High CourtsSingle Bench

Gurcharan Singh vs Punjab Mandi Board and Another

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 30 July 1998 · Citation: (1998) 120 PLR 694 : (1998) 4 RCR(Civil) 672

HON’BLE JUDGES
Swatanter Kumar, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 39 Rule 1, Order 39 Rule 2
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Revision No. 4564 of 1997
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Judgment

8 paragraphs · 1,051 words

Swatanter Kumar, J.—One Shri Gurcharan Singh had filed a suit for permanent injunction in the court of learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division) Muktsar, Alongwith the suit an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 C.P.C. was filed, praying for issuance of a temporary prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit land. It was averred by the plaintiff that he was in peaceful possession of 4 kanals of land described in the plaint, for more than 12 years and he has been cultivating the suit land himself. The possession and cultivation by the applicant was in the knowledge of the defendants. It is further stated that he had taken the land on lease 14-15 years ago and thereafter he had been in forcible possession of the same, till now. The defendants were stated to be owners of the property as recorded in the revenue records and they were trying to dispossess the plaintiff forcibly and illegally. According to the plaintiff he shall suffer irreparable loss and damage if he is permitted to forcibly dispossess from the land. As the defendants did not restrain themselves even after the notice was duly served upon them, he has been compelled to file the present suit.

2.

The suit was contested by the defendants who took up the plea that the land in question belonged to the Market Committee, defendant No. 2 since 17.6.1995. It is further submitted that since then every year land is being given on lease by public auction. On 29.3.1994 Kabal Singh, S/o Darshan Singh had given the bid at the rates of Rs. 4,900/- per acre and he deposited the total amount i.e. Rs. 28,690/- on 30.3.1994. Infact, with regard to the said auction the plaintiff Gurcharan Singh had himself participated and gave a bid but was not accepted. He signed the auction register for the year 1993-94, bid was accepted in favour of Gurdit Singh S/o Sham Singh and the successful bidder came in possession. It was stated that the defendant is estopped from filing the present petition. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial Court dismissed the injunction application vide order dated 27.3.1996. This order was unsuccessfully assailed in appeal by the plaintiff appellant. The learned Ist Appellate Court vide a detailed order dated 18.10.1997 dismissed the appeal. It is this order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Muktsar which has been assailed in appeal before this Court in the Civil Revision.

3.

Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the case of N. Umapathy Vs. B.V. Muniyappa, , to argue that he cannot be dispossessed except in due process of law. While learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of '' Smt. Gur Dai Vs. Arjan Singh (Died) through LRs, .

4.

Coming to the facts of the case, admittedly the plaintiff was inducted into the premises as lessee, by participating in a public auction. A lessee would continue to be a lessee unless contrary is shown by positive documentary and oral evidence. In the present case, there is no kind of evidence whatsoever except the fact that possession continued to be shown that of the plaintiff. The conduct of the plaintiff is such which would disentitle him from equitable relief on injunction. During the course of hearing, the Court had called for original auction register of the Market Committee. The original register clearly shows that as late as on 23.3.1994 the plaintiff had participated in the auction and had confirmed the bid in favour of the highest bidder, which admittedly was not the plaintiff. The learned counsel for the plaintiff did not dispute the fact the register is signed by the plaintiff. What was argued that it is one of the relations of the plaintiff who had been in possession. That in any case does not improve the case of the plaintiff. The learned courts below had rightly held that the affidavit of Kabal Singh was an admission in favour of himself and further that the alleged possession has no element of the possession being adverse because admittedly the plaintiff was inducted into the premises as lessee. The Courts also prima facie held that there was no entry in the revenue record which would show that the appellant/plaintiff to be a trespasser in regard to the land in question for the requisite period of 12 years. The revenue records which were produced before the Court below did not reflect that the applicant-plaintiff was in possession for 14-15 years as alleged. The acts of the plaintiff himself are such which do not meet even the minimum basic requirements of the claim of adverse possession. On the contrary, his case of participation in public auction and signing the minutes of the auction register in favour of the Market Committee are destructive to the very claim of adverse possession being sought to be raised by the plaintiff,

5.

In the above circumstances, the judgment of the Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of ''N. Umapathy, supra, has no application to the present case. Firstly, the fact of that case were totally different and secondly their Lordships clearly held that the plaintiff in that suit was liable to ejectment. While in the case of Smt. Gur Dai, supra, the Court had relied upon two judgments of Hon''ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of ''Premji Ratansay and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. J.T. 1994(6) S.C. 585 and Ramanuja Naidu Vs. V. Kanniah Naidu and anothers, .

6.

I am of the considered view that the present case is squarely covered under the observations of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the above referred two cases. The observations in the above referred two cases are more applicable to the facts of the present case and the plaintiff would not be entitled to the discretionary relief of injunction. The said relief has to be denied to the plaintiff for his own conduct as one who demands equity must act in a fair and equitable manner.

7.

Consequently, I find no jurisdictional error in the impugned order apparent on the face of record which would call for interference by this Court in its revisional Jurisdiction.

8.

Dismissed.