Gurdial Singh and Others vs Mam Chand and Others

Rakesh Kumar Jain, J.—The Plaintiffs are in second appeal against judgment and decree of the Courts below by which their suit for

possession by way of pre-emption on the basis of being tenants over the suit land, has been dismissed.

The case set up by the Plaintiffs is that Defendant No. 7 as co-sharer sold agricultural land measuring 12 Kanals 08 marlas, comprised in

Khewat No. 49, khatoni Nos. 76 and 87, Rect. No. 19, Killa No. 19/2(0-3), 21(0-17), 22(6-18), 23/1(2-6), Rect. No. 42 Killa No. 3/1/1(2-4)

out of total land measuring 37 Kanals 09 Marias comprised in Khewat No. 49, 605 and 221 as per jamabandi for the year 1984-85, to

Defendant Nos. 1 to 5 vide registered sale deed dated 05.04.1990 and that Defendant No. 7 executed lease deed in favor of Defendant No. 6 to

the extent of 1/3rd share of land measuring 37 Kanals 09 Marias for a period of 99 years from 30.03.1990 to 29.03.2089 vide lease deed dated

30.03.1990 for a consideration of Rs. 10,000/- and possession of the suit land is shown to have been delivered to the lessee, whereas Defendant

No. 7 was not in possession on 30.03.1990 or thereafter, therefore, there is no question of delivery of possession by him to Defendant No. 6 and

the Plaintiffs, being in possession as tenants over the suit land under the vendor, had a superior right of pre-emption which was exercised by way of

the present suit.

Initially, the Defendants were proceeded against ex-parte. Gurdial Singh, Plaintiff No. 1 appeared as PW1 in his ex-parte evidence and the suit

was decreed ex-parte on 25.07.1992. The ex-parte decree was challenged by Defendant No. 5 by moving an application which was dismissed by

the Trial Court on 05.01.2001. However, Civil Appeal No. 72 of 2001 against the said order was allowed on 11.05.2005 and ex-parte judgment

and decree of the Trial Court dated 25.07.1992 was set aside by the lower Appellate Court and the Trial Court was directed to decide the suit

afresh. In the second round, Defendant No. 2 filed his written statement, in which, besides taking preliminary objections, it was alleged that the

land in dispute is situated within municipal limits of Pehowa and is not pre-emptible. In the written statement of Defendant No. 5, it was alleged that

the lease deed dated 30.03.1990 was executed fictitiously and the vendor was in possession of the suit property at the time of the execution of the

sale deed and the possession was delivered to the vendees. It was also alleged that the Plaintiffs were never tenants under the vendor. Defendant

No. 6 filed his separate written statement in which objection was raised that no pre-emption could be sought on behalf of the minor and the suit

was also time barred. It was pleaded that Plaintiff Nos. 19 to 21 were minors. Defendant Nos. 3, 4 and 7 were proceeded against ex-parte vide

order dated 19.09.2005 and 20.10.2005 respectively whereas Defendant Nos. 8 to 26 were given up being unnecessary. The Plaintiff filed

replication only to the written statement filed by Defendant No. 5 and on the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court struck following issues on

14.11.2005:

Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for possession by way of preemption as prayed for on the grounds mentioned in the plaint? OPP

Whether suit of the Plaintiff is not maintainable? OPD 2(a). Whether the suit property is situated within municipal limit of Pehowa? OPD

Whether suit is time barred? OPD

Whether Plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit? OPD

Whether present suit is bad for misjoinder and non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD

While leading their evidence, Plaintiff No. 1 Gurdial Singh appeared as PW1 and tendered some documents, whereas Gurcharan Singh -

Defendant No. 5 appeared as DW5 and led his documentary evidence. The Trial Court decided issue No. 1 and 2(a) in favor of the Defendants

and against the Plaintiffs holding that the Plaintiffs are not the tenants and the land in dispute is not pre-emptible as it is, situated within municipal

limits of Pehowa. Aggrieved against the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the Plaintiffs had filed first appeal u/s 96 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 [for short "" Code of CPC ""] in which they had also filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 of the

Code of CPC in order to lead additional evidence by producing copies of jamabandi for the year 1963-64, 1969-70, 1974-75 and 1979-80. The

said application was, however, dismissed by the First Appellate Court vide its order dated 14.02.2007 on the ground that the reason assigned in

the application that the said jamabandis could not be led as evidence in the Trial Court, despite exercise of due diligence, was not acceptable and

in the absence of any other reason, the Plaintiffs were not allowed to lead the additional evidence. While appreciating the evidence available on

record, the learned First Appellate Court made the following observations:

As regards the Plaintiffs'' averment being tenants over the suit land measuring 12 Kanals 08 Marias, as detailed in para No. 3 of the plaint,

comprised in Khewat No. 49, Khatoni Nos. 86 and 87, Rect. No. 19, Killa Nos. 19/2, 21, 22, 23/1, Rect. No. 42, Killa No. 3/1/1, Plaintiff No.

1 Gurdial Singh PW1 deposed that they used to pay 1/3rd batai to Lal Chand etc. In fact the Plaintiffs are not sure whether it was 1/4th batai or

1/3rd batai since it has been mentioned in affidavit Ex.PW 1/A that it was 1/4th batai and in cross examination he stated that it was 1/3rd batai. In

this regard first of all reference is made to the jamabandi for the year 1984-85 Ex.P3 wherein Subhash Chand vendor-Defendant No. 7 has been

shown owner to the extent of 2/3rd share and Dharam Pal to the extent of remaining 1/3rd share and the Plaintiffs have been shown as ghair

maurusi on 1/3rd batai.

Ex.P4 is the copy of khasra girdawari of the suit land for the period from kharif 1985 to rabi 1990. Ex.P6 is also copy of khasra girdawari

from kharif 1989 to rabi 1990. Ex.P7 is also khasra girdawari from 1992 to rabi 1995. Ex.P8 is the copy of jamabandi for the year 1999-2000

with no entries regarding nature of the rent Likewise Ex.P9 is a copy of khasra girdawari from kharif 1999 to rabi 2000. Ex.P10 is also copy of

jamabandi for the year 1994-95 and Ex.P11 is again copy of khasra girdawari from kharif 2004 to rabi 2005. In the said documents, there is no

entry regarding payment of rent by the Plaintiffs to Subhash Chand.

besides it, no document creating tenancy rights in favour of the Plaintiffs has been placed on the file, nor there is any proof regarding payment

of any rent by the Plaintiffs to Subhash Chand and the version of the Plaintiffs that they had been paying rent to Lal Chand father of Subhash

Chand is not acceptable in the absence of any cogent and conclusive evidence that he was authorized in this regard to collect rent on behalf of his

son from the very beginning.

So in these circumstances, as held by learned Trial Court, the Plaintiffs have failed to prove themselves as tenants over the land in suit at the

time of sale on 05.04.1990 and filing of the suit on 03.04.1991 and date of decree on 03.01.2006. The entries regarding their being ghair-maurusi

cannot ipso-facto go to prove that they were tenants on the suit land unless rent column described their liability to pay rent and that entry alone in

the column of cultivation cannot confer status of tenants as held in Ram Karan v. The Financial Commissioner and Ors. 1980 P.L.J. 295 (P & H).

While dealing with the question of inclusion of the suit land within municipal limits of Pehowa and the land had become un-pre-emptible, the

finding was recorded in para No. 23 of the judgment of the First Appellate Court, which reads as under:

As regards the land in suit now coming within the municipal limits of Pehowa, notifications Ex.D1 and Ex.D2 in this regard have been placed on

the file, which has not been refuted by the other side. So in these circumstances also, in view of this fact, learned trial court has rightly held that the

land in suit was not pre-emptible.

Aggrieved against the judgment and decree of the Courts below, the Plaintiffs have come up in this second appeal, in which learned Counsel for

the Appellants has raised 3 questions, viz. i) the Courts below have misread the evidence on record in respect of determining the question of

tenancy of the Appellants over the land in dispute; ii) the learned First Appellate Court has erred in law in dismissing the application for additional

evidence as the documents sought to be produced on record are all original documents; and iii) the notification No. 33/6/80-3CI dated 24.!

1.1992, relied upon by the Defendants to contend that the land in dispute has been included in the municipal limits of Pehowa, does not pertain to

the land in dispute.

Elaborating his argument on the first point, learned Counsel for the Appellants has submitted that as per jamabandi for the year 1984-85, the

Plaintiffs are recorded as tenants under the vendor, therefore, it would not make any difference if they have not been recorded as tenants in the

subsequent jamabandis as held by the learned First Appellate Court because a tenant would remain a tenant until and unless evicted by an order of

a competent Court of law or when he himself relinquishes his tenancy rights. In this regard, he has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court

Mansu Vs. Shadi Ram, . Although, learned Counsel for the Appellants has also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram

Chand Vs. Randhir Singh and others, and a decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Ratni Devi Vs. Chankanda Ram and Another, but these

judgments are not applicable as the ratio of these judgments is to the effect that if a person is tenant over a part of the land sold, he has a right to

pre-empt the entire land sold. This question is not involved in this appeal. In respect of his second submission that the learned First Appellate Court

has erred in rejecting his application for additional evidence, he has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of North Eastern

Railway Administration, Gorakhpur Vs. Bhagwan Das (D) by Lrs., and Single Bench judgments of this Court in the cases of Ajaib Singh and Ors.

v. The State of Punjab 1987 P.L.J. 226, Kishan and Another Vs. Narain Dass and Others, and Ram Kishan v. Inder Pal and Ors. 2004(3)

R.C.R. 572. In respect of his third submission that the Defendants have failed to connect the suit property with the notification Ex.D1, learned

Counsel for the Appellants has tried to persuade this Court to re-consider the notification on facts, but he could not show from the record that this

objection was ever raised by the Plaintiffs before the Courts below.

In reply to the aforesaid issues, learned Counsel for the Respondents has submitted that insofar as the first question with regard to the jamabandi

for the year 1984-85 is concerned, he has submitted that the said jamabandi does not help the Plaintiffs because column No. 9 of rent is vacant

and 2/3rd share of the land in dispute is under self-cultivation and 1/3rd share is under cultivation of some other person under whom the-Plaintiffs

claim themselves to be the tenants. Meaning thereby, the Plaintiffs did not claim themselves to be the tenants directly under the vendor. Therefore,

it is submitted that the finding recorded by the Courts below in this regard cannot be termed as misreading of evidence. In respect of the second

issue as to whether the First Appellate Court had rightly dismissed the application for additional evidence, he has relied upon a decision of the

Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Krishana v. Magha Ram and Anr. 2010(2) R.C.R.91 to contend that the Plaintiffs cannot be allowed to fill up

the lacuna as they knew the documents which were already in existence. In respect of the third submission with regard to notification about the

inclusion of suit property in the municipal limits of Pehowa, it is submitted that the Plaintiffs cannot be allowed to make out a new case in the

second appeal as it has never been their case before the Courts below that the said notification is not applicable, rather the consistent case of the

Plaintiffs is that the notification was subsequent to the date of sale and to the date of the filing of the suit, therefore, it is prospective in nature and

would not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is, thus, submitted that the Plaintiffs have virtually admitted that by virtue of

the said notification, the land in dispute has come in municipal limits of Pehowa, but were consistently objecting to its applicability on the ground

that it is prospective in nature. In this regard, learned Counsel for the Defendants has read over relevant portions of the judgment of the Trial Court

and the First Appellate Court and also para No. 8 of the Grounds of Appeal, which reads as under -

That the Lower Appellate Court has gravely erred by confirming the findings of the trial court contained under issue No. 2-A even without

dealing with the subsequent notification dated 24.12.1992 (Ex.D-1). Since this notification came into existence during the pendency of the suit,

therefore, both the courts below have gravely erred by holding that the suit land is not pre-emtable. The suit of the Plaintiffs has already been

decreed on 25.07.1992 by Additional Senior Sub Judge, Pehowa Annexure A-6 and the Plaintiffs-Appellants had already implemented this

decree through executing court and as such they have got substantial right in the suit land, therefore, subsequent notification dated 24.12.1992

Ex.D-1 is not applicable to the present suit. Both the Courts below have gravely erred by relying upon the subsequent notification dated

24.12.1992 (Ex.D-1) in this case especially when they had already implemented the preemption decree dated 25.07.1992 through executing

court.

It was, thus, pointed out that it was never the case of the Plaintiffs that khasra numbers and areas mentioned in the notification do not cover the

land in dispute. In this regard, learned Counsel has relied upon two decisions of this Court in the case of Rajinder Parshad v. Sohan Lal and Ors.

1988 P.L.J. 363 and Bachittar Singh v. Gurnam Kaur etc. 1980 C.L.J. 296. He has further submitted that under the Pre-emption Act, 1913, the

Plaintiffs have to maintain their superior rights at all the three stages, namely, sale, suit and decree. In this case, sale was effected on 05.04.1990,

suit was filed on 03.04.1991 and decree was passed on 03.01.2006. In support his submission, he has relied upon a decision of the Supreme

Court in the case of Bhagwan Das (Dead) by L Rs and Ors. v. Chet Ram 1970 P.L.J. 780.

I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance.

First of all, I shall dispose of CM No. 4610-C of 2010 filed by the Appellants u/s 151 of the Code of CPC to place on record true translated

copies of the document Annexures P-2 to P-5 (jamabandis for the years 1963-64, 1969-70, 1974-75 and 1979-80) on the ground that the

jamabandis in vernacular (in Hindi) have already been filed with the memo of appeal and the translated copies thereof are being filed for the

convenience of the Court. Reply to this application was filed by the Respondents, in which it was alleged that application for additional evidence

was already dismissed by the learned District Judge, Kurukshetra vide his order dated 14.02.2007, therefore, these documents cannot be allowed

to be taken on record.

It is pertinent to mention that during the pendency of the first appeal before, the First Appellate Court, the Appellants had filed an application

under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 of the Code of CPC for permission to lead additional evidence for the purpose of producing

jamabandis for the years 1963-64, 1969-70, 1974-75 and 1979-80, but the said application was dismissed by the learned District Judge,

Kurukshetra on 14.02.2007 on the ground that the said documents were within the knowledge of the Appellants earlier, therefore, in terms of

Order 41 Rule 27(1)(aa) of the Code of Civil Procedure, they were not allowed to lead additional evidence in appeal. In this case, the Appellants

have also challenged the said order dated 14.02.2007 passed by the First Appellate Court by which their application for leading additional

evidence was dismissed. It may also be clarified that the application for leading additional evidence was dismissed on the same day when the main

appeal was dismissed by the First Appellate Court. The first question, which is to be decided by this Court, is as to ""whether the First Appellate

Court should have or should not have allowed the application for additional evidence because learned Counsel for the Appellants has placed heavy

reliance upon the jamabandis Annexures P-2 to P-5 in order to show that they were in possession of the land in dispute as tenants"".

Before appreciating the respective contentions, it would be worthwhile to peep into the relevant provisions of law, namely, Section 107 and

Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which are reproduced as under:

Section 107 of the Code of Code of Civil Procedure

Powers of appellate Court.-

(1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, an appellate Court shall have power-

(a) to determine a case finally;

(b) to remand a case;

(c) to frame issues and refer them for trial;

(d) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken.

(2) Subject as aforesaid, the appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred

and imposed by this Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein.

Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Code of Civil Procedure

Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.-

(1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if-

[(aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within

his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or]

(b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other

substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence of document to be produced, or witness to be examined.

(2) Whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the court shall record the reason for its admission.

Section 107 of the Code of CPC empowers an Appellate Court to determine a case finally, to remand a case, to frame issues and refer them

for trial and to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. With this substantive enabling power, Order 41 Rule 27 of the

Code of CPC came into being which lays down further conditions and circumstances in which the Appellate Court could take the additional

evidence. Originally, there were two conditions in Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, i.e. (a) if the Court from whose decree the

appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, and (b) if the Appellate Court requires any document to be

produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, but in the year 1976, Rule (aa)

was also inserted in Order 41 Rule 27(1) of the Code of CPC which provides mat if the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes

that despite exercise of due diligence, the evidence which is sought to be produced, was not within his knowledge or despite exercise of due

diligence, the evidence could not be produced by him when the decree appealed against was passed, could be granted permission. Thus, Clause

(aa) further enables the Court to give permission but Clause (b) of Order 41 Rule 27(1) empowers the Appellate Court to give permission for

additional evidence if the Court itself requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined for the purpose of its assistance for

coming to a just conclusion and for any other substantial cause. Substantial cause though has not been defined, therefore, it depends upon facts and

circumstances of each case. In the light of the aforesaid provisions, the order passed by the learned First Appellate Court dismissing the application

of the Appellants for additional evidence is to be examined. Even if the documents, namely, jamabandis which are sought to be produced on

record, were within knowledge of the Appellants, the Court can always allow it in terms of Order 41 Rule 27(1)(b) of the Code of Civil

Procedure. To my mind, documentary evidence which cannot be created or manufactured for the first time after the decision of the suit i.e. any

official document whose authenticity is not in dispute and is capable of assisting the Court to take final decision in respect of the dispute between

the parties, such evidence should not normally be disallowed to be taken on record. In this regard, the judgments relied upon by learned Counsel

for the Appellants in the case of North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur (supra) and Ram Kishan (supra) are fully applicable, whereas

the judgment relied upon by learned Counsel for the Respondents in the case of Smt. Krishana (supra) is not applicable as the facts of that case

were altogether different because in that case, application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of CPC by which permission was sought to lead

additional evidence to prove documents Mark-A to Mark-C, namely, lease deed, agreement and receipt respectively, were privately prepared

documents regarding which this Court had held that those were within the knowledge of the party who could have produced those documents

before the Trial Court but after the decision of the suit, in order to fill up the lacuna, the said documents cannot be allowed to be produced on

record. Thus, on its own facts, there is no quarrel with the law laid down by this Court in the case of Smt. Krishana (supra).

In view of the aforesaid discussion, the question with regard to order passed by the First Appellate Court on 14.02.2007 by which application

filed by the Appellants for leading additional evidence to produce on record certified copies of jamabandis was dismissed, is decided in favour of

the Appellants and the said order is set aside much-less overruled and hence, the CM No. 4610-C of 2010 is allowed and the documents

Annexures P-2 to P-5 are taken on record as additional evidence.

Now, the second question is as to ""whether the Appellants have a superior right for the purpose of pre-empting the sale in respect of the suit

land"". The Appellants had initially claimed their right of tenancy on the basis of jamabandi for the year 1984-85. The said jamabandi has been

thoroughly explained by learned Counsel for the Respondents. He has submitted that the jamabandi for the year 1984-85 shows Khewat No. 49

which has two Khataunis, namely, 86 and 87. In Khatauni No. 86, ownership of Dharampal is shown to the extent of 1/3rd share and ownership

of Subhash Chand to me extent of 2/3rd share, whereas the cultivation of Dharampal is mentioned to the extent 1/3rd share and cultivation of

Subhash Chand is mentioned to the extent of 1/3rd share and remaining 1/3rd share is shown to be in possession of Sadhu Singh S/o Lal Singh

who had further sub-let 1/3rd share of the land to the present Appellants. This Khatauni No. 86 pertains to Khasra Nos. 19//19/2(0-3), 21(0-17),

22(6-18), 23/1(2-6), total measuring 10 Kanals 04 Marias. Column No. 9 in the jamabandi for the year 1984-85 is blank as it does not show

whether the land in question is on cash rent or on batai tihai. Khatauni No. 87 pertains to Khasra No. 42//3/1/1(2-4) in which names of the present

Appellants are conspicuously absent, meaning thereby they are not tenants in any form over this piece of land. Faced with this situation, learned

Counsel for the Appellants has referred to jamabandi for the year 1963-64. In this jamabandi, Khasra No. 42//3/1/1 is shown to be in self-

cultivation of the owners, whereas Khasra Nos. 19//19/2, 21, 22, 23/1 are shown to be in the cultivation of the Appellants as Gair Marausi

(tenants) on batai. In jamabandi for the year 1969-70, a new entry had come in respect of land falling in Mustatil Nos. 19//19/2, 21, 22, 23/1 in

which Dharampal is shown to be without patta 1/3rd share, Subhash Chand without patta 1/3rd share and rest of the share, i.e. 1/3 share, was on

lease with Sadhu Singh S/o Lal Singh, who was getting it cultivated through the present Appellants as sub-tenants and the lease period, as per

column No. 12, was for 20 years starting from 15.06.1965 to 14.06.1985, meaning thereby in the year 1985, when the jamabandi for the year

1984-85 was prepared, the present Appellants were no more lease-holders under Sadhu Singh S/o Lal Singh and for that reason alone, there is no

entry in the column of rent or in the column of remarks in the jamabandi for the year 1984-85 to indicate the status of the Appellants qua the land

in dispute. Thus, even after considering the jamabandis Annexures P-2 to P-5, which have been allowed to be taken on record by way of

additional evidence, the case of the Appellants has not improved. Insofar as the judgment in the case of Mansu (supra) is concerned, the Supreme

Court had held that there is a presumption in favour of continuity of possession on the basis of entries in record of rights unless by some cogent

evidence or overt act, it could be proved that the tenancy has been abandoned or otherwise the tenant has been evicted in accordance with law.

There is no quarrel with the law laid down by the Supreme Court as it is based upon the principle of law that once a tenant always remain a tenant

until and unless evicted by order of a competent Court of law or tenancy rights are relinquished or abandoned, but in the present case, after 1963-

64, all the entries shows that the Appellants took the land in dispute falling in Mustatil Nos. 19//19/2, 21, 22, 23/1/1 from leaseholder Sadhu Singh

S/o Lal Singh for a period of 20 years which started from 15.06.1965 and ended up to 14.06.1985, therefore, as soon as the lease period was

over, their tenancy rights were also over as it was a fixed time lease and not a tenancy in perpetuity. Moreover, learned Counsel for the Appellants

has failed to show any law which recognizes a right of a sub-tenant as a superior right for the purpose of pre-empting the sale. Thus, in view of

above discussion, I do not subscribe to the view of learned Counsel for the Appellants that the Appellants were tenants over the land in dispute on

the date of sale, suit and decree.

The last question involved in this appeal is about the inclusion of land in the municipal limits. As a matter of fact and as argued by learned

Counsel for the Respondents, it has not been a case of the Appellants that the land in dispute has not been included in the municipal limits vide

notification No. 33/6/80-3CI dated 24.11.1992 issued by the Local Government Department in exercise of the powers conferred under Sub-

Section 3 of Section 4 of the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973, rather the consistent stand of the Appellants Was that since the notification has come

after the date of sale and suit, it is prospective in its operation and not applicable. In this regard, a decision of this Court in the case of Rajinder

Parshad (supra) would be worthwhile to refer in which a reference was made to the notification issued by the Government u/s 8 and 15(1) dated

03.10.1985 by which it has been decided to exclude sales of land falling in the areas of any municipal committee from right of pre-emption. Since

no dispute has ever been raised by learned Counsel for the Appellants on facts that the land in dispute has not come within the municipal limits by

virtue of notification dated 24.11.1992, the only question which is required to be adjudicated upon is as to ""whether the said notification would be

applicable"". The Supreme Court has settled the dispute once for all that the pre-emptor, who exercises its piratical right, has to maintain his right at

all the three stages i.e. at the time of sale, filing of suit and at the time of passing of the decree by the Trial Court. This law has been settled by the

Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwan Das (supra). In the present case, the Trial Court decree is dated 03.01.2006, therefore, at that time, after

inclusion of the land in dispute within the municipal limits, the Appellants had lost their superior rights to pre-empt the sale and hence they were held

not entitled to any relief by the Courts below.

No other point has been raised.

In view of above discussion, I do not find any question of law much-less substantial involved in this appeal, as envisaged u/s 100 of the Code

of CPC and as such, the present appeal is hereby dismissed with costs throughout.