Gundappa vs Collector of Gulbarga and Another

This is an application for the issue of a Writ of ''certiorari'' under Article 226 of the Constitution. At the time of arguments, it was desired to press it as an application in revision under Article 227, it being urged that the case was a fit one for interference under its power of superintendence.

The applicant Gundappa was a tenant at Rs. 6/- per month of two mulgies and two rooms belonging to a mosque situate at Station Bazaar, Gulbarga. The rent was later increased to Rs. 11-8-0 per month and at a subsequent reassessment made by the Committee in 1358F. the amount was enhanced to Rs. 15/- per month. The Petitioner considered that the increase was unjustified and he ventilated his grievance in the Court of the Tahsildar by seeking cancellation of the last mentioned enhancement. The Court of the first instance refused to interfere and the decision was upheld in appeal by the Collector of Gulbarga''s Gundappa now contends that the Rent Control Order does not apply to the case in view of Section 10, which excludes from its operation buildings etc., whose rent is utilised for educational, charitable and public purposes.

This point was not raised in the Court of the Tahsildar & though in the memorandum of appeal filed by the Petitioner before the Collector of Gulbarga, a ground to that effect was included, it was apparently abandoned at the time of the argument. We say so because the point is not referred to in the appellate judgment and further because the argument could not be sustained without any allegation much less proof of the facts which could entitle the building to exemption namely that Its income was utilized for the purposes mentioned in Section 10. We need scarcely stress that the mere fact that the mulgies and the rooms belong to a mosque does not necessarily imply that their income is or was used in that manner, at the time of reassessment of rent in 1358 Fasli.

The powers of the High Courts under Article 227 are the same which they possessed before the passing of the Government of India Act, 1935. Under the Act of 1935, the general superintendence of the High Court included powers of judicial as well as of administrative character and they were exercised as was pointed out in � Jhakri Kewat Vs. Ram Naresh Sahi, in exceptional circumstances only. In � Manmatha Nath v. Emperor 60 Cal 618, Sir George Rankin observed in this connection:

The general superintendence which this Court has over all jurisdictions subject to appeal, is a duty to keep them within the bounds of their authority, to see that they do what their duty requires, and they do it in a legal manner. It does not involve responsibility for the correctness of their decisions either in fact or law.

It is obviously not practicable that under Article 227 this Court should retry all cases which have been tried by judicial tribunals & that it should do so upon no settled principles but arbitrarily and sporadically. The power of superintendence is a power of known and well recognised character and it has to be exercised upon judicial principles which give it its character. As remarked by Lord Douman C.J., In � Queen v. Barton (1841) 1 QB 63 at p. 76:

It is of much more importance to hold the rule of law straight, than from a feeling of the supposed hardship of any particular decision, to interpose relief at the expense of introducing a precedent full of inconvenience and uncertainty in the decision of future cases.

The position has been clearly defined in � Sukhdeo Baiswar Vs. Brij Bhushan Misra and Others, � Narendra Nath Sashmal Vs. Binode Behari Dey and Others, and � Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vs. Sukumar Mukherjee, , & it is now well established that the superintendence referred to in the aforementioned Article does not invest the High Court with an unlimited prerogative to interfere in cases where a wrong decision has been arrived at either in fact or in law. The powers enjoyed under it must, we apprehend, be restricted to cases where there has been a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse of any fundamental principles of law and natural justice, and they must further be confined to cases where no other adequate or prompt remedy is available. Applying this principle, it is clear that, the present case does not fall within the article.

This application has no substance. We dismiss it accordingly.