Gurcharan Singh vs State of Punjab

S.S. Dewan, J.

Gurcharan Singh petitioner was brought to trial and convicted under Sections 4A, 338 and 337, Indian Penal Code, by the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Ludhiana, on the 7th of February, 1980. A sentence of 15 months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2000/ was imposed on the major charge whilst 4 months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500/ was directed to be imposed under Section 338, Indian Penal Code and to one month and a fine of Rs. 200/ under Section 337, Indian Penal Code. On appeal the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, whilst upholding the conviction of the petitioner reduced his sentence under Section 404A, Indian Penal Code to one year''s rigorous imprisonment and the fine to Rs. 1000/ Under sections 338 and 337, Indian Penal Code, the substantive sentence of the petitioner were maintained but the amount of fine was reduced to Rs. 300/ and Rs. 100/, respectively. The substantive sentences so awarded to the petitioner were, however, ordered to run concurrently.

The prosecution case is simple in nature. On 29th December, 1977, Pritam Singh, P.W. was going to Ludhiana, to purchase fertilizer and Jagir Singh P.W., a resident of village Mundian Khurd, was also going to Ludhiana, on a Rehra. Pritam Singh was given a lift in his Rehra by Jagir Singh. Smt Nirmla and her children also got a lift in the Rehra from village Jamalpur. The wife of Hari Shankar and his children were also in the Rehra. Hari Shankar himself was following the Rehra on a cycle. At about 12 noon when the Rehra of Jagir Singh reached near the Punjab Poultry Farm, Ludhiana, a truck bearing No. ASU 1296 driven by Gurcharan Singh petitioner came from the side of Ludhiana. The petitioner tried to overtake another which was coming from the side of Ludhiana and while doing so, he took his truck towards the right side of the road and struck the Rehra of Jagir Singh which was going on the correct side of the road. As a result of the accident, the Rehra fell into the pits and the occupants of the Rehra sustained injuries. Thereafter, the truck ran over Shivpujan and another unknown person, who were coming on foot, as a result of which those persons died at the spot. Hari Shankar, P.W., also received injures as a result of the accident.

Both the courts below have accepted the prosecution evidence in the case. In fact, the accident as such was not denied and the only defence taken on behalf of the petitioner was that he was not driving the truck but his driver named Purbia was driving it and that he (petitioner) was prosecuted in this case because that Purbia ran away. This cryptic plea of the defence was unhesitatingly rejected by both the Courts below. Before me also the identical contention has been raised. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended with some ingenuity that this accident took place because the tierod of the vehicle got broken and to but tress this argument, reliance was placed on the report, Exhibit P.A. 2 of Head Constable Kahla Singh, P.W. 3, who tested the vehicle.

I am unable to find any merit in this connection. As has already been noticed, the prosecution witnesses are categoric in their statements that the petitioner was driving the vehicle at a high speed and in the process of overtaking a bus, which was going a hald of the truck, the petitioner took his truck to the right side and hit the Rehra. As a result of this accident, 8 persons were injured, 2 persons were crushed to death and a mule also died. The pleas of alleged breakage of tierod seems, to be conclusively denied by the evidence of Pritam Singh P.W. 1 Kalha Singh, who tested the vehicle has stated that on the breakage of the tierod, it is not possible for the driver to control the truck. This witness has also stated that in this case the tierod having been broken, the driver could not control it by any means. From the statement of Kalha Singh, the learned counsel wants me to infer that the petitioner was not negligent while driving the truck and the accident took place because of the breakage of the tierod. Admittedly, there is not a shred of evidence adduced on behalf of the petitioner that the tierod was disconnected while driving. If the tierod of the truck had already broken, it could not be expected of the driver to overtake a bus which was going ahead of him. The manner in which the truck struck against the Rehra and thereafter ran over 2 persons, it could also result in the breakage of the tierod. The prosecution evidence that the petitioner was driving the truck at a very high speed and the truck hit the Rehra as a result of which the occupants of the Rehra sustained injuries and also caused the death of two persons, has not been seriously challenged. In view of those, there is no choice but to reject this cryptic pleas of the defence.

The learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the identity of the petitioner was not established because no identification parade was held. There is no force in this submission. There is ample evidence on the record to connect the petitioner with the offences. All the 3 injured witnesses have consistently stated at the trial that the petitioner was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. The plea of the petitioner that one Purbia was driving the vehicle when the accident took place, has no legs to stand because no particulars of that Purbia were furnished by the petitioner. The petitioner could very well have produced the logbook and other evidence to show that he was not driving the vehicle at the relevant time, but it was not done so for the reasons best known to him. There could be no doubt about his identity because the witnesses had been the petitioner for sometime before the slipped away from the place of accident.

During the course of arguments, the learned counsel cited decisions in case Syed Akbar v. State of Karnataka, A.I.R. 1979, S.C. 1848, Kanan and others v. The State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1127 and Bishnu Deo Shaw v. State of West Bengal, 1979 Crl. L.J. 851. There is no need of going into these decisions. I am afraid the facts of those cases relied on by the petitioner''s counsel are absolutely different and the ratio arrived at on the basis thereof, is clearly distinguishable.

The learned counsel for the petitioner then on the strength of the provisions of Section 360 and 361 of the Criminal Procedure Code, urged that the petitioner be released on a personal bond with surety. I regret my inability to accept this contention. On account of this accident, two persons had lost their and 8 persons had received injuries. In such a situation, no leniency is called for. Motor accident offences are the only cases where sentence of imprisonment and its severity holds out a deterrent effect on the persons who drive their vehicles in a rash and negligent manner. These offences are on the increase by leaps and bounds and, therefore, the provisions of sections 360 and 361, Criminal Procedure Code, are to be applied to such cases only a very rare and exceptional circumstances. The case in hand, in my view, is not of that kind.

The revision petition is hence dismissed both on the point of conviction and sentence. The amount of fine, if realized, whole of it shall be paid to the heirs of the deceased persons,