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73 paragraphs · 1,546 wordsV. Kanakaraj, J.—The applicants have filed this Contempt Application seeking to punish the Respondents for violating the orders of this
Court passed in W.M.P. No. 5912 of 1994 in W.P. No. 3683 of 1994 dated 11.8.1995.
From the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition and from the arguments of the learned Counsel for the applicants what comes to be known
is that the applicants filed the Writ Petition No. 3683 of 1994 praying to issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the first Respondent to conduct the
elections to the committee membeers in respect of Hydharadhul Alia Madhar Ka Jamaith, Paramakudi Ramanathapuram District and constitute a
Committee to administer the properties of the said Jamaith; that with the said Writ Peititon, the applicants herein also filed W.M.P. No. 5912 of
1994 praying for an order of injunction restraining Respondents 2 to 4 from in any way administering the Jamath and appoint any teacher or staff to
the Madarasa, pending disposal of the Writ Petition.
The further case of the applicants is that on 3.3.1994, this Court granted interim injunction in respect of the Respondents 2 to 4 from
administering the Jamath and appointing any teacher or any staff to the Madarasa Pending disposal of the Writ Petition and the said interim
injunction order was made absolute-on 11.8.1995, that the Respondents in utter disregard to the order of this Court, started appointing teachers to
the Jamath School and a specific instance of the appointment of one Jhansi Rani to the School run by the Jamath was brought to the notice of the
applicants; that the applicants issued a legal notice to the Respondents on 5.6.1997 and 12.9.1997, but the Respondents continued to violate the
orders of this Court dated 11.8.1995 and hence issuing an ultimate notice dated 2.7.1999, the applicants have come forward to file this Contempt
Application not only against the Respondents 2 to 4 but also against the first Respondent and Respondents 5 to 6 since in spite of knowledge of
the order of this Court being violated, they did not initiate action and in fact, Respondents 5 and 6 granted approval to the appointments effected
by Respondents 2 to 4. -
In the separate counter affidavits filled by Respondents 2 to 4, they would unequivocally contend that the contempt application is not
maintainable on ground of delay and latches; that the order of injunction restraining from appointing any teacher or staff to Madarasa has nothing to
do with the Higher Elementary School, which is under different management; that there has been no wilful disobedience of the order of this Court
and would pray for the dismissal of the above Contempt Application, but, however, without prejudice to the contentions of the counter, all the
three Respondents, i.e., Respondents 2 to 4 would tender their unconditional apology to this Court in the event this Court arrives at the conclusion
that its order has been disobeyed in any manner..
During arguments, the learned Counsel for the applicants besides confirming what has been pleaded in the contempt application would also
supplement citing two judgments, the first one delivered in Sukhdev Singh v. Hon''ble CJ., S. Teja Singh and The Hon''ble Judges of the Pepsu
High Court at Patiala reported in A.I.R.1954 S.C.186 wherein dealing with the nature of jurisdiction to punish for contempt, the Apex Court held:
The High Court can deal with it summarily and adopt its own procedure. All that is necessary is that the procedure is fair and that the contemner is
made aware of the charge against him and given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself.
The other judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the applicants is one delivered in Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur
through registrar reported in Pritam Pal Vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur through Registrar, wherein dealing with power of Supreme
Court and High Court to punish contempt, the Apex Court held:
The power of the Supreme Court and the High Court being the Courts of Record as embodied under Arts. 129 and 215 respectively cannot be
restricted and , trammeled by any ordinary legislation including the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act.... The caution that has to be
observed in exercising this inherent power by summary procedure is that the power should be used sparingly that the procedure to be followed
should be fair and that the contemner should be made aware of the charge against him and given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.
On perusal of the pleadings and counter pleadings and having regard to the materials placed on record and upon hearing the arguments of the
learned Counsel for the Petitioner and the Respondents 1 to 4 as well, what comes to be known is that the applicants herein have filed this
Contempt Application seeking to punish the Respondents numbering six named in the Contempt Application, out of whom, the first Respondent is
the Wakf Board, Respondents 2 to 4 being responsible for the Management of the wakf properties and Respondents 5 and 6 being the officials of
Elementary Educational Department and responsible for violating the orders of this Court passed in W.M.P. No. 5912 of 1994 in W.P. No. 3683
of 1994, dated 11.8.1995.
A perusal of the records would show that the applicants herein filed W.P. No. 3683 of 1994 praying for a Writ of Mandamus directing the first
Respondent to conduct election to the Committee Members in respect of Hydharadhul Alia Madhar Ka Jamaith, Paramakudi, Ramanathapuram
District and constitute a Committee to administer the properties of the said Jamaith and along with the said Writ Petition. They have also filed
W.M.P. No. 5912 of 1994 praying for an order of interim injunction restraining Respondents 2 to 4 from in any way administering the Jamaith and
appoint any teacher or any staff to the Madarasa, pending disposal of the Writ Petition. It is only in this W.M.P., three orders seem to have been
passed stage by stage, the one at the time that the Writ petition came up for admission on 3.3.1994, wherein the learned single Judge had passed
an order of interim injunction for four weeks against Respondents 2 to 4 herein and the said order had come to be extended until further orders as
per the orders of this Court dated 31.3.1994 and again while disposing of the said W.P.M., yet another single Judge of this Court has made the
interim injunction absolute as per the order dated 11.8.1995 and it is the case of the applicants that these orders have been wilfully disobeyed by
the Respondents and hence are liable for punishment.
So far as Respondents 5 and 6 of the Contempt Application are concerned, since no prima facie case was made out against them, this Court
has declined even to issue notice against them in the above Contempt Application and hence notices were issued only to Respondents 2 to 4 and
these Respondents besides appearing before this Court in person also engaged their counsel to appear on then-behalf, as a result of which their
personal attendance on future hearings had been dispensed with.
In the light of the above facts and in the context of the position of law, if the subject has to be dealt with, the points that arise for consideration
are:
Whether the above Contempt Application is maintainable on account of delay? and 2. Whether the Respondents are liable for being punished
for Contempt of Court?
Points No. l and 2:
The pith and marrow of the contempt application is that by the appointment of one Jhansi Rani as the Physical Education Teacher for one of
the institutions of the Jamaith school as on 1.6.1997, the Respondents 2 to 4 have committed the contempt of the order of injunction granted by
this Court in W.M.P. No. 5912 of 1994. Though generalised allegations of many appointments being periodically effected are seen throughout the
Contempt Application, the specific instance has been brought forth only relating to the appointment of one Jhansi Rani as on 1.6.1997, which had
come to be approved at a later stage by the Respondents 5 and 6. But, both the alleged appointment, and the approval had been done in the year
1997 and this Contempt Application has been taken on file on 20.7.1999 and thus the same is hopelessly time barred within the meaning of
Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Needless to answer the second point framed supra, since at this legal ground itself, the above contempt
application becomes liable to be dimissed in limine.
No other valid or tangible instances of the Respondents 2 to 4 having committed the contempt of this Court''s order have been brought forth in
the application in a legal manner so as to be considered for the purpose of the application and its prayer as a result of which, this Court is left with
no option but to answer the prayers of the applicants in the negative.
In result, the above Contempt Application, for the above reasons assigned, is not maintainable and it fails and the same is dismissed.
However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. CH/VCS.
