High CourtsSingle Bench

Gurbeer Singh vs State of Uttarakhand and Others

Uttarakhand High Court · Decided on 7 April 2015 · Citation: (2015) 90 ALLCC 211

HON’BLE JUDGES
Umesh Chandra Dhyani, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 320 · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 354
RESULT
Disposed off
CASE NUMBER
Cri. W.P. No. 406 of 2015
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Judgment

7 paragraphs · 919 words

Umesh Chandra Dhyani, J—The writ petitioner, by means of present writ petition, seeks to quash the impugned FIR No. 28 of 2015, dated 8.3.2015, under section 354 IPC, lodged by respondent No. 3, at Police Station Mukhani, Haldwani, District Nainital. A compounding application being CLMA No. 3729 of 2015 has been filed by the parties to indicate that they have buried their differences and have settled their disputes amicably. A joint compromise application has also been filed by them along with affidavits of Gurbeer Singh (petitioner No. 1) and Khashti Devi (respondent No. 4). Khashti Devi (respondent No. 4) is present in person before this Court, duly identified by her Counsel Mr. Sanjay Bhatt, Advocate. Petitioner is also present in person, duly identified by his Counsel Mr. Lalit Sharma, Advocate. Respondent No. 4 (Khashti Devi) says that she has no grievance left against the writ petitioners and she is not interested in prosecuting the petitioner, inasmuch as, the dispute has been settled amicably between the parties with the intervention of some elderly persons of the society. Respondent No. 3 who lodged the criminal law into motion also affirms in the same vein.

2.

Offence under section 354 is compoundable offence within the Scheme of section 320 of Cr.P.C. The question is- whether the respondent No. 4 should be permitted to compound the offence complained of against the petitioner or not?

3.

Learned Counsel for the parties drew the attention of this Court towards the ruling of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 9 JT 457 : (2012) 9 JT 426 : (2012) 9 SCALE 257 : (2012) 10 SCC 303 in which Hon''ble Supreme Court has observed as below:

"The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal Court for compounding the offences under section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim''s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."

4.

A reference may also be had to the decision of Narinder Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2014) AIRSCW 2065 : (2014) CriLJ 2436 : (2014) 4 JT 573 : (2014) 4 SCALE 195 : (2014) 6 SCC 466 in this regard.

5.

The instant case is squarely covered by the said rulings of the Hon''ble Supreme Court. The obvious reply to the question posed above is in the affirmative in view of the ruling of Hon''ble Apex Court in Gian Singh''s case (supra) and Narendra Singh''s decision (supra).

6.

In view of the above, the impugned FIR No. 28 of 2015, dated 8.3.2015, under section 354 IPC, lodged by respondent No. 3, at Police Station Mukhani, Haldwani, District Nainital and the criminal proceedings emanating therefrom, are hereby quashed qua the writ petitioner. Criminal Writ Petition No. 406 of 2015 is thus disposed of in terms of compromise arrived at between the parties.