Gurdial Singh vs Ram Singh Sachdeva

Rajendra Nath Mittal, J.—This Revision Petition has been filed by the landlord against the judgment of the Appellate Authority, Jullundur dated October 22, 1979 affirming the judgment of the Rent Controller, dismissing the application for ejectment.

Briefly, the facts are that Gurdial Singh landlord, who was Chief Agricultural Officer, gave the house in dispute on lease to Ram Singh Sachdeva, respondent on a rent of Rs. 250/- per mensum, in January, 1971. The petitioner retired from the service on April 4, 1972. He filed on application u/s 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act for ejectment of the respondent on the ground that he required the premises for his own use and occupation and that of his married son and that he had not vacated any house within the residential area of Jullundur without any sufficient cause. The application was contested by the respondent, who controverted the allegations of the petitioner. He further pleaded that an open space, servant quarters and a garage were also rented out to him which have not been included in the application for ejectment and consequently the application was bad being for ejectment from part of the property. Some other pleas were also taken but they do not survive in the Revision Petition.

The learned Rent Controller held that the petitioner did not require the premises bonafide for his own use and occupation and that the application for ejectment was made for part of the property. Consequently, he dismissed the same. On appeal the Appellate Authority reversed the finding of the Rent Controller that the application was for ejectment of part of the property and held that it was for whole of the property let-out to the respondent. On the other point it came to the conclusion that the petitioner had failed to establish that he had not vacated the premises in the residential area of Jullundur without sufficient cause and, therefore, affirmed the order of ejectment. The landlord has come up in revision to this Court. During the pendency of the Revision Petition, the respondent died on January 12, 1981. Civil Misc. Application No. 1748-CII of 1981 was filed to the effect that cut of his four legal representatives namely Avtar Singh, Sarvdaman Singh, Gurdip Singh and Manmohan Singh the latter two be brought on the record which was allowed vide order dated May 26, 1981.

It was contended by Mr. Sarin that the petitioner was working as Chief Agricultural Officer in January 1971 when he leased out the house to the respondent with an understanding that it would be vacated by him in April, 1973 when he would retire from government service. He further argued that the respondent seeing the necessity of the petitioner had agreed to vacate the premises in the first week of April, 1973, and gave a writing dated 5th December, 1972, in that regard. According to him, the learned Appellate Authority, while deciding the appeal, did not discuss the evidence of the petitioner and affirmed the finding of the Rent Controller. He next submitted that the Appellate Authority further erroneously held that the petitioner had leased out the house to the respondent in January, 1971, that is, about one year and three months prior to the date of retirement and thus he had vacated the premises to question without sufficient cause. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents has urged that the finding that the petitioner did not require the premises either for his own use and occupation or that of his son is one of fact and cannot be reversed in revision petition.

I have heard the learned counsel at a considerable length. The first question that arises for determination is as to whether a concurrent finding of the Authorities regarding personal necessity can be upset in revision. Sub-section (5) of Section 15 of the Act provides that the High Court may call and examine the records relating to any order passed for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such an order and may pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit. The sub-section came up for interpretation before the Supreme Court in Nanak Chand v. Inderjit and others 1959 R.C.J 881, wherein it was held that the revisional power conferred on the High Court under sub-section (5) of Section 15 is wider than that conferred by section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under the sub-section, the High Court has jurisdiction to examine the legality or propriety of the order under revision and that would justify examination of the finding by the Rent Control Authorities about the requirement of the landlord u/s 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act. This case was followed by this Court in Feroze Ali Shah vs. Jamil Ali Shah and another 1981 (1) R.C.J. 77, wherein it was held that only proper concurrent findings are binding on the High Court and that the Court is entitled to go into evidence and re-appreciate the same in order to point out that the findings rendered by the Courts below are lacking in propriety. I am in respectful agreement with the above observations.

The learned counsel for the respondents made a reference to Sri. Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and Others Vs. Rangaswamy Chettiar, Shri Rattan Chand Jain v. Shri Charan Singh 1978 (1) R.L.R. 589, and Nasib Chand v. Mohan Singh and others 1980 (2) R.L.R. 208. In M/s. Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court were interpreting Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The learned Judges even in that case observed that if a taint of unreasonableness results in miscarriage of justice, the high Court can exercise revisional powers. The facts of that case are also distinguishable. In Rattan Chand Jain''s case (supra), this Court observed that as the Appellate Authority had construed the word ''require'' wrongly, the order was bad. The learned Judge, therefore, upset the finding of the appellate Court. Similarly, in Nasib Chand''s case (supra), the learned Judge observed that the authorities below had acted illegally in coming to the conclusion that the need of the landlord was bonafide. He, consequently, accepted the revision petition and reversed the order of the authorities below. Thus, from the latter two judgments mentioned above, it cannot be held that the finding of the authorities below regarding personal necessity can, in no circumstances be gone into in revision by this Court I am, therefore, of the opinion that the above judgments are of no help to the respondents.

Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is not disputed that the petitioner was working as the Chief Agricultural Officer from which post he retired on 4th April, 1972. He deposed that he had constructed the house for his own residence He knew Ram Singh Sachdev, who was the retired Principal of the College, since deceased, and he gave it on lease to him. He required the house for his own use and occupation and that of his married son, which was known to him. He gave letter, Exhibit A-5, dated 5th December, 1972, giving an undertaking that he would vacate the house in the first week of April, 1973, under all conditions. Maghar Singh A.W-1 and Saranpal Singh A.W-2 (son of the petitioner) supported him. There are no grounds to disbelieve the statement of the petitioner who immediately after his retirement requested the deceased to vacate the premises and the latter expressed his regrets that he could not vacate the premises at that time and gave on undertaking that he would do so by 1st April, 1973 (see Exhibit A.5). The writing has been assailed by the learned counsel for the respondents on the ground that the petitioner wanted to get certain benefits from the Government and, therefore, it was executed by the respondent. I regret my inability to accept the explanation. He has not been able to tell me as to what benefit could be derived by the petitioner from the writing. The deceased was a highly educated person and retired as a Principal. It cannot be expected that he would pass on such a writing to the petitioner without intending to vacate the house. It was a natural desire of the petitioner to stay in his house after his retirement. The respondent cannot derive any benefit from the fact that the petitioner is slaying in his village. After the retirement, there was no alternative for him but to stay in the village as the house had not been vacated by the deceased. Thus, it cannot be held that as the petitioner has started living in the village, he does not require the house for his own use and occupation.

The learned counsel for the respondents has also urged that there was no reason for the petitioner''s son Saranpal Singh to stay at Jullundur as he was managing his farm in the village and living there since long. He also stated that his son was too young to be educated at Jullundur. I am not convinced with the argument. It is in the evidence that the petitioner has only one son and his wife has already died. It is but natural that after his retirement, he would like someone to stay with him. If both of them stay at Jullundur, his son can very well manage the farm, which is at a distance of 30 miles from there. The son was married in 1971, whereas he appeared in the witness-box in 1974. By now even his son must have started going to the school. It cannot be denied that Jullundur has many known educational institutions where the children can be given better education. It may also be highlighted that the deceased did- not dare to appear in the witness-box to deny the personal necessity of the petitioner and give explanation as to in what circumstances the writing. Exhibit A-5, was given by him to the the petitioner. After taking into consideration all the above circumstances, I am of the opinion that the petitioner requires the premises for his personal use and occupation. A similar view was taken by this Court in Padam Prashad Jain v. Shri Arma Ram 1981 C.L.J. (Civil) 105. In that case, the petitioner wanted to reside in his town after his retirement. A plea was taken that his sons and daughters were employed elsewhere and, therefore, it could not be held that he bona fide required the house, The Appellate Authority held that the petitioner did not require the premises bona fide. This court reversed the finding and held his requirement was a bona fide one.

The next question that arises for determination is as to whether the petitioner is entitled to get the house vacated on the ground of personal necessity in 1972 when he gave it on lease in January, 1971. The learned Appellate Court has observed that the petitioner had vacated the premises without sufficient cause in 1971 when he had to retire in April, 1572, and, therefore, he could not seek ejectment of the tenant. It is admitted that he at the time when he let out the house to the deceased, was in service. His son was also not married at that time. It is common knowledge that in these days of price hike, it has become difficult even for high officer to make both ends meet without supplementing their income from other sources. In addition, the taxation on houses in urban areas is too high. In that situation, if the petitioner gave the house on lease to the deceased, it cannot be said that be parted with the possession of the house without sufficient reason.

Faced with the above situation, the learned counsel for the respondents sought to urge that the learned Appellate Authority had erroneously held that the application had been filed for ejectment from a part of the building and not the whole which was leased out to the deceased. He challenged the finding of the learned Appellate Authority in that regard. I am not impressed with this argument of the learned counsel as well. It is not disputed that no rent note was got executed by the petitioner from the deceased When the application was first filed, no objection was taken by the respondent to the effect that the open space, servant quarter and garage were included in the tenancy and the application was for partial ejectment. It was at a subsequent stage that the objection was taken. The deceased, who was alive when the case was being tried by Rent Controller, did not appear in the witness-box to say that he also took on lease the servant quarter, open space and grarage. It is well-settled that if a party does not appear to support its case, adverse inference is to be taken against it. In my view, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Appellate Authority in that regard is correct and I affirm the same.

For the aforesaid reasons, I accept the revision petition, set aside the judgments of authorities below and order ejectrrent of the respondents. I, however, grant them three month''s time to vacate the premises subject to their depositing all arrears of rent in the Court of the Rent Controller within a period of two weeks and to go on depositing in that Court future rent, in advance, by the 15th of each month. In case they fail to deposit the rent, as ordered above, they shall be liable to be ejected forthwith. No costs.