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Judgment
3 paragraphs · 671 wordsI.S. Tiwana, J.
The appellant stands convicted under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and also under Section 161 Indian Penal Code. The allegations which have been taken to be established against him are that on 25th of October, 1982, he accepted Rs. 40/ as illegal gratification from Major Singh complainant for the supply of a copy of jamabandi which the latter needed in connection with an application for getting a tubewell connection. Since the learned Counsel for the appellant assails this conviction primarily on the ground that evidence of demand of bribe as deposed to by Major Singh remains uncorroborated by any independent evidence, I do not feel the necessity of examining the facts in detail. The learned Counsel contends that neither the statement of this complainant to the Vigilance Inspector Exhibit PE can possibly be treated as a corroborative piece of evidence nor the only other witness, i.e. Harkamal Singh, P.W.6, who is stated to have actually witnessed the recovery of the tainted money from the appellant corroborates the statement of Major Singh complainant, so far as the "demand of bribe" is concerned. I have scanned the evidence in the light of the submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties and find that the submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties and find that the learned Counsel for the appellant is right in submitting that the statement of Major Singh complainant, that the appellant demanded Rs. 40/ for the supply of a copy of the jamabandi, remains uncorroborated by any independent piece of evidence. It is conceded by the complainant himself in his crossexamination that before the alleged demand of bribe on 2.10.1982 or few days earlier to the same, he had not gone to any office of the Electricity Department to make any application nor did he actually make any such application. He also accepted that even subsequent to the above noted incident, he never applied for the said tubewell connection and, therefore, never procured any copy of the jamabandi from anywhere for the said purpose. It, thus, remains doubtful that the complainant ever needed a copy of the jamabandi for the purpose deposed to. Harkamal Singh, P.W.6, who joined as a shadow witness, also does not depose that the complainant ever stated in his presence or told him in any other manner that the appellant had raised the abovenoted illegal demand for the supply of the copy of the jamabandi to him. It has repeatedly been laid down by the final court that the giver of bribe is normally to be treated as an accomplice and so has to be treated the shadow witness and before recording the conviction of the delinquent Government servant and an independent corporation of the evidence of the accomplice i.e. the complainant and the shadow witness is normally sought for, if not as a matter of law, then at least as a matter of prudence. If any authority is needed for the above noted proposition, a reference to Mohammad Hussain Umar Kodira v. K.S. Dalipsinghji, 1970 S.C.C. (Crl.) 99 can be made with advantage. It has been ruled therein that the combined effect of sections 133 and 114, Illustration (b), of the Indian Evidence Act is that though the conviction based upon the accomplice''s evidence may be legal, but the Court will not accept such evidence unless it is corroborated in material particulars from an independent source. As has been pointed out above. In the case in hand even Harkamal Singh, P.W.6 has nowhere stated that complainant Major Singh ever informed him of any demand of illegal gratification by the appellant.
In the light of the discussion above, I am satisfied that there is no corroboration of the factum of demand of illegal gratification by the appellant and in the absence of the same, his conviction cannot be sustained. He is entitled to the benefit of doubt. I, therefore, allow the appeal and while setting aside his conviction, I acquit him.
