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Judgment
M.H.S. Ansari, J.—Identical questions arise for consideration as also the reliefs claimed are similar in all the three writ petitions pertaining to the Award No. 131 of 1986 dated 23-9-1986. The above three writ petitions were accordingly heard together and are being disposed of by this common order.
W.P. No. 20581 of 1994 and W.P. No. 20593 of 1994 are filed by the daughters of one late Sri G. Chandraiah and W.P.No. 20601 of 1994 is filed by the grand-daughter of the said G. Chandraiah. In all the three writ petitions, the relief claimed is with regard to the rejection of the application filed by the petitioners u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short "the Act") and assailing the said orders of rejection made by the Land Acquisition Officer-sole respondent.
Brief facts alone need to be stated. They are:
Sri G. Chandraiah was the owner of land in R.S.No. 67/2 (extent of Ac.2.26 cts.), R.S. No. 67/3 (extent of Ac.2.38 cts.) and R.S. No. 75/1 (extent of Ac.10-5 cts.) situated at Chintalapudi Taluk. The said lands were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. Section 4(1) notification was published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette Part I Supplementary Edition, dated 10-4-1980 wherein certain other lands belonging to some other persons were also acquired under the same notification. The Award No. 131 of 1986 was passed by the Respondent-Land Acquisition Officer on 23-9-1986. While the Land Acquisition proceedings were pending, a suit O.S.No. 175 of 1981 was filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Eluru. The said suit was filed for partition by the sons of late Chandraiah against the said Chandraiah. The writ petitioners are also said to be party defendants to the said suit. Because of the pendency of the said suit, the Respondent-Land Acquisition Officer referred the matter u/s 30 of the Land Acquisition Act for determination of the persons entitled to the compensation and u/s 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, the amount of compensation as determined in the Award was also deposited in the Court. The reference made by the Land Acquisition Officer was registered as Original Petition No. 71 of 1988 on the file of the Subordinate Judge''s Court, Eluru. The said reference was compromised between the parties therein and the respective writ petitioners were allotted the lands acquired and it was also declared that they shall be entitled to the compensation in respect thereof and to any enhancement of compensation u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The respective writ petitioners thereafter on 19-4-1994 filed application before the respondent-Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.
By the impugned order, reference No. 152 of 1994, dated 23-8-1994, the respondent-Land Acquisition Officer rejected the said applications in the following terms:
"Ref.No. 152/94 Dated: 23-8-1994 Since this application is not made within the time u/s 18 of the L.A. Act, the same is rejected.
Sd/-& & & & & & & Spl. Tahsildar (LA), Unit No. IV,& & & Jangareddigudem.
The petitioners have assailed the said orders of rejection inter alia on the ground that notice u/s 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act had not been served on the petitioners.
Learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition sought to sustain the impugned order of rejection on the ground of limitation. It was contended on behalf of the respondents by the learned Government Pleader that the application filed u/s 18 is hopelessly belated as even according to the petitioners, the matter was compromised between the heirs in 1991 in O.P.No. 71 of 1988 and the compensation was withdrawn by the writ petitioners whereas the applications have been filed u/s 18 three years-thereafter i.e., in 1994 and the same are therefore hopelessly barred by time.
Sri K.V. Satyanarayana, learned Counsel for the writ petitioners relying upon Mahmoodunnissa Begum v. The Government of Hyderabad through the Collector (Baghath), Hyderabad District submitted that the period of limitation shall not commence unless the contingency mentioned in Section 18 has occurred viz., the service of notice from the Land Acquisition Officer u/s 12(2) of the Act. It was further submitted relying upon Smt. Laleemma @ Lalithamma and Others Vs. The Tahsildar-cum-Land Acquisition Officer, that service of notice u/s 12(2) is mandatory and that mere intimation or mere knowledge of passing of an award is not sufficient as held in Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition (S.S.P.), Kurnool Vs. C. Sai Reddy and Others, .
The Supreme Court in State of Punjab Vs. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum and Another, dealing with proviso (b) to Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act, which lays down that reference may be sought "within six weeks" from the date of Collector''s award, which words were substituted by "two months from the date of service of the notice from the Collector u/s 12 Sub-section (2)" by Act XX of 1959 in the application of the Act to the State of Andhra Pradesh, observed that any period of limitation should commence from the date of knowledge of the award. The Supreme Court in that case after referring to and relying upon the ratio of the decision in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh Vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Another, explained as to what constitutes knowledge, thus:
".....It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh Vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Another, is that the party affected by the award must know it. actually or constructively, and the period of six months will run from the date of that knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party u/s 12(2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in Court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award."
A Division Bench of this Court in Sat Reddy''s case (3 supra) referred to the ratio in Qaisar Jehan Begum''s case (4 supra) and observed thus:
"On the facts of that case the Court held that merely because the claimant had filed a petition on a particular date, though it was with reference to the land acquired and the compensation paid, he could not be attributed to knowledge of the award. If knowledge of the award means knowledge of the essential particulars, the present notice u/s 12(2) does not even refer to the essential particulars, nor does it make a mention of the claim made by the writ petitioners. It does not refer to the date of taking possession nor the amount awarded towards the value of the land, or structures and the interest if any paid. It does not state what the decision of the Land Acquisition Officer was with reference to the rival claims, if any, made. In those circumstances, it cannot be said that the claimants were given notice of the award."
The Division Bench further held that since notice u/s 12(2) itself has not been issued as contemplated by the Act, the writ petitioners are not precluded from seeking a reference u/s 18 of the Act beyond the period of two months from the date of the award.
It is therefore apparent that what has to be considered in matters relating to applications filed beyond the period of two months from the date of award u/s 18 of the Act is whether the mandatory notice u/s 12(2) of the Act has been issued by the Collector and whether the writ petitioners can be said to have knowledge of the essential contents of the award. In the case where no notice as contemplated u/s 12(2) of the Act has been issued, the writ petitioners would be entitled to seek reference u/s 18(2) beyond the period of two months from the date of the award. However, where writ petitioners are attributed with the constructive knowledge of the contents of the award, then the period of limitation of two months shall be reckoned u/s 18 of the Act from the date of such knowledge. The Supreme Court in Qaisar Jehan''s case (4 supra) has clarified that knowledge of the award means knowledge of the essential contents of the award.
In the instant case, it is not in dispute that notice u/s 12(2) of the Act was not issued to the writ petitioners. It is, however, not known whether any such notice was issued to late Sri G. Chandraiah or to his sons. On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that the writ petitioners did not make any claim nor were they parties before the Land Acquisition Officer. The petitioner''s father G. Chandraiah was the claimant and "notified" person who attended the award enquiry and claimed ownership as well as possession of the lands acquired and sought payment of entire compensation to him. His five sons viz., (1) Seetharamaiah (2) Subba Rao (3) Satyanarayana (4) Bhaskara Rao (5) Tetaiah @ Butchaiah had also appeared before the Land Acquisition Officer and recorded their statements wherein it was stated that a partition suit O.S. No. 175 of 1981 was filed and that the same was pending adjudication and their request was not to pay the compensation amount in respect of the lands to anybody till the suit is disposed of. The above facts are stated in the award. It was in those circumstances that the respondent-Land Acquisition Officer referred the matter of apportionment to Court u/s 30 of the Act and deposited the amount into Civil Court u/s 31(2) of the Act in respect of the lands in question. The reference which was registered as O.P.No. 71 of 1988 was compromised, as noted above, and decree in terms of the compromise was passed in I.A. No. 1215 of 1991 in O.P.No. 71 of 1988.
In the light of the said facts and circumstances of the case can it be said that the writ petitioners had no knowledge of the contents of the award passed by the respondent-Land Acquisition Officer. The further question is whether the writ petitioners had knowledge of the essential contents of the award. These are, however, pure questions of fact which need to be established in accordance with law and which it may not be appropriate to decide in writ proceedings.
The Supreme Court in Mohammed Hasnuddin Vs. State of Maharashtra, held that the making of an application for reference within the time prescribed by proviso to Section 18 of the Act is a sine qua non for a valid reference by the Collector. It was further held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the reference was made beyond the period prescribed by the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act and if it finds that it was so made, decline to answer the reference.
The respondent-Land Acquisition Officer, as noticed above, by a cryptic order rejected the application without considering any of the relevant aspects adverted to supra. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the writ petitioners need to be afforded an opportunity of establishing the requisite facts before the Civil Court which is competent to decide the reference u/s 18 of the Act as also the competence of the reference made to it u/s 18 of the Act.
Accordingly, these writ petitions can be disposed of with certain appropriate directions, as under:
(a) The impugned order dated 23-8-1994 of the respondent, rejecting the application filed u/s 18 of the Act, be and is hereby set aside.
(b) Consequently the respondent is directed to make a reference u/s 18 of the Act to a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with law, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
(c) It shall be open to the respondent-Land Acquisition Officer/Government to raise objections before the Civil Court with regard to the competency of the reference with respect to the application u/s 18 being barred by time and it shall be open to the Court to which the reference has been made to decide the same in accordance with law and in the light of the evidence that may be placed before Court, oral or documentary by either parties.
(d) With directions as above, the three writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. But, in the circumstances, without costs.