Gurdas Ram and Others vs Raghbir Chand and Others

R.S. Pathak, C.J.—This is a Defendants'' second appeal arising out of a suit for a declaration.

The Respondents filed a suit on the following allegations. The Appellants as estate proprietors in the village of Rampur had instituted a suit against the village Panchayat pleading that they enioyed title and possession over a shamlat land and were entitled to an injunction restraining the Panchayat from disturbing their possession. The suit was dismissed on February 18, 1960. Subsequently another suit (No. 96 of 1966) was filed by the Appellants against the Panchayat in respect of a part of the same land and therein also the Appellants claimed to be owners in possession. The Appellants succeeded in offecting a compromise with the Panchayat, and on the basis of that compromise the suit (No. 96 of 1966) was decreed in so far that 3/4th of the entire shamlat area was declared as belonging to the Appellants while the remaing 1/4th only was declared as belonging to the Panchayat for the common use of the village residents. The present suit was then filed by the Respondents alleging that the compromise had been obtained by fraud and collusion and therefore was vitiated, and a declaration to that effect was sought in the suit.

The suit was resisted by the Appellants on the ground that the Respondents had no locus standi and were not entitled to maintain it.

The trial Court decreed the suit and granted a declaration that the land in dispute continued to be owned by the Gram Sabha and that the compromise decree was null and void.

An appeal by the Appellants has been dismissed by the learned District Judge, Una by his decree dated March 27, 1971.

In this second appeal, the Appellants reiterate the contention that the Respondents have no locus standi and, therefore, cannot maintain the suit. It is urged that as the shamlat area vests in the Gram Panchayat the Respondents have no interest in it. Reliance is placed on Section 4 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961. In my opinion, the contention is without force. By virtue of Section 4(1) of the said Act all rights, title and interests in the land included in the shamlat deh of a village vest in the Panchayat constituted for that village. But Section 5(1) of the Act declares that all lands vested or deemed to have been vested in a Panchayat under that Act shall be utilised or disposed of by the Panchayat for the benefit of the inhabitants of the village concerned in the manner prescribed. Rule 3(2) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Rules, 1964, sets out the different purposes to which the land in the shamlat deh shall be applied. It is apparent from the list enumerated in that provision that the several purposes relate to the common benefit of the individual residents of the village. It is clear that the Act vests the Panchayat under a statutory obligation to utilise the land for the benefit of the inhabitants of the village. Because of the statutory trust so created, each inhabitant of the village has a beneficial interest in the land. There can be no dispute that because of that beneficial interest the Respondent are entitled to maintain the present suit. They allege that the land purports to have been lost to the village residents by virtue of a fraudulent and collusive transaction, and to remove the cloud caused by this transaction they are entitled to assert that they continue to be entitled to the beneficial interest in the land and to sue for a declaration that the compromise decree is invalid and of no legal effect.

On behalf of the Appellants, reliance has been placed on Surat Ram v. The State ILR (1972) Him. 395. The facts in that case are distinguishable-A writ petition was filed by two Petitioners, the first of whom was a member of a Gram Panchayat and the second was merely a resident in the village falling within the jurisdiction of that Gram Panchayat. The Gram Panchayat decided to institute a suit in a Court of law for a declaration in respect of the shamlat land, and the first Petitioner was authorised to file the suit. The suit was filed, but some time later the Gram Panchayat passed a resolution revoking the authority given by it to the first Petitioner for filing the suit and decided that action be taken for withdrawing the suit. The second Petitioner applied to the Sub-Divisional Officer, who bad jurisdiction u/s 97 of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952 to suspend the execution of the resolution of the Gram Panchayat, and the Sub-Divisional Officer made an order suspending the resolution. That order was rescinded by the Director of Panchayats. The writ petition sought relief against the order of the Director. The writ petition came on before me for hearing, and I took the view that neither Petitioner was entitled to maintain it. It was pointed out that the question whether the suit instituted by the Gram Panchayat should be continued or not was not a matter in which either Petitioner could be said to injoy any direct interest, and that it was for the Gram Panchayat, acting within its powers and in the exercise of its disctetion, to decide whether it should pursue the suit or withdraw it.

In the present case, the compromise decree, in respect of which the declaration has been sought by the Respondents, is a decree which can be said to directly affect the rights of the inhabitants of the village and therefore to deprive them of the benefit created u/s 5(1) of the aforesaid Act. As inhabitants of the village the Respondents are clearly affected. They are therefore entitled to maintain the suit.

Reliance has also been placed by the Appellants on (Sah) Dharam Narain and Another Vs. Gur Saran and Others, and Krishnaveni Ammal and Another Vs. M.D. Soundararajan and Others, In the former case the Allahabad High Court observed that a person claiming relief against the modification of a wakf-deed, on the ground that it operated to his prejudice as he was likely to succeed as shebait, was not entitled to maintain the suit because the appointment of a shebait proceeded not by inheritance but by selection and there was nothing to suggest that the Plaintiff in that case had more than a mere possibility of being so selected. The mere possibility of selection was too tenuous a basis for claiming a right to maintain the suit. In the latter case, the Madras High Court was called upon to consider whether a suit was maintaintble by a creditor for a declaration that certain transfers made by the debtor to his wife and daughter were benami and fictitious and were made for the purpose of defrauding the creditors. The learned Judges held that inasmuch as the Plaintiff had no present right or interest in the properties transferred he was not entitled to maintain the suit. Plainly, both the cases are distinguishable and no reliance can be legitimately placed on them having regard to the facts of the present case.

The appeal fails, and is dimissed with costs.