High CourtsDivision Bench

Gurpreet Kaur vs The Union of India (UOI) and Another

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 3 October 1989 · Citation: (1990) 1 ILR (P&H) 365 : (1990) 97 PLR 145 : (1990) 2 RCR(Rent) 26

HON’BLE JUDGES
M.M. Punchhi, J · Amrit Lal Bahri, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226, 227
CASE NUMBER
Civil Writ Petition No. 5497 of 1989
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Judgment

5 paragraphs · 564 words

M.M. Punchhi, J.—The petitioner on 12th March, 1987 was allotted a flat by the Chandigarh Housing Board. In terms of the agreement she was required to accept or refuse the allotment within 30 days of the issue of the letter. In case of acceptance, she was required to deposit a sum of Rs. 12,723/- and the balance in regulated instalments. Clause 3 of the agreement provided that in case the deposit was not made within the time stipulated then the allotment shall be deemed to have been cancelled and the deposit would be refunded after forfeiting such amount as provided in Clause 19 thereof. Forfeiture was to be from the initial deposit of 10 per cent. Besides the petitioner was required to submit some documents. The petitioner made payment belatedly on 29th April, 1989 which was accepted at the counter by the Board. Thereafter the petitioner made various payments as detailed in para 2 of the petition which too were accepted by the Board. Now the Board has turned round to invoke Clause 3 of the agreement to say that since 15 percent, that is to say, Rs. 12,723/- were deposited belatedly, the allotment of the petitioner stood deemingly cancelled.

2.

Clause 4 of the agreement makes interesting reading. The Chairman of the Chandigarh Housing Board or any other person authorised by the Board can extend the period of 30 days-referred to in Clause 3. The time is further extendable subject to the maximum of three months. On belated payment interest is chargeable "and in some cases even penal interest is permissible.

3.

Contention of the learned counsel for the Housing Board in these circumstances that the terms of Clause 3 of the agreement are absolute is not sound. If in a given set of circumstances, time is extendable under Clause 4 then rigour of Clause 3 is not absolute. Besides, the Board was, in case the allotment is cancelled, under obligation to refund forthwith the amount as provided in Clause 19 of the agreement Concededly, no refund was sent to the petitioner. Rather on the contrary, from time to time, the instalments were being kept accepted. In this situation, it is too late in the day for the Housing Board to say that there was a deemed cancellation of allotment. We are rather of the view that the allotment in favour of the petitioner cannot be held to have deemingly been cancelled.

4.

Learned counsel for the Board says that the petitioner has not complied with the directions requiring her to send some documents and those sent have been found to be suspicious. No order as yet in regard thereto seems to have been passed by the Board. If it is a case of cancellation of allotment, the respondent-Board would have to initiate proceedings in accordance with law against the petitioner. On that part, we do not pronouce and leave it open to the Board to take such appropriate action against the petitioner as is known to law.

5.

For the foregoining reasons, we partially allow this petition declaring the allotment of the petitioner subsisting even though there was late payment leaving other questions as spelled out earlier open to the Board. The Board could, however, raise a demand of interest for belated payment. The Board''s learned counsel says that no interest on that count shall be charged from the petitioner. No costs.