Har Parshad Wali and Another vs Naranjan Nath Mattoo and Others

J.N. Wazir, C.J.—This is a letters patent appeal against the order of a single Judge of this Court holding that the Defendants are not

agriculturists for the purpose of the Agriculturists' Relief Act.

The Plaintiffs brought a suit under Order 37, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, for the recovery of Rs. 3,132 on the basis of a pronote against

Hari Prashad Defendant No. 1 and Sham Lal Defendant No. 2. The Defendants pleaded that they were agriculturists and the suit ought to be tried

under the Agriculturists' Relief Act. An issue was framed by the learned Single Judge whether or not the Defendants were agriculturists and the

onus of proof was placed on the Defendants. After examining the evidence the trial Judge decided the issue against the Defendants. Against that

decision the Defendants have appealed under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.

A preliminary objection is raised on behalf of the Plaintiffs Respondents that the order appealed against was not a judgment within the meaning

of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. It is argued by the counsel for the Respondents that the order is an interlocutory order not finally disposing of

the suit or proceedings in the suit and, therefore, it was not a ""judgment"" within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.

Reliance is placed on Tuljaram v. Alagappa ILR Mad 1 (FB), in which it has been held that an order of a single Judge on the original side refusing

to frame an issue asked for is not a judgment within Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and is not appealable. Reliance is also placed on a Supreme

Court decision Asrumati Debi Vs. Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot and Others, , in which it has been held that an order for transfer of a suit made

under Clause 13 of Letters Patent Act is not a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 and, therefore, is not appealable.

The learned Counsel for the Appellants has relied upon the same judgments and has argued that the order appealed against fulfills all the tests of

a judgment laid down in the Supreme Court case and the order under appeal comes within the purview of the word ""judgment"" as used in Clause

12 of the Letters Patent.

There is no doubt a wide divergence of judicial opinion among different High Courts in regard to the true meaning and scope of the word

'judgment' as it occurs in Clause 12 of our Letters Patent which corresponds to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court, but the

Full Bench of the Madras High Court in ILR Mad 1 (FB), formulated a definition of ""judgment"" in a comprehensive manner in which Sir Arnold

White, C.J., observed as follows:

The test seems to me to be not what is the form of the adjudication, but what is its effect on the suit or proceeding in which it is made. If its effect,

whatever its form may be, and whatever may be the nature of the application on which it is made, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding so far

as the Court before which the suit or proceeding is pending is concerned, or if its effect, if it is not complied with, is to put an end to the suit or

proceeding, I think the adjudication is a Judgment within the meaning of the clause.

In Asrumati Debi Vs. Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot and Others, , their Lordships have not framed an exhaustive definition of the word

judgment"" as used in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. They have, however, indicated what the essential features of a judgment are according to

both the Calcutta and Madras High Courts. It was remarked by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as follows:

It cannot be said, therefore, that according to Sir Richard Couch every judicial pronouncement on a right or liability between the parties is to be

regarded as a 'judgment' for in that case there would be any number of judgments in the course of a suit or proceeding, each one of which could be

challenged by way of appeal. The judgment must be the final pronouncement which puts an end to the proceeding so far as the Court dealing with

it is concerned. It certainly involves the determination of some right or liability, though it may not be necessary that there must be a decision on the

merits.

This view, which is implied in the observation of Sir Richard Couch C.J., quoted above, has been really made the basis of the definition of

'judgment' by Sir Arnold White C.J., in the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court to which reference has been made: vide ILR Mad 1

(FB) (E). According to White C.J., to find out whether an order is a 'judgment' or not, we have to look to its effect upon the particular suit or

proceeding in which it is made. If its effect is to determine the suit or proceeding, the decision would be a 'judgment' but not otherwise.

As this definition covers not only decisions in suit or actions but 'orders' in other proceedings as well which start with applications, it may be said

that any final order passed on an application in the course of a suit, e.g., granting or refusing a party's prayer for adjournment of a suit or for

examination of a witness would also come within the definition. This seems to be the reason why the learned Chief Justice qualifies the general

proposition laid down above by stating that an adjudication on an application, which is nothing more than a step towards obtaining a final

adjudication in the suit is not a judgment within the meaning of Letters Patent.

In Mansata Film Distributors Vs. Sorab Merwanji Modi, , it is held as follows:

It is well settled that interlocutory orders can also be judgments and it is not necessary that a Court should pass a final decree or a final order that

an appeal should lie. Now, when you have an interlocutory order which is purely procedural in character, or, as it has been said, which is nothing

more than a step towards obtaining a final adjudication in the suit then undoubtedly such an order would not constitute a judgment within the

meaning of Clause 15.

But if an interlocutory order determines the right of a party even 'pro tanto' then the party whose right has been affected would have the right to

appeal against that order.

Relying upon these principles it is clear that an order passed by the trial Judge finally adjudicating upon the status of a party, whether he is an

agriculturist or not, which substantially affects the jurisdiction of the Court would, in our opinion, be a judgment within the meaning of Clause 12 or

the Letters Patent.

The preliminary objection raised by the Plaintiff Respondent has no force and is overruled.

Now the question for determination is whether or not the Defendants are agriculturists.

As regards Sham Lal there is evidence to show that he is not an agriculturist for the purpose of Agriculturists' Relief Act and the learned

Counsel for the Appellant has not argued his case. (After discussing the evidence as regards Hari Parsaad Defendant in Paras 12-15, the judgment

concluded:)

The Defendant Appellant has not proved satisfactorily that he is an agriculturist for the purpose of the Agriculturists' Relief Act and we do not

find any good ground to interfere in this appeal with the order passed by the trial Judge. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed; but the parties are left

to bear their own costs in this Court.

K.V. Gopalakrishnan Nair, J.

I agree.