deceased persons and the Respondent Shivcharan was a ''workman'' as defined in Section 2(1)(n) of the Act. The controversy in this connection centers round the first paragraph of Clause (n) of Section 2(1) which is as follows-

''workman'' means any person (other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer''s trade or business) who is- .................

It is not disputed that the other conditions laid down in Clauses (i) and (ii) of this definition are fulfilled. What is contended is that a person whose employment is of a casual nature is a workman within this definition only if he is employed for; the purposes of the employer''s trade or business; and that in the present ease the three workmen concerned were not employed for any trade or business of the applicants. The language of Clause (n) is plain enough to show that in order to exclude a person, whose employment is of a casual nature, from the definition of ''workman'' under the, Act, it is necessary that he must be employed "otherwise than for the purposes of the employer''s trade or business." The question, therefore, resolves itself into this; whether in digging a well on the Petitioners'' land Gulabsingh, Raghubira and Shivcharan were employed for any trade or business of the Petitioners. The Commissioner found that they were employed for the agricultural business of the applicants inasmuch as the well was being sunk on the applicants'' agricultural land, that the Petitioners were agriculturists and that the workmen were paid by the Petitioners. Now, the question whether a casual labourer is employed for the purposes of the employer''s trade or business is a question of fact. There can be no interference in a finding of fact improceedings under Article 226 or Article 227.

The decisions of the Commissioner directing the Petitioners to pay various amounts of compensation to the Respondents cannot be assailed as being without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. There is no error apparent on the face of any of those decisions. There can, therefore, be no question of the determination of Commissioner being quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari under Article 226. The directions given by the Commissioner can not also be quashed under Article 227. The circumstances in which the High Court can interfere under Article 227 with the decision of a Court or tribunal do not admit of any doubt. They are settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Waryam Singh and Another Vs. Amarnath and Another, , and Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde and Others Vs. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, . In Waryam Singh''s case (supra), the Supreme Court laid down that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. In that case, the Supreme Court approved the view taken by Harries, C. J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vs. Sukumar Mukherjee, , as to the extent of the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227. In Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee (supra), the learned Chief Justice based his view on the observations of Rankin C. J., in Manmatha Nath Biswas Vs. Emperor, , on the scope of the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court by Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915. Rankin C. J. described the power of superitendence by saying:

The superintendence is not a legal fiction whereby a High Court Judge is vested omnipotence, but is a term having a legal force and signification. The general Superintendence which the High Court has over all jurisdiction subject to appeal is a duty to keep within the bounds of their authority to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. It does not involve responsibility for the correctness of their decisions either in fact or law.

In Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjun (supra), after pointing out that Article 27 of the Constitution corresponds to Section 167 of the Government of India Act, 1915 the Supreme Court has observed:

However wide it may be than the provisions of S. 115 Of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is well established that the High Court cannot in exercise of its powers under that section assume appellate powers to correct every mistake of law. Here there is no question of assumption of excessive jurisdiction or refusal to exercise jurisdiction or any irregularity or illegality in the procedure Or any breach of any rule of natural justice. If anything it may merely be an erroneous decision which, the error not being apparent on the face of the record, cannot be corrected by the High Court in revision under S. 115 of the Code of CPC or under Article 227.

In that case it has also been said that an error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there could conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record.

Therefore, quite apart from the fact that the Petitioners could have preferred an appeal u/s 30 of the Act and even in that appeal the finding of the Commissioner that the digging of the well was for the purpose of the Petitioners'' business, could not have been interfered with, the power under articles 226 and 227 cannot be invoked in this case for seating aside the directions made by the Commissioner on the ground of an error in the said finding. It may be added that the finding cannot be said to be erroneous, It is based on the evidence that the well was being sunk in the Petitioners'' agricultural lands and was intended to promote the farming of those lands. For the purposes of Clause (n) of Section 2(1) it is not necessary that digging of wells itself should have been a trade or business of the Petitioners. It is also not material whether as a fact the well would have given the Petitioners increased benefit from agriculture lands. Under the definition it is sufficient if the casual labourer is employed for the purposes of the employer''s trade or business. ''Business'' means "anything which occupies the time and attention and labour of a man for the purpose of profit." It has a more extensive meaning than the word ''trade'' and includes farming [see Harris v. Amery (1855) 1 CP 148, and Smith v. Anderson ( 1880 (sic)) 15 Ch. D 247 at p. 258] Agriculture being the occupation of the Petitioners, it cannot be denied that the digging of the well on their agricultural lands was for the cultivation of those lands and the employment of the deceased persons and Shivcharan was for the purpose of the Petitioners'' business as agriculturists. A similar view has been taken in Sitharama v. Ayyaswami AIR 1956 Mad. 212. In that case, a person having a small well in his field engaged some labourers to deepen it. In the course of the deepening operations, dynamite was used. On one occasion when dynamite was used for digging operations, there was an explosion injuring a labourer. On a claim being made by the injured person, the Commissioner for Workmen''s Compensation awarded him some compensation. The order of the Commissioner was upheld by the Madras High Court on the view that the labourer was a workman as he was employed for the purposes of the employer''s business as agriculturist.

For these reasons, there can be no interference with the directions made by the Commissioner, awarding compensation to the Respondents. The result is that all these petitions are dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs in each case. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the Petitioners.