Hans Raj vs State Of HP

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 24 of 2024 dated 21.04.2024 registered at Police Station Kumarsain, District Shimla, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as "NDPS").

It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the police stopped a bus bearing registration No. HP-06A-1557 at Jabli near Kingal on 21.04.2024 at 9:30 AM. The petitioner was stated to be occupying seat No.1, and he got frightened after seeing the police. The police checked the bag being carried by the petitioner in the presence of the witnesses and recovered 1 kg 229 grams of charas. The police seized the charas and arrested the petitioner. The petitioner had filed the bail petitions before this Court, which were registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1140 of 2025 and Cr.MP(M) No. 2120 of 2025, and were dismissed on 04.06.2025 and 15.09.2025, respectively. The statements of prosecution witnesses have been recorded. Two witnesses have not supported the prosecution case. The case of the prosecution is false, and there is nothing to connect the petitioner to the commission of a crime. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that may be imposed by the Court. Hence, the petition.

The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on 21.04.2024. They checked a bus bearing registration No. HP-06A-1557 at 9:30 a.m. They found the petitioner occupying seat No.1, having a backpack on his lap. He tried to conceal the backpack after seeing the police. The police became suspicious and searched the petitioner in the presence of the driver and conductor. The police recovered 1kg and 229 grams of charas. Statements of all the witnesses have been recorded, and the matter was listed on 28.04.2026 for recording the statements of defence witnesses. The petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar offence in case of his release on bail. The quantity of charas found in the possession of the petitioner was commercial. The narcotic adversely affects society, and the petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar offence in case of his release on bail. Hence, the status report.

I have heard Mr Nikhil Ghonkrokta, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State.

Mr Nikhil Ghonkrokta, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. The petitioner has been behind the bars since 21.04.2024. More than two years have elapsed since the arrest of the petitioner. The police have filed the chargesheet, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was found in possession of a commercial quantity of charas. He had approached this Court earlier, and his bail petitions were dismissed. A subsequent bail petition only lies when there is a change in the circumstances. The prosecution has already completed the evidence, and the matter is now listed for the arguments. There is no delay in the progress of the trial. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed bail petitions, which were registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1909 of 2024 and Cr.MP(M) No. 1140 of 2025 and were dismissed by this Court on 30.09.2024 and 04.06.2025. It was held in the State of Maharashtra Vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed:

"Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him.

Similar is the judgment delivered in State of M.P. v. Kajad, (2001) 7 SCC 673, wherein it was observed: -

It has further to be noted that the factum of the rejection of his earlier bail application bearing Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not been denied by the respondent. It is true that successive bail applications are permissible under the changed circumstances. But without the change in the circumstances, the second application would be deemed to be seeking a review of the earlier judgment, which is not permissible under criminal law, as has been held by this Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [(2001) 1 SCC 169: 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and various other judgments.

Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528, that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held:

"11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted."

A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed:

When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents."

This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was observed:

"30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications."

It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed:

"7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law which requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognized principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application."

Therefore, the present bail petition can only be considered on the basis of the change in the circumstances, and it is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court.

It was contended that two independent witnesses had not supported the prosecution's case, and the prosecution's version is highly doubtful. This submission will not help the petitioner. The Court had already dealt with this submission in Cr.MP(M) No. 1140 of 2025 and held that the bail Court does not have the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence, and it is within the jurisdiction of the learned Trial Court to appreciate the evidence and assess its effect. Thus, this plea will not assist the petitioner.

The status report mentions that the prosecution evidence is complete and the matter was listed before the learned Trial Court on 28.04.2026 for recording the statements of defence witnesses. A downloaded copy of the order sheet dated 28.04.2026 was filed during the hearing, in which it was recorded that the defence evidence was closed on 28.042026 and the matter is listed for arguments on 30.05.2026. Therefore, it is apparent that a trial has concluded and only the arguments are to be addressed. Therefore, the plea taken by the petitioner that there is a delay in the progress of the trial justifying the grant of bail cannot be accepted.

No other point was urged.

In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.

The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.