GURNAM SINGH vs G.S. GILL

THE Complainant, Gurnam Singh, filed a complaint under Section 12 of the CPA, 1986 against Dr. G.S. Gill, OP1, Dr. Sushant Srivastava, OP2, Dr. Sohan Lal Arora, OP3 and United India Insurance Co. Ltd., OP4, before the District Forum, Mansa. The District Forum, Mansa, accepted the complaint against OPs 1, 2 & 3 and gave various directions against them in its order.

AGGRIEVED by that order, First Appeal was preferred before the State Commission, Chandigarh. The State Commission, Chandigarh came to the conclusion that no cause of action had arisen at Mansa, except for a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/ - which was paid to OP3, at Sardulgarh, which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of District Forum, Mansa but OP3 has denied this fact in his reply. The cause of action had arisen at Bhatinda. The State Commission came to the following conclusion: - "13. In view of the above discussion, we accept both the appeals. The impugned order passed by the District Forum is set aside. The matter is remanded back to the learned District Forum, Bhatinda to decide the matter afresh and record of the District Forum, Mansa, be also sent to learned District Forum, Bhatinda, to pass fresh order in accordance with law, under intimation to the learned District Forum, Mansa".

We have heard the counsel for the petitioner/complainant. He has cited an authority reported in Hasham Abbas Sayad Vs. Usman Abbas Sayyad & Ors., : (2007) 2 SCC 355. It is a case under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Our attention was invited towards para No. 24 of the judgment, which runs as follows: - "24. We may, however, hasten to add that a distinction must be made between a decree passed by a court which has no territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction in the light of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and a decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction in regard to subject -matter of the suit. Whereas, in the former case, the appellate court may not interfere with the decree unless prejudice is shown, ordinarily the second category of the cases would be interfered with".

We are of the considered view that this para, rather supports the finding given by the State Commission.

MOREOVER , the Hon''ble Apex Court in Sonie Surgical Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.,, 2010 CTJ 2 (Supreme Court) (CP), was pleased to hold at para Nos. 9 & 10, as under: "9. ....... In our opinion, an interpretation has to be given to the amended Section 17(2) (b) of the Act, which does not lead to an absurd consequence. If the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, it will mean that even if a cause of action has arisen in Ambala, then too, the complainant can file a claim petition even in Tamil Nadu or Guwahati or anywhere in India, where a branch office of the insurance company is situated. We cannot agree with this contention. It will lead to absurd consequences and lead to bench hunting. In our opinion, the expression ''branch office'', in the amended Section 17(2) would mean the branch office where the cause of action has arisen. No doubt this would be departing from the plain and literal words of Section 17(2)(b) of the Act but such departure is sometimes necessary (as it is in this case) to avoid absurdity. [vide G.P. Singh''s Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Ninth Edition,, 2004 P. 79].

In the present case, since the cause of action arose at Ambala, the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Haryana, alone will have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint".

IT must be borne in mind that the parallels cannot be drawn between the provisions regarding jurisdiction in Section 21 CPC and Section 11 of CP Act. The difference is deliberate. Again, in Ethiopian Airlines Vs. Ganesh Narain Saboo : (2011) 8 SCC 539, in para 65, it was held, as under: - "However, notwithstanding the fact that the proceedings of the National Commission are "suits", under the Carriers Act, vide the expressio unius principle, the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, clearly enumerates those provisions of the CPC that are applicable to proceedings before the Consumer Fora. Such provisions include 13(4), in which the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, vests those powers which are vested in a civil court under CPC to the District Forum. However, according to the principle of ''expressio unius'', because the legislature expressly made the aforementioned provisions of CPC applicable to the consumer proceedings, the legislature is, therefore, deemed to have intentionally excluded all other provisions of CPC from applying to the said proceedings. This is particularly true, since, as explained above, the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, sets forth an exhaustive list of procedures, distinguishable from those required under CPC, that the consumer redressal fora must follow. Therefore, since the CPA, 1986, does not state that Section 86 applies to the Consumer Fora''s proceedings, that section of CPC should be held to be not applicable.

Similar view was taken in Malay Kumar Ganguly Vs. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee & Ors., : (2009) 9 SCC 221, ECIM Exports Vs. South Indian Corporation Agencies Ltd.& Anr., : 2009 -14 SCC 412 (para 7) and Rajeev Hitendra Pathak & Ors. Vs. Achyut Kashinath Karekar & Anr., : (2011) 9 SCC 541. Consequently, the court is not to find out whether the conditions laid down in Section 21 of the CP Act, 1986, stand complied with or not".

Consequently, we dismiss the revision petition and affirm the order passed by the State Commission. The parties are directed to appear before the District Forum, Bhatinda, as directed by the State Commission. Accordingly, IA 6906/2014, stands disposed of.