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Judgment
Ramaswami, J.—This is a Civil Revision Petition filed against the order made by the learned Subordinate Judge of Kozhikode in O. S. No.
16 of 1952.
The facts are: The plaintiff Kuttikrishna Menon was employed in the Guruvayur Devaswom of which the present hereditary trustees are
defendants 2 and 3. The Plaintiff''s services were terminated with effect from 10-7-1952. The Plaintiff then rushed to Court with this suit in order to
nullify this order and also for recovery of damages contending that the order terminating his services was illegal, void and inoperative and that he
was not given an opportunity to explain the charges against him, if any, before removal from service.
The contention of the defendants was that this suit was impliedly barred by reason of Sections 49 and 93, Madras Act 19 of 1951 read with
Section 9, C P. C. The learned Subordinate Judge relying upon - ''Kallalagar Devasthanam v. Thiru Vengudathan Thirumalai Nambigal'', AIR
1943 Mad 222 (V30) (A) and - AIR 1940 105 (Privy Council) held that where principles of natural justice or judicial procedure have not been
complied with, civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases, and gave a finding under issue 1 that the suit was maintainable and that he had
jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of the suit. Hence this Civil Revision Petition by the defeated trustees of the Devaswom.
Generally, Civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain all suits of a civil nature except suits of which the cognizance is expressly or impliedly,
barred (Section 9, C. P. C). The question of jurisdiction of the civil Courts has to be examined with reference to two aspects viz., the rules of
implied bar and the rule of express bar. The rule of implied bar may apply by reason of the constitution of separate tribunals under the Act.
The rule has been succinctly stated in the AIR commentaries on the CPC 5th (1951) edition page 142. Where a special tribunal or a public
body is created by or under the authority of an Act of Legislature for determining questions which are the creation of the Act, like those arising
from the administration and management of temples under the H. R. E. Act the jurisdiction of that tribunal or body is exclusive and civil Courts
cannot take cognizance of such matters.
Where in the exercise of such jurisdiction an Individual may receive an injury and a party actually receives such injury still the jurisdiction of the
Civil Courts is ousted and the method of redress is that which is pointed outlay the statute creating the jurisdiction; - ''Krishna Murthy v.
Parthasarathy'', AIR 1949 Mad 780 (V36) (C);.(Lease & Rent-Control Act);-''Mohesh Chandra v. Abdul Gafur, AIR 1946 Cal 435 (V33) (D);
(Debt Settlement Board); Dr. Brij Behari Lal Vs. Emperor, B. Bruusgaard Kiosteruds Dampskibs Aktieselskab Vs. The Secretary of State for
India in Council, (F) Mugi Subbayya Vs. Ravulacheruvu Thippa Reddi and Another, . V. Panchapakesa Aiyar Vs. The Secretary of State for
India in Council, (Madras Electoral Rules); - Ramanatha Gurukkal alias Parameswara Gurukkal Vs. V.V.R. Arunachalam Chettiar and Another, -
''Dayaram Ramdas v. Secy, of State'', AIR 1925 Sind 130 (V12) (J) (Income Tax) Jogendra Nath Banerjee Vs. Tollyganj Municipality, ;
(Municipal Act); Saibesh Chandra Sarkar Vs. Moharajadhiraj Sir Bejoy Chand Mohatap Bahadur and Others, ''Ramachandra v. Secy, of State'',
12 Mad 105 (M) (Forest Act); - ''Heddon v. Evans'', (1919) 35 TLR 642 (N) (Military Law).
So long as that prescribed tribunal acts within its jurisdiction the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred in the absence of mala fides or fraud.
Where, however, the tribunal acts ultra vires or refuses to exercise its jurisdiction or acts mala fide or arbitrarily, the civil Court has power to
interfere and set matters aright. (For an exhaustive discussion see the Full Bench decision of - AIR 1949 131 (Lahore)
Therefore, before the civil Courts can interfere, the party aggrieved must have recourse to the special procedure prescribed under the Act and
exhaust his remedies. In other words, where a mode of redressing an injury caused by the exercise of statutory powers is indicated by the statute
itself, that is the only mode of redress available to the injured person.
The ordinary jurisdiction of civil Courts is excluded in such cases: see- ""Bhaishankar v. Municipal Corporation of Bombay''. 31 Bom 604 (P); 12
Mad 105 (M) and - '' Sri Iswarananda Bharathi Swami of Ednir Mutt Vs. The Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, . The
decision in - ''Kamaraja Pandiya Naicker v. Secy, of State'', AIR 1936 Mad 269 (V23) (R) is not in conflict with this view. The decision has been
explained and distinguished in - Mugi Subbayya Vs. Ravulacheruvu Thippa Reddi and Another, . The later decision of the Privy Council in - AIR
1940 105 (Privy Council) which cited with approval the observations of Willes J. in - ''Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co., v. Hawkesford'',
(1859) 141 ER 486 (S) clearly shows that, where a statute creates a liability and prescribes the remedy in respect of it. the ordinary jurisdiction of
civil Courts'' is ousted in the matter.
In short two principles are well-recognized. As has been laid down by the Privy Council in AIR 1934 84 (Privy Council) Section 9, Civil P. C.
lays down a general rule in favour of the jurisdiction of the civil Court and the burden of proof is on the party, who maintains an exception to the
general rule.
The Madras decisions are in conformity with this Privy Council decision: -
Srimath Kidambi Jagannathacharyulu Ayyavarlu Vs. Pidipiti Kutumbarayadu and Another, see also -- ''Ali Mahomed v. Hakim'' AIR 1923 Lah
121 (V15) (FB) (V). But it should be noted that Section 9, Civil P. C. deals with the jurisdiction of the Courts and not with rights of the parties. In
the words of Trevelyan, J. in-''Sabharpat Singh v. Abdul Gaffur, 24 Cal 101 AW).
Before we can say that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is excluded it is necessary for us to find that there is an enactment barring their
jurisdiction.
Therefore, the usual rule of interpretation of statutes is that a statute encroaching on ordinary jurisdiction of a Court-must be construed strictly -
''Valli Ammal v. Madras Corporation'', AIR 1916 Mad 1119 (V3) (X); - Soosai Odayar Vs. R. Swaminatha Aiyar, Vaidyanatha Aiyar and
Others Vs. Yogambal Ammal and Others, - Subbuswami Goundan Vs. Kamakshi Ammal and Another, - Gulamhusain Lalji Sajan Vs. Clara
D''Souza, Sri Iswarananda Bharathi Swami of Ednir Mutt Vs. The Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments,
But it is equally well recognized that where infringements of legal rights are involved the Legislature may point the particular modes of redress. The
distinction has to be borne in mind between the general right to resort to civil Court and any particular form of procedure which has to be restored
to before seeking the aid of the civil Court.
Such special procedure has been prescribed for redressing wrongs under the various Special Acts before the Civil Courts can be approached.
Bearing these principles in mind if we examine the facts of this case, we find that this is the case of a person who feels aggrieved that he has been
arbitrarily dismissed and in violation of natural principles of justice and for whom the redress of his grievances is provided for under the Act. The
Act provides for a hierarchy of tribunals to hear the appeals from such dismissal orders.
It is only if those special tribunals prescribed by the Legislature for redressing these grievances fail to comply with the provisions of the Act or do
not act in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, there can be re-course to the civil Court. The mere fact that a claim for
damages has bean added in order to clothe the civil Court with jurisdiction-as this is a relief which cannot be granted by the tribunals provided
under the Act - would no enlarge the rights of the plaintiff and enable him to approach the civil Court direct.
The question of damages would only arise if the dismissal is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide and ultra vires. Therefore, the plaintiff must
first establish the illegality of the dismissal and after getting it affirmed must approach the civil Court for damages. Therefore, no amount of dexterity
in drafting the pleadings would alter or in any way enlarge the rights of parties and enable them to override the provisions of Section 9, Civil P. C.
In the result, the finding of the lower Court is set aside, this Revision Petition is allowed and the suit is found not maintainable and it is hereby
dismissed with costs throughout including the C. R. P.